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ABSTRACT
By examining the specific policy and administrative instruments
that successful East Asian countries used to carry out their outward-
looking development strategies, this paper attempts to draw practical
lessons for other developing countries, especially those at an earlier
stage of developing their export capabilities. Focusing more on useful
specifics than on broad generalities, the paper provides a foundation from
which specific guidelines needed for policy and administrative reforms and
institution building can be derived.
The discussion presented in this paper centers around two key
concepts: "neutral status" and "extended neutral status." Neutral status
enables exporters to compete with foreign competitors in world markets on
an equal footing in regard to undistorted markets and policies. Extended
neutral status enables equal incentives between export and import substitu-
tion firms. Conventional export policy and administrative instruments that
are designed to achieve neutral or extended neutral status discussed in the
paper include:
(1) those for maintaining a realistic exchange rate;
(2) those for achieving a free trade regime for exporters;
(3) those for assuring automatic access to export financing;
(4) those for keeping primary input prices competitive;
(5) those for compensatory export incentives.
Even though first-best policy instruments are emphasized, circumstances
under which the need arises to adopt second-best policy instruments as
transitional measures are carefully analyzed.
The paper also discusses the unconventional policy instruments
for export development and stresses the critical contributions of effective
institutional mechanisms to the export successes in the East Asian
countries--institutional mechanisms that have served as catalysts in:
(i) implementing conventional export policies effectively;
(ii) developing the ability and desire of producers and traders to
respond aggressively to opportunities in the world market.
CONDENSE
En examinant les divers instruments administratifs et de
politique generale que certains pays d'Extreme-Orient en expansion ont
utilis6s pour mettre en oeuvre leurs strat6gies du developpement orient6es
vers l'exterieur, le present document tente de tirer des enseignements
pratiques valables pour d'autres pays en d6veloppement, particulierement
ceux qui n'en sont pas encore au meme stade du point de vue du develop-
pement de leurs capacites d'exportation. On pourra a partir de ce
document - qui expose des faits precis plutot que des generalit6s -
definir les directives specifiques necessaires pour proceder a des refor-
mes administratives et de politique generale ainsi qu'au renforcement des
institutions.
Le d6bat expose dans le present document tourne autour de deux
concepts fondamentaux : l'"'tat neutre" et l"'etat neutre e1argi". Le
premier permet aux exportateurs de lutter sur un pied d'6galite avec leurs
concurrents etrangers sur les marches mondiaux en l'absence de distorsions
au niveau des marches et des politiques suivies. Le second fournit des
stimulants egaux aux societ6s exportatrices et a celles dont la production
se substitue aux importations. Les instruments classiques au niveau de la
politique d'exportation et des dispositions administratives en la matiere
qui sont destines a assurer le statut de neutralite ou le statut de
neutralite 6largi dont il est question dans le document comprennent
1) les instruments qui visent a maintenir un taux de change
realiste;
2) les instruments qui assurent un regime de libre change aux
exportateurs;
3) les instruments qui assurent un acces automatique au financement
des exportations;
4) les instruments qui permettent aux prix des intrants primaires
de rester competitifs;
5) les instruments qui offrent des incitations compensatoires a
1'exportation.
Bien que l'accent soit mis sur les instruments de politique generale
optimaux du premier ordre, les circonstances dans lesquelles il est
indispensable d'adopter provisoirement des instruments de politique
generale optimaux de second ordre sont soigneusement analysees.
Le document 6tudie egalement les instruments de politique g6n6-
rale non classiques visant a assurer le developpement des exportations et
souligne combien des mecanismes institutionnels efficaces contribuent aux
succes des pays d'Extreme-Orient en matiere.d'exportations, mecanismes qui
ont joue un role de catalyseur
i) en assurant la mise en oeuvre efficace de politiques d'expor-
tation de type classique;
Ii) en donnant aux producteurs et aux operateurs le d6sir et les
moyens de profiter de facon dynamique des d6bouch6s offerts par
le marche mondial.
EXTRACTO
-Al examinar los instrumentos especificos de politica y adminis-
traci6n usados por los paises de Asia Oriental que han tenido exito con
las exportaciones para llevar a cabo sus estrategias de orientaci6n
externa, en este documento se intenta extraer ensenianzas de valor practico
para otras naciones en desarrollo, especialmente para las que estan en una
etapa inicial de expansi6n de su capacidad exportadora. El documento, que
se concentra mAs en aspectos concretos pertinentes que en grandes genera-
lidades, proporciona una informaci6n bAsica de la que pueden derivarse los
lineamientos especificos necesarios para la reforma de las politicas y la
administraci6n y para el desarrollo institucional.
El examen presentado en este documento gira en torno a dos con-
ceptos claves: el "estado neutral" y el "estado neutral ampliado". El
estado neutral permite que los exportadores nacionales compitan con los
extranjeros en los mercados mundiales en un pie de igualdad en lo que
respecta a mercados y politicas libres de distorsiones. El estado neutral
ampliado hace posible la igualdad de incentivos para los exportadores y
para las empresas de sustituci6n de importaciones. En el documento se
examinan los instrumentos corrientes de politica y administraci6n conce-
bidos para lograr un estado neutral o un estado neutral ampliado, es
decir, los necesarios para:
1) Mantener un tipo de cambio realista;
2) Lograr un regimen de libre comercio para los exportadores;
3) Asegurar un acceso automatico al credito de exportaci6n;
- 2 -
4) Mantener precios competitivos para los insumos primarios;
-5--)- Ofrecer incentivos de exportaci6n compensatorios.
Aunque se hace hincapi6 en los instrumentos de politica 6ptimos, se
analizan cuidadosamente las circunstancias en que surge la necesidad de
adoptar como medida de transici6n los que ocupan el segundo lugar.
En el documento se examinan tambien los instrumentos de politica
poco corrientes para el fomento de las exportaciones y se recalca el
caracter critico de las contribuciones que los mecanismos institucionales
eficaces han aportado al 6xito de los paises de Asia Oriental en sus
exportaciones. Esos mecanismos institucionales, han actuado como elemen-
tos catalizadores para:
i) Aplicar eficazmente las politicas corrientes de exportaci6n, y
ii) Desarrollar la capacidad y el interes de los productores y los
comerciantes para reaccionar con actitud emprendedora ante las
oportunidades del mercado mundial.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent balance of payments crises in many developing
countries have led to increased attention to export promotion efforts. In
pursuing these efforts, countries in earlier stages of export development
are interested in learning how a number of East Asia's developing countries
have achieved such remarkable success in expanding their exports. The
purpose of this paper is to explore the detailed instruments of export
policy and administration in the successful East Asian countries, drawing
practical lessons that might be applicable--or at least adaptable--in other
countries.
A search for lessons from the East Asian experience must begin
with recognition of two critical considerations: First, export promotion
has recently been undertaken by many developing countries largely to
satisfy urgent needs for earning foreign exchanges. But the export success
in the East Asian countries has resulted from successful trade and
industrial strategies that stress specialization based on comparative
advantages, rather than from a simple desire to earn foreign exchanges.
Second, while much has been written about the success stories of the East
Asian countries, the broad generalities describing these successes are of
little practical use unless supplemented with explanations of specific
policies and institutions that provided the foundation for export growth at
early stages of export development. Therefore, in articulating the lessons
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of the East Asian experience in export policy and administration, this
paper stresses these considerations: (a) export policy within the context
of a rational development strategy and (b) specific policy tools and public
and private institutions. These are discussed further below.
Because the primary objective of this undertaking is to discover
and relate specific means by which the successful East Asian countries
accomplished their export development and growth, this is inevitably quite
lengthy and detailed. Readers who are interested in an introduction to the
significant points presented here, unaccompanied by the detailed
examination included in this paper, are referred to a separate paper
entitled, "A Framework for Export Policy and Administration: Lessons From
the East Asian Experience."
The countries examined in drawing lessons from the East Asian
success stories are Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea. To illustrate some of
the practical issues that developing economies face as they attempt to
rationalize their policies and build export capabilities, some of the
ongoing developments in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia are
sketched. This paper is not a comparative analysis of these six East Asian
countries. Rather, it attempts to build an analytic framework, to the
extent possible, based on the East Asian experience. The basic approach
taken, however, is one that focuses on describing the East Asian experience
rather than prescribing policies to be pursued by other developing
countries.
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Information on Korea has been based largely on materials
collected through the author's involvement in the World Bank research
project, Export Incentives in Developing Countries. Information on
Singapore and Hong Kong was collected through the author's brief visits to
these countries during May 22-30, 1983. Information on Indonesia and the
Philippines has been based on materials collected through the author's
participation in several operational missions to these countries during
1982-83. Information on Malaysia is mainly based on materials collected
during the author's participation in a manufacturing sector mission in
1980.
(a) Export and Development Strategy
A rational development strategy of a developing country strives
for production specialization in both domestic and export markets (i.e.,
import substitution and exports) where the country has comparative advan-
tages, while imports are not discouraged where the country has comparative
disadvantages. Our discussion of export policy and administration focuses
on the export side within the context of such a rational development
strategy. As such, import substitution and imports are dealt with only
implicitly, not because they are not important in a rational development
strategy, but because the focus of this undertaking is on the specifics of
export policy and administration. As our discussion of the export side
unfolds, the equal regard for the importance of import substitution and
imports will be apparent.
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As used in this paper, "exports" include processing,
manufacturing, and sales activities for all commodities that generate
export value added. This definition therefore encompasses the activities
of indirect as well as direct exporters. Excluded from the term *exports"
are activities involved in the production of primary goods that are
exported.
A look at the role of export in the development strategies of the
successful East Asian countries can further define the context of our
discussion. The development strategies in these countries started with an
export policy that focused on removing disadvantages vis-a-vis foreign
competitors in world markets. This export policy has played the dual role
of: (i) encouraging industrial efficiency by exploiting the tremendous
externality of exporting and competing in world markets and (ii) laying the
groundwork for putting domestic competitors in the domestic market on an
equal footing with exporters and foreign competitors, thereby preventing
the development of inefficient import substitution. This paper summrizes
the specific tools used for such strategies.
(b) Specific Policy Tools and Institutions
To dig beneath broad generalities and provide practical guidance
for developing countries at the early stage of export development, several
factors that are implicit in export development efforts must be recog-
nized. First, the market fragmentation, externalities, uncertainties, and
lack of institutional development that are characteristic of most
developing countries dictate the use of transitional policies when
first-best policies are not feasible. Second, the lessons from successful
developing countries would be of little use if we failed to consider the
institutional requirements needed to implement policies. Finally, because
we are concerned with the behavior to the business firm, any consideration
of export incentives that is not based on disaggregation at the firm level
will be misleading. Therefore, our discussion of the lessons of the
successful East Asian countries in export policy and administration
emphasizes (i) institutional development, (ii) specific transitional policy
tools, and (iii) incentives at the firm level. These factors are discussed
in Chapter I.
(c) Structure of the Paper
Chapter 1 defines neutral status and extended neutral status,
discusses the above three key elements in achieving neutral status, intro-
duces principles of administrative arrangements for neutral status, and
explains methods of payment for exports and imports. Chapters 2 through 6
deal with the specific policies and administrative arrangements necessary
to achieve neutral status for export activities: maintaining a realistic
exchange rate, achieving a free trade regime for exporters, assuring
automatic access to export financing, keeping primary input prices competi-
tive, and implementing compensatory export incentives to establish neutral
status. Chapter 7 discusses issues related to extended neutral status.
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Chapter 8 focuses on how public and private institutional mechanisms can be
designed to achieve a synergistic partnership between government and busi-
ness in implementing effective export policies and competing successfully
in world markets. Chapter 9 summarizes the major findings and discusses
their implications for other developing countries.
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CHAPTER I
NEUTRAL STATUS--ITS MEANING, KEY ELEMENTS, AND RELATED ISSUES
Because export policy and administration in developing countries
are best analyzed within the context of an overall development strategy,
the discussion presented in this paper centers around two key concepts:
"neutral status" and "extended neutral status." This chapter defines these
concepts and, based on the experiences of the successful East Asian
countries, discusses the key elements and principles of administrative
arrangements for achieving neutral status. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of methods of payment for exports and imports, which sets the
stage for introducing administrative arrangements and institutional factors
that have proven critical for export success.
(a) Definitions of Neutral Status and Extended Neutral Status
A country cannot exploit its comparative advantages in the world
market through specialization if it is not able to compete with other
countries on an equal footing in regard to undistorted markets and
policies. For example, if a tariff on an input required for the production
of a potential export results in higher production costs for a dometic
producer than for a similar foreign producer who operates under free trade,
the domestic producer is not on an equal footing. In this case, the
exporter can achieve equal footing with his foreign competitors if imports
used for export production are tariff free.
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We therefore will define neutral status as the set of
arrangements that will enable exporters to compete with foreign competitors
in world markets on an equal footing in regard to undistorted markets and
policies. These competitors operate under (i) a flexible and realistic
exchange rate, (ii) free trade in inputs and outputs, (iii) competitive
financial and money markets, (iv) competitive primary input markets, and
(v) nondiscriminatory domestic taxes. Neutral status for export activities
in a developing country can be achieved by providing a combination of these
five elements or equivalent compensating incentives in all activities that
generate export value added.
If a country provides positive protection for import substitution
activities, achieving neutral status for export activities puts potential
exporters on an equal footing with world market competitors in regard to
undistorted markets and policies, but does not provide incentives
equivalent to those for import substitution activities. With high
effective protection for import substitution, anti-export bias in the
domestic economy is reduced, but not eliminated, by putting exporters on an
equal footing with foreign competitors in regard to undistorted markets and
policies. In the example above, neutral status achieved by duty-free
import of inputs for export production that results in a zero effective
protection rate provides an incentive level lower than that for an import
substitution firm whose effective protection rate is, say, 50 percent.
Anti-export bias can be eliminated by "extending" neutral status
for export activities such that export is not discouraged relative to
-9-
import substitution. We will define extended neutral status as a situation
in which the level of export incentives is as high as the level of
incentives for import substitution activities. If--in addition to neutral
status provided by duty-free imports used for export production--the
exporter in the example above is granted tax incentives of 50 percent of
world market value added, then the exporter would enjoy extended neutrality
with respect to the import substitution firm that enjoys an effective
protection rate of 50 percent. These firms, then, would have equal
incentives for import substitution and for export.
(b) Key Elements in Achieving Neutral Status
Three major empirical studies of the effects of foreign trade
regimes on the economic growth of developing countries (World Bank: Balassa
1971, 1982; OECD: Little, Scitovsky, and Scott 1970; NBER: Bhagwati 1978
and Krueger 1978) more or less reach the same conclusion: economies with
outward-looking strategies have had better export performance and better
economic growth than economies with inward-looking strategies. Three
hypotheses have been suggested to explain this conclusion: (i) an
incentive neutrality hypothesis, (b) an allocative- and X-inefficiency
hypothesis, and (iii) a technology and externality hypothesis. The
meanings of these hypotheses are given below in relevant parts of the
paper. The relative importance of these hypotheses has not been
empirically tested (Krueger 1980). One thing, however, appears clear.
These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and therefore all of them may
be helpful in explaining the performance of most developing economies.
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As we shall see throughout this paper, the policies and
administrative arrangements that have achieved neutral status, and
sometimes extended neutral status, for export activities at the firm and
product level have been the cornerstone of the export promotion systems of
the successful East Asian countries. Three elements--incentives at the
firm level, transititional policies, and institutional development--have
been the key factors in achieving this. These are discussed below.
Incentives at the Firm Level: The first of the three hypotheses
mentioned above, the incentive neutrality hypothesis, is based on empirical
evidence that in developing countries with outward-looking strategies,
aggregate (i.e., economy-wide or average) effective incentives for exports
have come close to matching aggregate effective incentives for import
substitution (see Chapter VII). In other words, extended neutrality at the
aggregate level is the basis of the incentive neutrality hypothesis. But
despite this empirical evidence, the critical importance of the internal
structure of such extended neutrality and the detailed administrative
apparatus needed to achieve extended neutrality at the firm or product
level has not received the attention it deserves. The major reason for
this may be that the studies mentioned earlier were devoted to analyzing
aggregate or sectoral incentives rather than incentives at the firm or
product level. A recent study that focuses on institutional and
administrative arrangements at the firm and product level (Rhee and others,
forthcoming) found that in some developing economies that have succeeded in
establishing outward-looking strategies, true neutral status for export
activities at the product and firm level has been the essential
precondition for extended neutrality.
This paper argues that in the East Asian developing economies
that have established outward-looking strategies, neutral status for export
activities at the product and firm level has been an essential precondition
for extended neutrality. Referring again to the example above, we
presented the achievement of neutral status (by assuring duty-free status
for all imports used in export production) as a precondition for providing
extended neutral status (through tax incentives). The successful East
Asian countries adopted this course. Hypothetically, however, we can
envision another course, which could achieve aggregate extended neutral
status even though neutral status at the firm level has not been achieved.
This could be accomplished, say, by providing huge cash grants to a select
number of exporters, while no duty-free imports of inputs are allowed to
all exporters. The selected exporters would then enjoy highly positive
effective incentives, while other exporters would suffer a negative
effective incentives. Aggregate figures, however, would indicate that
firms have achieved extended neutrality.
Transitional Policies: As mentioned above, developing countries
at early stages of export development compete in the world market with
countries that have provided these key ingredients of an efficient economy:
(i) a flexible equilibrium exchange rate, (ii) free trade in inputs and
outputs, (iii) competitive financial markets, (iv) competitive primary
input markets, and (v) nondiscriminatory domestic taxes. The first step
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toward achieving an efficient economy, then (as well as the first step in
export development), is to come as close as possible to replicating the
conditions created by these key ingredients, at least with respect to all
activities that generate export value added. Such a policy may be con-
sidered either still distortive or necessarily transitional, depending on
one's perception.
This raises questions, however, about what constitutes distortive
policy measures in developing economies--which are characterized by market
fragmentation, externalities, uncertainties, and lack of institutional
development--as opposed to developed economies (Bruno 1981). Therefore,
circumstances that dictate a set of transitional policies 1/ may have to
be understood, even though the ultimate goal may be to establish first-best
policies (Bruno 1981, McKinnon 1980). The development process is a transi-
tional one moving from one stationary state to another, and transitional
policies deal with such a transitional process. This paper concerns itself
not only with the proper mix of second-best policy tools but also the
appropriate time for switching from second-best to first-best policies.
2 /
1/ A transitional policy is characterized as a second-best policy. Such a
policy is suitable at a certain stage for a developing country, even
though it may not be the best policy for a developed country. A
first-best policy is defined as a policy suitable for a developed
country.
2/ Recently, increasing attention has been given to the phasing and
sequencing of liberalizations in a set of interrelated markets (such as
foreign exchange, financial, and commodity markets). See Krueger
(1983b), Edwards (1983).
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Adoption of several second-best policies--with respect to all
activities that generate export value added--has been critical to the
achievement of neutrality for some successful East Asian developing
countries during transitional periods. These second-best policies are:
(i) Guaranteeing a realistic exchange rate (including compensation
for overvaluation) for exporters. This is a minimum condition
for competing in world markets, and is equivalent to maintaining
an equilibrium exchange rate for exporters.
(ii) Providing free trade status for export production activities.
This is not only a precondition for competing in world markets on
the basis of a country's comparative advantage, but also could be
a first step toward liberalizing domestic saies of imports.
(iii) Guaranteeing automatic access to working capital at uniform
interest rates which are not higher than the neutral rate for all
export production and sales activities. This is not only a
minimum condition for competing in world markets but also amounts
to creating a situation that comes close to the situation
provided by competitive financial markets.
(iv) Guaranteeing that the actual prices of inputs for export
activities are equal to shadow prices. This creates a situation
that comes close to a situation of competitive primary input
markets.
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(v) Using differential compensatory tax incentives to achieve the
preceding four policies. This amounts to maintaining non-
discriminatory domestic taxes.
Since the adQption of these policies means (i) that a realistic
exchange rate will be maintained for exporters even if the official
exchange rate is overvalued, (ii) that free trade status for export activi-
ties will be guaranteed even if imports for domestic sales are subject to
restrictions, (iii) that access to export financing will be assured even if
other sectors of the economy are subject to credit rationing, (iv) that
shadow prices for primary inputs will be guaranteed notwithstanding the
existence of noncompetitive primary input markets, and (v) that non-
discriminatory taxes will be maintained by using tax instruments as compen-
satory export incentive tools, it is clearly not simple to achieve neutral
status. It is therefore necessary to create efficient administrative
arrangements that are designed to guarantee neutral status. Section (c) of
this Chapter focuses on the key elements of such administrative arrange-
ments.
Institutional Development: Adoption of second-best transitional
policies in the developing East Asian economies (when first-best policies
were not possible) has required innovation and diligence by government.
Experience shows that it is far from simple to achieve neutral status, and
any theory about markets and government policies which assumes that it is
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possible to ignore the critical importance of institutions and institu-
tional development is unrealistic and impractical.3 / Analytic results
based on a general characterization of policy issues in terms of
"liberalization" within the abstract frameworks of "free markets" and
government intervention" have little value unless they are also based on a
careful evaluation of the underlying institutional background. The reason
is that neither market operations nor government policies can be imple-
mented without proper institutional development. Such institutional devel-
opment, in turn, requires not only deliberate efforts (both private and
public) but also considerable time. A financial market, for example, can
hardly exist unless the appropriate financial institutions also exist;
financial policies can hardly be implemented unless government as well as
private financial instruments and institutions have been developed. In
many instances, therefore, conclusions about how to improve export policies
will necessarily imply answering interdependent questions: "How is it
possible to develop markets?", "How is it possible to improve government
policies?", and "What kinds of institutional developments are necessary?"
3/ In his Nobel lecture, Herbert Simon (1979) refuted the argument that
the unrealism of some of the microeconomic assumptions underlying
classical or neoclassical theory on the operations of markets is
harmless. He reinterpreted the rule known as Occam's razor to mean
that theory should make no more assumptions than necessary to account
for observed phenomena, and not to mean merely the achievement of a
theoretical simplicity.
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(c) Principles of Administrative Arrangements
Table 1 provides an overview of an export incentive system
characteristic of a successful East Asian developing country. While laws
and regulations administered by government and private agencies constitute
the formal administrative machinery, we deal here mainly with the key
principles of an export incentive system.
Those principles are (a) automaticity; (b) equal treatment of all
activities that generate export value added; (c) prevention of abuse; and
(d) administrative convenience.
Automaticity: Unless discretionary or case-by-case rulings are
prohibited--in other words, unless neutral status is granted automatically
and immediately--would-be exporters may not be willing to brave the ensuing
administrative uncertainty, and would-be entrepreneurs may be unable or
unwilling to respond to incentives granted by the government to stimulate
exports. Speed is the name of the game in international trade. Without
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TABLE 1
A Typical Export Incentive System
Export Incentives Laws and Regulations Administering Agencies
1. Realistic Exchange Rates 0 Foreign Exchange Laws 0 Ministry of Finance
° Central Bank
2. Free Trade Regime for. 0International Trade Law 0 Ministry of Trade
Exporters 0 Tariff Law and Industry
o Duty Drawback Law 0 Commercial Banks
o Free Trade Zone Law
3. Automatic Access to 0 Banking Regulations 0 Central Bank
Export Financing °EX-IM Bank Law 0 Commercial Banks
° Export Credit Insurance Law 0 Development Banks
° EX-IM Bank
o Export Credit
Insurance Agency
4. Competitive Prices of °Labor Law ° Ministry of Labor
Primary Inputs ° Wage Council
5. Compensatory Export 0 Tax Laws 0 Ministry of Finance
Incentives 0 Banking Regulations. 0 Central Bank
o Export Estate Development Law 0 Conmercial Banks
o Technical Assistance 0 Ministry of Trade
Regulations and Industry
o Ministry of
Technology
6. Institutional Support 0 Export Association Law 0 Ministry of Trade
0 Export Inspection Law and Industry
0 Trade Development Decree 0 Export Associations
° Export-Inspection
Agency
0 Trade Development
Council
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it, sales opportunities in world markets (and domestic production
opportunities as well) will be lost.
Equal Treatment of all activities that generate export value
added4 /: This means several things:
o Equal treatment of exports sold through different
methods of payment, such as letters of credit (L/Cs),
sight or time drafts, and or other methods.
o Equal treatment of both direct and indirect
exports--that is, equal treatment of all processes
that generate value added for export.
o Equal treatment of both imported and domestically
produced inputs.
o Equal treatment of all manufacturing, processing, and
sales activities pertaining to manufacturing,
agricultural, or fishery products.
o Equal treatment of foreign exchange, whether earned
through construction or service contracts.
4/ Activities for which optimum export taxes are justified--that is,
activities for the production of primary export goods--should be
treated separately.
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Prevention of abuse: Rules are strictly applied to minimize
abuses of the incentive system.
Administrative convenience: Administrative costs and feasibility
are important factors in determining the most suitable administrative
arrangements. To keep administrative costs down and increasing adminis-
trative efficiency, many administrative tasks can be delegated, say, to
commercial banks or export associations. The administrative and banking
procedures necessary to import intermediate inputs, for example, could be
integrated with those for making export loans.
(d) Methods of Payment for Exports and Imports
Because the selection of particular instruments for export and
import policy and administration is closely related to methods of payment,
we will examine here the methods used to pay for exports. Similar methods
are used to pay for imports. This discussion will serve as a background
for analyses throughout the paper that hinge in important ways on these
methods of payment.
Sales of export commodities are generally concluded on the basis
of an export letter of credit (L/C), an export draft, a cash deposit prior
to full payment, cash against document (CAD), consignment, an open account,
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or some other method. Of these, the first two are the most commonly used
in international trade.5/
An export L/C 6/.is a document created'by a bank, acting on
behalf of the importer, that declares to the exporter that the bank will
pay a draft drawn on it if the exporter submits, together with the draft,
such documents as invoices, insurance certification, or negotiable bills of
lading (B/L).7/ An export draft based on a L/C is an order written by an
exporter (the seller) ordering an importer (the buyer) or his agent to pay
a specific amount of money at a specified time. Except for a cash payment
in advance, an export L/C gives the exporter the greatest amount of
protection. The L/C calls for sight or time drafts to be drawn on the bank
that opens (or confirms) the L/C. A sight draft is payable immediately
upon being presented to the drawee (that is, the importer's bank). A time
draft (also called a usance draft) allows a delay in payment. It is
presented to the drawee, who accepts it and thus acknowledges in writing
his obligation to pay the sum indicated on the face of the draft. Such a
draft then becomes an acceptance. The maturity of the draft, referred to
as its usance, usually is 90 days. A "red clause" L/C is similar to a
normal L/C except that it contains a clause (originally typed in red)
authorizing the negotiating bank to make cash advances to the exporter even
if the L/C is not accompanied by invoices, bills of lading, or other proof
of sale.
5/ For further explanation of these terms, see any standard textbook on
international business finance: for example, Eiteman and Stonehill
(1973).
6/ Unless specified otherwise, L/C means an irrevocable L/C.
7/ There are documentary L/Cs with deferred payment that do not require
beneficiary's drafts.
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Exporters may agree to payment by a draft without an L/C if the
protection afforded by an L/C is not needed or if an exporter is willing to
take such a risk. An export draft is an unconditional order drawn by the
exporter on the importer instructing him to pay the amount of the draft,
either on presentation (a sight draft) or at an agreed future date (a time
draft). A sight draft is often called a document against payment (D/P)
draft; a time draft is often called a document against acceptance (D/A)
draft.
Under a cash against document (CAD) agreement, an exporter
receives payment by presenting shipping documents to the importer's agent
or bank in the exporter's country.
Under a consignment sale, an exporter retains title to the
exported goods and agrees that payment will not be required until the goods
have been sold in the country of import. Sales on an open account are
usually settled on the basis of periodic statements of account. When sales
of exports are based on a CAD, consignment, or open account, the seller is
not protected against nonpayment. Therefore, CAD or consignment sales are
usually limited to transactions where the buyer 6r consignee is a proven
and trusted agent. Open account sales are generally restricted to cases
where there is an inter-company relationship between seller and buyer and
there are no exchange restrictions to complicate settlement. Generally,
the financing on both consignment and open account sales is arranged by the
exporter.
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Empirical Evidence on Methods of Payment: Statistics on the
degree to which these different methods of payment are used in developing
countries would be useful. Unfortunately, however, virtually all the
published trade data on both developed and developing economies omits such
information, except for some data provided by the Bank of Korea. On the
basis of the payment methods used in Korean trade, we can draw some
inferences about the relative importance of the various methods of
payments. Such information is critical in assessing the need for
government policies to achieve equal treatment for all activities earning
foreign exchange, in particular the needs for different types of export
financing, export credit insurance, and finance guarantees.
Table 1 of Annex I shows Korean exports by type of payment for
the period 1968-80; Tables 4 and 5 of Annex I show Korean imports by type
of payment for the periods 1968-72 and 1975-80. An attempt to obtain
comparable data for U.S. trade failed, but data on U.S. exports for one
quarter in 1975, based on a sample survey of exporters, were obtained
(Table 2 of Annex 1). These data, however, only show the relative shares
of immediate cash and deferred payment trade.
During the years from 1968 to 1980, sight drafts drawn under L/Cs
were the basis of 77 to 91 percent of sales of Korean exports. Only 3 to 7
percent were based on time drafts drawn under L/Cs, and only 1 to 6 percent
were based on red clause L/Cs. Only 0.1 to 10 percent of Korean exports
during the same period were based on D/P and D/A drafts (Table 1 of Annex
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While 36 percent of U.S. exports in 1975 were sold on the basis
of deferred payment, Korean exports sold on the same basis were less than
11 percent. This comparison indicates the greater importance of
postshipment export financing and export credit insurance for the U.S.
exports. In Korea, as will become clear below, preshipment financing is of
greater importance.
As in the case of exports, information on the relative importance
of different methods of paying for imports would also be valuable, since it
would then be possible to assess the need to finance imports used in the
production of exports. About one-third of Korea's total import bills
during the years from 1968 to 1980 were for the purchase of inputs used for
export production. While imports of grain and fuel for domestic
consumption were mainly based on time drafts, imports of raw materials and
intermediate inputs for export production were based mainly on sight drafts
(Tables 4 and 5 of Annex I). Because only a minor part of the imports used
in export production has been purchased on credit terms, the financing of
imports used in export production has been an important part of Korea's
preshipment export financing system.
Information on the different methods of paying for exports and
imports is also one of the important elements in designing and implementing
administrative arrangements for imports and exports. Such factors as
importers' and exporters' preferences, or importing and exporting
countries' trade restrictions and financing availability, may influence the
payment methods used in international trade. The most important
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determinants of payment methods, however, will be the characteristics of
the commodities traded. Therefore, as the exports of a developing economy
change, so will the relative importance of the different payment methods.
This can be seen in the estimates of the shares of Korea's exports based on
the different methods of payment shown in Table 3 of Annex I. As per
capita exports (and heavy industry exports)8 / increased, while the shares
of exports based on L/Cs decreased, the shares of exports based on drafts
without L/Cs and the shares of exports based on deferred payment both
increased. It should also be noted, however, that the share of exports
based on sight drafts drawn under L/Cs has been dominant, as shown in Table
1 of Annex I. This does not, of course, imply that a dollar earned from
exports through the other payment methods is less important than a dollar
earned from exports based on sight drafts drawn under L/Cs. The principle
of equal treatment of all activity earning foreign exchange requires equal
treatment of all export sales, regardless of payment method.
(e) Conclusions
The experiences of the successful East Asian countries indicate
that only by assuring neutral status at the individual product and firm
level for all activities that generate export value added can a country
exploit its comparative advantages in the world market through
specialization. Neutral status has been achieved by providing a
combination of the five following elements or equivalent compensating
incentives: (i) flexible and realistic exchange rates, (ii) free trade in
8/ More than 90 percent of Korea's exports in 1980 were manufactured
goods.
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inputs and outputs, (iii) competitive money and financial markets,
(iv) competitive primary input markets, and (v) nondiscriminatory domestic
taxes.
Neutral status, however, does not provide incentives equivalent
to those for import substitution activities when an economy provides high
effective protection for import substitution in order to protect infant
industries. Anti-export bias created in such a situation can be eliminated
through extended neutral status, which provides a level of export
incentives as high as the level of incentives for import substitution
activities.
The policies and administrative arrangements that have achieved
neutral status, and sometimes extended neutral status, for export
activities at the firm and product level have been the cornerstone of the
export promotion systems of the successful East Asian countries. Three
elements have been key factors in achieving this: (i) incentives at the
firm level--which have been essential preconditions for extended
neutrality; (ii) transitional policies--which have provided second-best
measures with respect to all activities that generate export value added
until first-best measures are possible; and (iii) institutional
development--which has been critical for implementation of policies
designed to achieve neutral status at the firm and product level.
The key principles of administrative arrangements that have
characterized export incentive systems in the successful East Asian
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countries are (i) automaticity, (ii) equal treatment of all activities that
generate export value added, (iii) prevention of abuse, and (iv) adminis-
trative convenience. Finally, information on methods of payment for
exports and imports is one of the important elements in designing and
implementing administrative arrangements for imports and exports.
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CHAPTER II
MAINTAINING A REALISTIC EXCHANGE RATE
The most important and central variable affecting the returns
exporters realize in local currency for the foreign exchange they earn
through export value added is exchange rate. The exchange rate is most
important to exporters, and our discussion focuses on its incentive
aspects. However, macroeconomic aspects can hardly be neglected because
exchange rates are also key macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, the
exchange rate policy of a country cannot be separated from its regime for
managing foreign exchange. Because the approach of a developing country to
foreign exchange management depends on its particular circumstances, this
chapter discusses such factors as stages of financial institution
development and trade regimes.
(a) Overview
Fixed parities in exchange rates among the currencies of the
Western industrial countries were central to the Bretton Woods Agreement of
1945, which was the basis of the international monetary system prevailing
after the Second World War. Even though the postwar system was envisaged
as one of "fixed but adjustable" exchange rates, it evolved increasingly as
a fixed exchange rate system with periodic large-scale devaluations. Then,
in the late 1960's, a number of factors combined to disrupt the system.
These included the inability of many countries to make the adjustments
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needed to eliminate their external imbalances under the fixed exchange rate
system, declining confidence in the dollar as U.S. inflation worsened, and
the increasingly integrated character of the world capital market. In 1971
the US terminated conversion of the dollar into gold, and by 1973 the fixed
exchange rate system had disintegrated into a system of floating exchange
rates in the industrial economies.
Since then, exchange rates have fluctuated in a much more
unstable manner than was anticipated by the proponents of a flexi6le rate
system. Owing to this volatility, many observers have expressed increasing
concern about the effectiveness of the present system (Witteveen 1983,
McKinnon 1983a). In turn, exchange rate theory as applied to Western
industrial economies has gradually switched from a theory of commercial
policy (or balance of payments) to monetary theory (Krueger 1983a). Since
exchange rate value in a floating exchange rate system is determined by
equilibrium conditions in asset markets, some argue that one should expect
floating exchange rates to exhibit the larger fluctuations typical of stock
prices rather than the smaller fluctuations of goods prices (Frenkel 1981).
But this discussion is relevant mainly to the developed
industrial economies. What about developing economies? One perspective is
well summarized in the following statement by Arthur Lewis:
"It is now the conventional wisdom that the currencies of the
developed countries should float, but the currencies of the less
developed countries should not; that is to say, that each LDC
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should choose a more developed country as a partner - or the SDR
- and tie itself in a fixed relationship" (Lewis 1977).
This statement suggests several questions about "the conventional
wisdom." First, why is it infeasible to have floating exchange rates in
developing countries? Second, doesn't pegging the currency of a developing
country to one of the major currencies imply floating vis-a-vis all the
others, since major currencies continuously move against each other?
Third, isn't the real exchange rate, rather than the nominal exchange rate,
the essential matter of concern?
According to recent IMF publications (Hooke 1983, IMF 1983a), 54
IMF members were pegging their currencies to the currency of a major
trading and financial partner at the end of June 1983 (See Table 2). A
second group of 39 countries was pegging its currencies to various
composites of currencies, such as the SDR. Among members that choose not
to peg, five were adjusting the exchange rate of their currency on the
basis of a set of indicators. Eight other countries were participating in
an arrangement in which the value of each member's currency was maintained
in relation to the values of the currencies of the remaining members. Most
of those remaining members were maintaining systems of managed or
independently floating currencies, with several of the Western industrial
countries in particular maintaining systems of independently floating
currencies. Since exchange rate regimes are related to regimes of foreign
exchange management, a brief history of the latter is sketched below.
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Table 2. Exchange Arrangements of IMF Member Countries as of
June 30, 1983
Type of Arrangement Number of Countries
Currency pegged to
U.S. dollar 36
French franc 13
Other currency 5
SDR 14
Other currency composite 25
Exchange rate adjusted to set of
indicators 5
Cooperative exchange arrangements 8
Other arrangements 39
Total 145
Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement provides a
definition of current account convertibility9 /. While dollar-area
countries, such as Canada and the US, have maintained convertibility since
1945, it was not until 1958 that the major European trading countries
9/ Article VII underpins the Fund's role in encouraging its members to
avoid restrictions on payments for trade and other currency payments,
which Article XXX defines to include payments due in connection with
normal short-term banking and credit facilities, and moderate
amortization payments on capital. Therefore, commercial credits
normally granted by exporters or received by importers are considered
current for the purpose of satisfying Article VIII. Most of the
Article VIII status countries retain substantial restrictions on
capital account. The current-capital account distinction is not very
sharp under Article VIII. It is not impossible to manipulate net
capital inflows based on commercial credits.
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achieved free convertibility. At that time, fourteen Western European
countries made their currencies externally convertible for current
transactions. Japan did not formally achieve convertibility until April
1964. As of December 1975, 44 out of 128 members (34 percent) had formally
accepted convertibility under Article VIII. As of June 1983, 57 out of 145
members (39 percent) had done so. Meanwhile, 88 members (61 percent) had
been availing themselves of the transitional arrangements allowed under
Article XIV. These arrangements permit a country to maintain restrictions
on current payments and transfers until it is satisfied that its balance of
payments is strong enough to remove such restrictions (IMF 1983a). A
majority of the developing countries belong to this latter group.
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia maintain Article VIII status,
while Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines belong to the Article XIV
group. In turn, according to the IMF publication, while Korea, Indonesia,
and the Philippines are classified as maintaining a system of managed
floating exchange rates, Singapore and Malaysia are classified as pegging
their currencies to composites of currencies, even though there are free
foreign exchange markets in the latter (and in Hong Kong) but not in the
former. In our discussion of foreign exchange management and exchange rate
policies, we consider the East Asian countries under headings describing
the general policies and procedures that govern operation of their foreign
exchange markets.
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(b) A Market-Based Foreign Exchange Regime
Institutional Requirements
A free, market-based, foreign exchange regime is feasible when
the domestic currency is convertible. Then commercial banks can establish
a unified market in foreign exchange by intermediating the unrestricted
demand and supply of nonbank customers and by operating in interbank
markets. In short, a free market foreign exchange regime is feasible for
countries with mature financial markets that are integrated with inter-
national financial markets.
A free market foreign exchange regime requires the existence of a
large number of agents in the private sector who hold their home currency
as part of their portfolio and who can sell home currency when the exchange
rate rises above its expected level and buy any home currency when the
exchange rate falls below that level. Such activities can hardly be
expected to occur without well-developed financial markets. The short-run
determination of floating exchange rates through financial market
equilibrium makes financial structure the center of analysis in the choice
of foreign exchange regimes (Branson 1983).10/ The previous statements by
Lewis on the infeasibility of floating exchange rates in most developing
10/ One might argue that another condition for a market-based foreign
exchange regime is a large volume of trade denominated in the currency
concerned. However, this view is based only on transaction demands for
foreign exchange. If one includes speculative demands, such a regime
is feasible as long as a country has liberalized forward-covering
activities, interest arbitrage, and capital flows, even though trade
volume is not large.
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economies is probably based not only on his understanding of the
underdeveloped status of financial institutions and markets in these
economies but also on the long periods required to develop mature financial
institutions and markets.
It is important to understand clearly the process by which
free foreign exchange markets developed in Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Malaysia. Hong Kong and Singapore were cities founded by the British
to carry out entrepot functions, while Malaysia became a source of
primary goods for international trade. Their early British connections and
early exposure to international trade-related activities gave Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Malaysia ample opportunities to develop Western-style
financial and trade-related institutions. Because they were entrepot trade
centers, their financial institutions developed around international
trade. As early as the 1850s, more than ten foreign banks representing
British, Dutch, French, and American interests were operating in Singapore
and Penang. In 1980, Hong Kong had 115 licensed banks with 1,123 branches
operating within the territory, or about one branch for every 4,000 people,
a ratio exceeding that of many developed countries. But despite the
extensive British influence and international trade activities, it took
more than a century for the financial institutions and markets of Hong Kong
and Singapore to develop to the point of becoming international financial
centers (Geiger and Geiger 1975, Drake 1969).
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Foreign Exchange Markets
A foreign exchange market has several functions. It offers a
mechanism for clearing payments related to international trade or
investment on a multinational basis, it provides credit in different
currencies, it includes facilities for hedging foreign exchange, and it
determines exchange rates between convertible currencies. National markets
for the major currencies are effectively joined together by arbitragell/,
so that a currency's value is more or less the same all over the world. A
foreign exchange market is a network of telephone, cable, and computer
communications among banks, investors, foreign exchange brokers, and
dealers all over the world. The market operates on three levels:
(i) commercial banks engage in foreign exchange transactions on behalf of
their non-bank customers; (ii) commercial banks deal with each other in an
interbank market; and (iii) central banks intervene in the market to
maintain the value of currencies within desired levels.
A foreign exchange market determines not only the spot exchange
rate but also forward exchange rates. A forward rate is one agreed to now
for an exchange of currency at some date in the future. The forward rate
is based on the current value of a currency in the spot market plus or
minus a premium or discount for forward delivery. A forward exchange cover
based on the forward margin (i.e. forward sale of foreign exchange)
11/ Arbitrage is the process of taking advantage of the differences in
buying and selling prices within a single market or between markets,
through dealing in spot and/or forward transactions, or in combination
with money market or capital market rates.
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provides an exporter who draws an export draft in a major convertible
foreign currency with protection against unexpected fluctuations in
exchange rates that may occur between the date of the export contract and,
the date on which the export bill is negotiated. The cover is usually
arranged by the exporter's bank. Similarly, an importer who receives an
import draft drawn in foreign currency can make a forward purchase of that
currency that will enable him to make future payments before the date of
import bill clearance.
Even though Singapore conformed to IMF's convertibility
requirements (Article VIII status) in November 1968, it maintained controls
over foreign exchange transactions until 1978.12/ Singapore's foreign
exchange market became much more active after the Singapore dollar began to
float in 1973. Daily market turnover grew from $369 million in 1974 to
$8.5 billion in 1982. Participants in the market include banks, money
brokers, Asian Currency Units (or ACUs--bookkeeping entities established to
deal only in foreign currencies), and non-bank customers. About three-
quarters of all foreign exchange transactions in Singapore are on a spot
basis. U.S. dollar-Singapore dollar transactions account for 15 percent of
total transactions, with the remaining 85 percent being transactions in
other currencies. A major development has been greater utilization of
U.S. dollar-Singapore dollar swaps13/ as a money market instrument by the
12/ Until 1978, Singapore residents were restricted from borrowing or
depositing in foreign currencies, particularly in Asian Currency Units.
13/ A common swap transaction involves converting the deposit currency into
loan currency in spot exchange and simultaneously selling the loan
currency forward for the deposit currency to meet the maturing fixed
deposit.
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Monetary Authority of Singapore. Such swap operations have served also to
promote the forward exchange market.
Deliberate efforts by the Government of Singapore were
instrumental in establishing the Asian Dollar Market in Singapore rather
than Tokyo or Hong Kong. Japan has not been as liberal as Singapore in
allowing capital movements, and Singapore offered exemptions from its
withholding tax to dollar depositors much earlier than Hong Kong did. The
Asian Dollar Market is an international money and capital market similar to
the Euro-Dollar Market. Financial institutions that want to operate in the
Asian Dollar Market have to obtain approval from the Monetary Authority of
Singapore to set up ACUs to carry out transactions in the market. At the
end of 1982 there were 150 ACUs. Funds in the market came mainly from
inter-bank borrowings. Government policies have been instrumental in
making Singapore an active foreign exchange market while at the same time
maintaining the stability of the Singapore dollar through market
intervention.
Hong Kong's foreign exchange market became active after Hong
Kong's exclusion from the Sterling Area in 1972. US dollar-Hong Kong
dollar transactions are the most prevalent, accounting for some 25 percent
of all transactions. Deposit-taking companies and foreign banks obtain
Hong Kong dollars through swap transactions in the spot and forward markets
by selling foreign currencies for Hong Kong dollars, with an agreement to
repurchase them at a fixed date at a price reflecting market interest rates
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and exchange risks.14/ The residual source of liquidity for the banking
system as a whole is the foreign exchange market and the ability of each
individual bank to acquire Hong Kong dollars against the sale of US
dollars, an ability assured through the activities of the government's
Exchange Fund.
Malaysia also operates a foreign exchange market, although it is
not as big as the exchange markets of Singapore and Hong Kong. Here again,
US dollar-Malaysian currency trading is by far the most important,
accounting for over half of all business. In recent years the central
bank's use of swap facilities between the Malaysian dollar and other
currencies as a means of relieving short-term liquidity problems has also
helped the two markets (i.e., the exchange market and the credit market)
move as one (Skully 1983).
Free-Floating vs. Managed Floating Exchange Rate
There are two things that distinguish a free (clean or
independent) floating exchange rate from a managed (or dirty) floating
exchange rate: (i) whether the monetary authorities intervene in the
foreign exchange market and (ii) whether they adjust the domestic money
s4pply to smooth exchange rate fluctuations. Countries with market-based
foreign exchange regimes have the option of pegging or not pegging to a
convertible foreign currency or a composite of such currencies. We
14/ There are two types of swaps: interbank swaps and swap deposits taken
from the public.
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consider pegging under a market-based foreign exchange regime to be one
form of managed floating.
Free-Floating: McKinnon (1983a) summarizes in the following
words his analysis of the unstable aspects of a free-floating exchange rate
regime:
Under the conditions prevailing in the commodity and asset
markets of the major industrial economies, I show that a floating
rate is an inefficient mechanism for balancing international
payments. The comparative political or economic riskiness of
holding financial assets in different countries changes
continually. But domestic money supplies and national interest
rates cannot vary to provide the necessary offsetting risk premia
demanded by investors. The result is inherently high
exchange-rate volatility--overshooting--that distorts the flow of
international commodity trade and causes cycles of unanticipated
inflation and deflation in any open economy.
Some suggest that the argument over a managed versus a free float
is dead for all practical purposes, since almost all countries manage their
float by more or less heavily intervening in the foreign exchange market
(Haberler 1982). A critic might well argue that if the governments of
industrial countries agreed not to intervene at all in foreign exchange and
followed fixed domestic monetary growth rules, more stability would be
achieved. McKinnon, however, criticizes the noninterventionist solution on
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the ground that it implicitly presumes that the demand for national money
is stable, ignoring the possibility of cumulative currency substitution in
favor of or against the national currency.15/ Recent empirical
evidence--in particular, the current overvaluation of the dollar--confirms
that there is extensive currency substitution (McKinnon 1982a, 1983c). In
any event, many have expressed concern regarding the harmful effects of
floating exchange rates on the international trading system and have
stressed policy interdependence among industrial economies (Witteveen 1983,
IMF 1983b).
Managed Floating: The argument for managed floating is based on
a belief that the costs imposed by volatility and the misalignments
associated with free floating exceed the benefits of treating the exchange
rate as a residual in policy determination. If exchange rate stability is
accepted as a key policy objective, two major questions arise. First, what
is the norm for determining the stability or instability of the exchange
rate? Second, what policy instruments are available to manage a floating
rate?
The usual approach to determining a norm exchange rate 16/
involves finding a period during which exchange rates appear to have been
15/ International currency substitution includes indirect as well as direct
substitution. Direct currency substitution means that two (or more)
currencies compete as a means of payment within the same commodity
domain. Indirect currency substitution refers to investors switching
between nonmonetary financial assets--say bonds--denominated in
different currencies in a way that indirectly influences the domestic
demand for transaction balances (McKinnon 1983b).
16/ Williamson (1983) calls it a Fundamental Equilibrium Rate.
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at appropriate levels and then making a "purchasing power parity" (PPP)
comparison to identify the nominal exchange rate that would produce the
real exchange rate of the base period, given intervening inflation (see
below for the concept of PPP and real exchange rate).17/ The norm exchange
rate may need to be adjusted to reflect desired change in capital flows; a
"zone" or "band" approach will be preferable in comparing the norm rate
with the actual rate.
There appears to be a consensus that monetary policy provides the
main instrument for influencing the exchange rate, even though there may be
some disagreement on (i) the relative importance of various objectives of
monetary policy, and (ii) the relative effectiveness of other policy tools
for influencing the exchange rate. McKinnon stresses the consistency in
monetary cum exchange rate policy. He contends (1983b) that in a small
open economy (not using an inflation tax) in a position of monetary and
exchange rate equilibrium, the rule for maintaining equilibrium is to be
aware that the national money supply should expand above its norm when the
currency becomes unexpectedly strong on foreign exchanges, and contract
when it is weak. McKinnon suggests that further monetary coordination may
be necessary among larger countries to maintain stable growth in their
aggregate money supply.
17/ See Williamson (1983). Mckinnon's discussion (1983c) of dollar
overvaluation was based on a similar estimate.
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Other policy instruments that can complement monetary policy in
maintaining exchange rate stability are, (i) sterilized intervention,18/
(ii) capital controls; and (iii) fiscal policy. It has been argued that
sterilized intervention is impotent to remedy persistent misalignments,
even though it is a useful tool for smoothing out short-run volatility.
The effectiveness of capital controls varies, depending on the degree to
which a country is integrated into the world capital market. For example,
while the effectiveness of capital controls in Japan has been noted, the
opposite was the case in the US in the 1960s. While it is very important
that fiscal policy be consistent with exchange rate policy,19/ it has been
argued that fiscal policy is not well suited to be a major instrument of
exchange rate policy (Williamson 1983).
Table 6 of Annex I summarizes the history of Hong Kong's foreign
exchange regime. Although Hong Kong was a part of the Sterling Area until
1972, the relationship between the Hong Kong dollar and sterling was at no
time a statutory one but was established and maintained by the operations
of the Exchange Fund in conjunction with note-issuing banks. The
relationship weakened after the devaluation of the pound in 1967, and ended
18/ Intervention in the exchange market is said to be "sterilized" when it
is not allowed to affect the domestic money supply. This requires that
the potential reduction in the monetary base as a result of the central
bank selling foreign currency in exchange for domestic currency is
prevented by a central bank purchase of domestic nonmonetary assets
(Williamson 1983).
19/ It has been widely accepted that a major cause of the very high value
of the dollar has been the large US budget deficits. See 1984 annual
report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers (U.S. Government
1984).
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after the pound was allowed to float in June 1972. The government
then announced the pegging of the Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar (with
provision for fluctuations of up to 2.5 percent). This link was broken in
1974. Since that time the Hong Kong dollar has floated according to market
conditions.
Even though the exchange-rate of its dollar is determined by the
free market, the government of Hong Kong is active in foreign exchange
markets through its commercial bankers to the extent that portfolio
management considerations of the Exchange Fund require, and the timing of
transactions can be varied with a view to their impact on the exchange rate
of the Hong Kong dollar. The government may on occasion intervene more
positively, but such intervention generally seeks only to smooth out
erratic movements in the rate. The main purpose of the Exchange Fund has
been to regulate the exchange value of Hong Kong's currency by selling or
purchasing foreign currency in the foreign exchange market. Another policy
instrument is the imposition of withholding taxes on interest earned from
foreign currency deposits. In 1982 the government abolished the interest
tax on foreign currency deposits held in Hong Kong, while it reduced the
corresponding tax rate for Hong Kong dollar deposits from 15 percent to 10
percent. This stimulated local financial institutions to compete with
other international centers for funds by means of interbank swaps. At the
same time, it resulted in a very extensive switch of local funds into
foreign currencies. This switch prompted some criticism about the wisdom
of different tax treatment of local and foreign currency deposits. There
is neither a central bank nor marketable government debt in Hong Kong.
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However, it is interesting to note that, in hopes of slowing a drastic
weakening in the value of Hong Kong's dollar, the Hong Kong Association of
Bankers raised the prime lending rate two percentage points to 13.5 in the
middle of 1983 (Asia Week, June 10, 1983). Between 1974 and 1982 the
trade-weighted exchange rate index, which is calculated against the
currencies of Hong Kong's 15 principal trading partners, showed that the
Hong Kong dollar depreciated about 24 percent (see Table 6, Annex I). A
managed floating foreign exchange regime helped Hong Kong to maintain its
competitive position as a major manufactured good exporter as well as a
major international financial center.
The exchange rate of Singapore's dollar was tied to sterling
until June 1972, when the pound was allowed to float. The Singapore dollar
did not follow sterling downward because Singapore then tied its currency
to the US dollar. But when the U.S. dollar declined in June 1973,
Singapore allowed its dollar to float. Singapore's exchange rate
management system is operated on the basis of the Singapore dollar's
relationship to a trade-weighted basket of currencies representing
Singapore's major trading partners. The exchange rate of the Singapore
dollar in terms of the US dollar, the intervention currency, is determined
in the foreign exchange market. Rates for other currencies are established
on the basis of the daily rate of the US dollar and their cross rates in
international markets.
Singapore's exchange rate policy represents, more or less, a
successful example of the aforementioned integrated strategy of monetary
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and exchange rate policies for a small open economy advocated by
McKinnon. The centerpiece of Singapore's domestic monetary policy has been
the stabilization of its exchange rate with respect to the US dollar.
Singapore's monetary base has thus been largely endogenized by the desire
to maintain an orderly foreign exchange market. Instead of setting firm
internal rules for rates of monetary growth, Singapore has allowed the
monetary base to reflect foreign exchange interventions. This policy has
achieved the objective of maintaining stability in exchange rates, even
though the money supply has fluctuated widely in the short run.20 /
Singapore's successful policy has resulted from that country's
determination to separate the domain of foreign currency transactions from
the domain of local currency (McKinnon 1982c). Until June 1978, this
separation was achieved by exchange controls; Singapore residents were
restricted from borrowing or depositing in foreign currencies, particularly
in ACUs, which are specifically authorized to deal only in foreign
currencies. After exchange controls were eliminated in June 1978, the
separation was due to: (i) differential tax treatment of interest income
from foreign currency deposits between nonresidents and non-bank residents;
and (ii) differential tax treatment of interest income from foreign
currency deposits and those from domestic currency deposits. There is no
withholding tax on interest income from ACUs for nonresidents, but there is
a 40 percent withholding tax on interest income for domestic nonbank
residents who own foreign currency deposits in ACU and on Singapore dollar
deposits. Thus, foreigners are given a strong incentive to transact
20/ Such short-run fluctuations in money supply do not endanger price
stability in an open economy whose domestic prices are completely
dominated by a flow of imports and exports.
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business in foreign currency only with ACUs, whereas local residents are
not given artificial incentives to move out of Singapore dollars. In the
absence of exchange depreciation, Singapore residents have had no incentive
to switch to foreign currencies inside or outside the country. As shown in
Table 7 of Annex I, the Singapore dollar has appreciated relative to the US
dollar over the last 10 years or so.. In 1951, 3.1 Singapore dollars
exchanged for one US dollar, and this rate stayed constant until 1970, when
it began to decline. By 1982, one US dollar was equivalent to only 2.1
Singapore dollars. After adjustment for inflation, which in the case of
Singapore has been less than that of its trading partners, the nominal
appreciation of its dollar implies fairly stable real exchange rates. In
sum, Singapore's exchange rate policy has achieved competitiveness for
exporters as well as domestic price stability.
Malaysia's exchange rate system is similar to that of Singapore.
It has been based on the relationship between the Malaysian ringgit and an
undisclosed weighted basket of currencies of Malaysia's major trading
partners. The exchange rate of the ringgit in terms of the US dollar, the
intervention currency, is determined in the foreign exchange market, and
Bank Negara Malaysia intervenes in order to maintain stability in its
exchange rates. Table 8 of Annex I shows nominal and real exchange rate-
indices during 1970-79 (measured in terms of the official composite of
foreign currencies per ringgit). During 1970-79 the nominal exchange rate
appreciated. Due to the stability of domestic prices as compared to the
prices of export and import commodities, however, real exchange rates for
exports and imports depreciated between 1970 and 1974. During 1975-79,
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however, the real exchange rate for imports appreciated while that for
exports depreciated, resulting in a somewhat improved position for export
industries compared to import substitution industries (Rhee 1980).
(c) Managed Foreign Exchange Regime
Institutional Background
Underdeveloped financial markets and financial institutions in
developing countries may be one of the major reasons why these countries
have continued to maintain managed foreign exchange regimes rather than
relying on a free foreign exchange market. McKinnon (1981a) states:
Financial immaturity, or more active domestic financial
repression, is clearly linked with maintaining tight controls
over foreign exchange transactions. If, as in most LDCs,
domestic financial assets are illiquid and bear a low real rate
of return for that degree of liquidity, then domestic nationals
will prefer to hold liquid assets abroad unless prevented by
official restrictions. These exchange controls are usually
tightened in a situation of on-going price inflation, an
important aspect of which is to collect a tax from the domestic
banking system. Because the tax is levied on domestic currency
and deposits, the purchase of foreign bonds or working balances
of foreign exchange erodes the tax base. These resources not
only elude the government's inflation tax but in doing so cause a
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further socially unwarranted capital outflow from the domestic
economy. Given the initial distortion of a repressed domestic
financial system, therefore, a detailed web of exchange controls
is a perfectly rational--indeed necessary--policy response.
Financial immaturity in developing economies is characterized by
fragmented financial markets. In most cases, this fragmentation merely
reflects stages of underdevelopment in general (Goldsmith 1969). Of
course, financial repression associated with misguided government policies
(McKinnon 1973) aggravates such fragmentation. In turn, financial
repression may stem partly from financial immaturity. While every effort
to relieve financial repression by means of rational fiscal and monetary
policies should be encouraged, a mature financial market cannot be achieved
without a painstaking process of institution-building and learning by
doing. Thus, while efforts to build financial maturity are pursued in
developing economies, their transitional status in foreign exchange
management may have to be accepted.
Financial immaturity and repression are closely related to choice
of trade regime. For example, McKinnon (1971, 1979a) stresses capital
constraints stemming from financial market fragmentation in explaining the
persistent use of import restrictions to protect infant industries. The
NBER study (Krueger 1978), which analyzed the five phases in trade regimes
and exchange control, considered the most advanced phase (Phase V) as the
phase of full currency convertibility on the current account. This phase
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could be associated with detailed controls on the capital account,
implicitly requiring a pegged exchange rate, even though it is free from
quantitative restrictions. Except for Israel, however, none of the other
eight countries in the study (including Korea and Brazil) was able to reach
Phase V by 1972.
Foreign Exchange Management
During transitional periods a foreign exchange management system
operated by the government'must perform the functions that a market-based
foreign exchange system carries out in an advanced industrial economy.
Under a managed system, the monetary authority views foreign exchange
management as an integral part of its work. Under such a system, capital
flows and the convertibility of local currency into foreign currency are
partially or fully restricted. Of course, such a managed system must be
carefully designed to achieve, with minimum administrative costs, the
objectives of realistic exchange rates and efficient allocation of foreign
exchange. Prevention of ca'pital flight takes high priority in a managed
system.21 / Selectivity is applied to capital inflows in order to minimize
21/ Keynes realized the prdblems caused by capital flight. He argued that
a free flow of capital among many countries would make successful
domestic planning for full employment in any one country impossible
(Crotty 1983).
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any harmful impact on domestic stabilization policies and borrowing
status22 / without jeopardizing inflows of the physical capital essential
for domestic capital formation and technology transfer. A foreign exchange
supply and demand plan is an important administrative tool in achieving
efficient resource allocation. In setting priorities in such a system,
nothing appears more important than guaranteeing unrestricted access to the
foreign exchange needed for importing inputs for export production. In an
economy that has an underdeveloped financial market and shortages of
foreign exchange, a foreign currency loan scheme can be an effective tool
for achieving efficient foreign exchange management.
As the recent external debt crises of some developing countries
attest, efficient foreign exchange management is currently one of the most
important issues in economic management, particularly for a developing
economy with a large external debt. Some developing economies, however,
did not appear to know the extent of their own short-term debt until they
reached a point of crisis. (Short-term debt in many developing countries
generally exceeds 30 percent of the total medium and long-term debt
outstanding.) Thus, 1983-84 World Debt Tables (World Bank 1984) concludes:
"...the events of the past two years have emphasized the need for borrowing
countries, banks, and international agencies to monitor more closely trends
in short-term flows (of external debt)."
22/ Diaz Alejandro (1983) argues that the case for some limitations on free
capital account movements rests partly on macro-economic considera-
tions, partly on the need to correct micro-economic imperfections in
domestic and international financial markets characterized by "moral
hazard" and "expectations of bail-outs."
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As indicated above, Korea belongs to the nonconvertible currency
group (i.e., countries with Article XIV status). The major reason for
reliance on a managed foreign exchange regime in these economies appears to
be a lack of well-developed financial markets and institutions integrated
with international capital markets. Unlike Singapore and Hong Kong, Korea
did not have an early opportunity to develop financial institutions
specializing in trade financing and foreign exchange transactions. During
the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945), the financial system in Korea was
owned and controlled by the Japanese and was used to channel savings into
Japanese industrial expansion and then into the Japanese war effort. Even
in Japan the financial markets have been characterized as noncompetitive
and segmented, unlike those in the Western industrial economies at a
similar stage of development (Wallich and Wallich 1976). Cole and Park
(1983) evaluated Korea's financial system during 1945-1978 in these words:
As in the case of Japan during the post-war period, and also in
many other developing countries, the regulated part of the Korean
financial system may be characterized as a 'disequilibrium
system' in which institutional controls have taken away from
interest rates much of the function of allocating resources...
the government has been actively involved in managing the system,
using it to mobilize financial resources from abroad and at home,
and to allocate those resources in ways that supported its
high-growth policies....To judge from the remarkable performance
of the economy over the past decade and a half, the total mix
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of policies has been effective in transforming Korea from a poor
agricultural to a newly industrialized middle-income country.
Korea's managed foreign exchange regime has been' an integral part of its
managed financial system. An annual program for foreign exchange supply
and demand has been one of the key components of the annual economic
management plan of the Korean government. Judging from the success of an
outward-looking development strategy that involved heavy external
borrowing, Korea's managed foreign exchange system has been very effective
in: (i) preventing capital flight, (ii) allowing selectivity in capital
inflows, (iii) utilizing a foreign currency loan scheme for the use of
exchange reserves, and (iv) maintaining stability in the real exchange rate
or the effective real exchange rate. Korea's experience indicates that
efficient management of foreign exchange during the transitional period is
the most important immediate practical issue for developing economies while
efforts to build financial maturity are being pursued. As Korea's efforts
to rationalize its financial system progress, conditions in Korea will
become conducive to a gradual transformation to a free market-based foreign
exchange regime.
Real Exchange Rate Policy
Under a managed foreign exchange regime, commercial banks and
nonbank customers are in no position to create a unified market for foreign
exchange, either spot or forward, as they might-do under a free market-
based regime. Instead, the central bank establishes an official foreign
- 52 -
exchange market by setting official exchange rates and managing foreign
exchange transactions on a day-to-day basis. Many foreign exchange
transactions are delegated to commercial banks, which handle such
transactions on the basis 6f official rules, regulations, and exchange
rates. Since exchange rates are not governed by a free market, what
criteria does the government rely on to determine official exchange rates?
Since we have already discussed the infeasibility of floating, we turn now
to the issues associated with nominal vs. real exchange rates and the
pegging of one currency to another.
Nominal vs. Real Exchange Rate: Under a managed foreign exchange
regime, a central bank does not have much choice but to adopt some version
of a pegged exchange rate. Pegging the nominal value of the local currency
to that of a leading foreign currency does not mean, however, that the
objective of pegging is to maintain the stability of the nominal exchange
rate. The export incentive value of the official exchange rate is
reflected in the underlying purchasing power of the local currency unit
that is being obtained in exchange for one unit of the foreign currency
(and the associated purchasing power in the foreign country).
Stabilization policy aims at direct stabilization of the international
purchasing power of the local currency by stabilizing the exchange rate,
which is considered the first line of defense in stabilizing domestic
purchasing power (McKinnon 1982a). Therefore, particularly in an economy
where the purchasing power of the local currency is relatively unstable due
to a higher inflation rate than that of its trading partners, the objective
of exchange rate policy should be to maintain stability in the real
exchange rate.
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A real exchange rate is defined as a purchasing power parity
(PPP) adjusted official exchange rate:
Official Exchange Rate
(number of units of the
[Real Exchange Rate] local currency per unit - [PPP], (1)
of the foreign currency)
where
[PPP] [Domestic Price Index] - [Foreign Price Index] (2)
In order to maintain a constant real exchange rate (i.e., a base level real
exchange rate) when PPP changes, the official exchange rate must be
adjusted so as to devalue (or appreciate) the local currency as much as the
excess (or deficit) of the domestic inflation rate over the foreign
inflation rate (all rates being relative to the base period):
Desired Official Devalua-
tion Rate (rate of increase Domestic Foreign
in the number of units of Inflation - Inflation (3)
the local currency per unit Rate Rate
of the foreign currency)
For the purpose of maintaining stable export incentives (i.e.,
the competitiveness of exporters in the home country with those of the
competing country), the most appropriate price index for computing
inflation rates with Formula (3) would be the manufacturing cost indices of
both countries. For example, Balassa (1983) uses labor cost indices for
computing real exchange rates. Given the objective of maintaining the
stability of the real exchange rate, two additional questions arise.
First, what is the appropriate base level real exchange rate that would
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enable an economy to maintain stability? Second, how often should the
official exchange rate be adjusted in order to maintain the real exchange
rate at a constant level?
We indicated previously that the usual approach to estimating a
norm for exchange rate stability in a managed floating regime involves
finding a period during which exchange rates appear to have been at
appropriate levels. A similar approach may be most practical under a
managed foreign exchange regime in a developing economy that has maintained
realistic exchange rates at least for a while after previous devaluations.
But if a developing economy has maintained an overvalued exchange rate
throughout its whole development process, a new equilibrium exchange rate
must be sought as the base rate on which the crawling peg can adjust the
official exchange rate. Such an equilibrium exchange rate can be estimated
by using a method of "compensated devaluation" that involves reductions in
import protection (Balassa 1977). In turn, an equilibrium exchange rate
estimate must also take into account the optimum level of foreign capital
inflows. While there appears to be no generally accepted method for
estimating with precision the equilibrium exchange rate under alternative
circumstances (Krueger 1983a), policy-makers in a developing economy may be
able to come up with some reasonable "band" or "zone" for such an
equilibrium rate, based on sensible judgements on how to improve the
competitive position of exports. Many recent contributions to the
literature dealing with the shadow prices of foreign exchange23 /, as well
23/ The literature on shadow price of foreign exchange concerns mainly
correct exchange rates for a micro-project appraisal. See Blitzer,
Dasgupta, and Stigliz (1981).
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as information on black market exchange rates, would be useful in making
such judgments.
Adjustable Peg vs. Crawling Peg: In an adjustable peg system,
the exchange rate is kept rigid for several months or years until a
possibly large devaluation must be made. In a crawling peg system, on the
other hand, the government devalues in very small steps by an amount equal
to the amount domestic inflation in the preceding week or month exceeded
that abroad. Haberler (1982) states that the crawling peg is best regarded
as a species of the managed float, since it is much closer to a system of
floating exchange rates than to a system of par values. However, McKinnon
(1981a) calls such a typical crawling peg a "passively downward crawling
peg," since the policy is simply to adjust passively in order to maintain
stability in the real exchange rate. Since the distortions inherent in
delayed and massive devaluations stemming from an adjustable peg have
become so well-known, many advocate the advantages of the crawling peg over
the adjustable peg. Also, the crawling peg can check the dangers
associated with excessive speculation that may occur under the adjustable
peg by increasing the frequency of changes in the exchange rate and making
the changes quite small. However, experience in many developing countries
0
indicates that the crawling peg often faces resistance from those who fear
that frequent exchange rate movements directly accentuate domestic
inflation in addition to destabilizing the demand for money. They claim
that the adjustable peg is preferable because of the need to stabilize
price-level expectations and to inspire confidence in the government's
financial future. While skepticism about the effectiveness of the crawling
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peg appears largely unwarranted, however, particularly when the
disadvantages of large discrete adjustments are considered.
Single Peg vs. Composite Peg: So far, we have only discussed
pegging the local currency to a single major currency. Countries with
trade that is highly concentrated in one major currency area peg only to
that major currency. However, countries whose trade is so dirversified that
a single currency peg is not appropriate are left with the choice of a
currency basket for the peg. Under the old fixed exchange rate system, and
in the absence of major currency readjustments, pegging to any one of the
major currencies was equivalent to maintaining a fixed parity with all
others. In a world of floating rates, however, pegging to any one of the
major currencies implies floating vis-a-vis all others. Thus, to avoid
large fluctuations in their exchange rates, an increasing number of
developing countries have abandoned single-peg policies and adopted
composite pegs. A composite peg amounts to pegging the local currency to a
weighted average of the currencies of trading partners. Even under a
composite peg system, a single intervention currency such as the US dollar
is usually selected, because once an official exchange rate of the local
currency in terms of the intervention currency is determined, the exchange
rates of the local currency in terms of other major convertible foreign
currencies are automatically set in light of the international market
exchange rates of the intervention currency in terms of the major
convertible foreign currencies.24 /
24/ The exchange rate of the local currency in terms of a major convertible
currency = [the official exchange rate of the local currency in terms
of the intervention currency] x [The exchange rate of the intervention
currency in terms of a major convertible currency].
- 57 -
What is meant by "the exchange rate" of a country in a floating,
multiple-currency world? A trade-weighted index of the local currency
price of various foreign currencies has been used to approximate "the
exchange rate" of a country. The IMF now publishes such weighted average
exchange rates for 18 industrial countries25. This is an index combining
the exchange rate of each currency in question weighted against 17 other
major currencies, using the IMF's multiple currency exchange rate model
(Artus and Rhomberg 1973). We present below a convenient formula for
pegging to a currency basket to maintain the constant real weighted average
exchange rate (Branson and Katseli 1981). A country can maintain a
constant real weighted average exchange rate by pegging the local currency
to the optimum level of the intervention currency, based on this formula.
The country sets an appropriate official exchange rate for the local
currency in terms of the intervention currency after choosing an
appropriate set of weights for the intervention currency's exchange rates
with respect to the various foreign currencies so as to equate the real
devaluation (or appreciation) rate of the local currency in terms of the
intervention currency with the weighted average real appreciation (or
devaluation) rate of the intervention currency in terms of the various
foreign currencies (including the intervention currency):
25/ IMF calls such weighted average exchange rates "effective exchange
rates." We, however, use the term effective exchange rates differently
(see below).
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Weighted Average Real
Desired Real Devaluation (or Ap- Appreciation (or Devalu-
preciation) of the local currency ation) Rate of the dollar (4)
in terms of the dollar in terms of the various
foreign currencies
where
a!-
Desired Real De- Desired Offic-
valuation (or Ap- ial Devaluat- Domestic Dollar
preciation) Rate ion Rate of _ Inflation - Inflation (5)
of the local the local cur- Rate Rate
currency in terms rency in terms
of the dollar of the dollar
Weighted
Average
Real Appre- Nominal
ciation (or N Devalua-
Devaluation) _ Dollar Inflation tion Rate
Rate of the =[Weighti Inflation - Rate in - of the (6)
dollar in _ _ Rate country i dollar in
terms of the i = 1 terms of
various foreign
foreign currency i
currencies L
a/ Official nominal devaluation (or appreciation) rate of currency A in
terms of currency B = Rate of increase (or decrease) in the number of
units of currency A per unit of currency B.
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The appropriate set of weights for the above basket of N currencies can be
estimated, depending on three different targets of the government: (i) the
balance of trade, (ii) terms of trade, and (iii) stabilization of the
relative price of traded vs. nontraded goods (see Annex II-A for the
specific formulas for the weights). Note in formulas (4) to (6) that all
the data are exogenously given except for the basket weight for N foreign
currencies and the official exchange rate of the local currency in terms of
the dollar. Therefore, once the optimum set of weights is chosen based on
one of the above targets, the object of exchange rate policy under the
composite peg is merely to determine the optimum official exchange rate of
the local currency in terms of the dollar that satisfies formulas (4) to
(6). The exchange rates of the local currency in terms of the other
foreign currencies are mechanically established on the basis of (i) the
newly set official exchange rate of the local currency in terms of the
dollar and (ii) the daily exchange rate of the dollar in terms of the
foreign currencies in international markets (see Footnote 26 on page 50).
An intuitive interpretation of the above rule for the basket peg
can be made in relation to the recent real appreciation of the dollar
against such currencies as the Japanese yen and the German mark. Countries
such as Korea, which export to Japan and Germany as well as the U.S., must
devalue their own currencies in terms of the intervention currency (the
dollar) much more than they would in the absence of the overvaluation of
the dollar in terms of the yen and mark in order to maintain stability in
their real weighted average exchange rate.
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Korea's exchange rate policy since its adoption of an
outward-looking development strategy in the early 1960s has been a mixture
of adjustable and crawling peg policies. The four major devaluations that
occurred prior to 1980 suggest that the crawling peg policy was not
perfectly implemented, since it was forced to yield to an adjustable peg
policy several times. Since early 1980, however, the crawling peg policy
has been firmly rooted (see Tables 9 and 10 of Annex I). The exchange rate
reform of May 1964 (which marked the transition to an export-oriented
policy) resulted in a fluctuating unitary exchange rate policy and a large
devaluation from 130 won to 256 won to the dollar (a 96.9 percent
devaluation). In March 1965 the government announced the implementation of
a fluctuating unitary exchange rate system, but from August 1965 through
December 1967 the exchange rate was pegged at around 272 won to the
dollar. Beginning in 1968, the won was allowed to devalue gradually at a
rate believed to be sufficient to maintain purchasing power parity. The
rate reached 326 won to the dollar by June 1971, when a devaluation brought
the rate to 370 won to the dollar (a 13.5 percent devaluation). After
further gradual devaluation, the won was pegged at about 400 won to the
dollar in June 1972. When the dollar was devalued in February 1973, Korea
decided to maintain the won-dollar rate, resulting in sizable devaluation
of the won relative to the Japanese yen. The 400-won per dollar rate
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remained until December 1974, when it increased to 484 won per dollar (a 21
percent devaluation). The 484 won per dollar rate prevailed until January
1980, when there was an increase to 580 won per dollar (a 16.7 percent
devaluation). As shown in Table 10, the won per dollar exchange rate has
been increasing about one percent or so every month since the crawling peg
was adopted after the January 1980 devaluation. In February of that year,
a basket-peg system replaced Korea's single-peg system (Bank of Korea
1981).
In sum, Korea has attempted to provide realistic exchange rates
for exporters (even though at times with some time lag) through a mixture
of major devaluations and flexible adjustments. Although the policy
adopted in Korea has not resulted in a perfectly constant real exchange
rate, particularly in the periods between major devaluations, the Korean
government has succeeded in compensating for periodic domestic currency
overvaluation by means of financial and tax incentives for exporters,
except for several years in the latter half of 1970s (Westphal and Kim
1982; Balassa 1983). In the Philippines and Indonesia, exporters did not
receive the benefits of stable real exchange rates (including compensation
for currency overvaluation) throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Baldwin 1975,
Bautista and Power 1979, Pitt 1981). Recently, there have been more
concerted efforts to bring about stable real exchange rates in these
economies.
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From Managed to Market-Based System
It is difficult, if not impossible, for a country to maintain a
freely floating exchange rate unless current account convertibility and
free capital flows are allowed and the country has a well-developed and
mature financial market that is integrated with world financial markets.
What is the correct order of steps in moving from a managed foreign
exchange system to a free market-based system? The following answer is
based on some recent contributions to the subject (Mckinnon 1982b, Edwards
1983). First, controlling any fiscal deficit is a precondition for taking
initiatives to reduce financial repression. Second, eliminating financial
repression and developing a competitive and mature domestic financial
market are necessary for eliminating trade restrictions and allowing free
capital flows. Third, liberalization of current accounts normally precedes
liberalization of capital accounts. Fourth, after a free and mature
domestic financial market is developed and foreign trade is liberalized,
exchange rate policy can be converted from a passive to an active crawling
peg. Abandoning its goal of maintaining a constant real exchange rate by
means of a passive crawling peg, the government can, in the presence of
freed commodity arbitrage with the outside world, manage the nominal
exchange rate to make the domestic inflation rate converge toward the
international rate. (Fiscal surpluses and wage restraints are also
needed.) Fifth, after a change in exchange rate policy from passive to
active downward crawling, the restrictions that have inhibited inflows and
outflows of financial capital can be relaxed. The differential between
foreign and domestic nominal rates of interest should lessen gradually as
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the rate of devaluation slows, and international arbitrage between foreign
and domestic financial markets becomes more mature. Finally, with conver-
gence toward a fixed exchange rate and liberalization of capital controls,
a free market-based foreign exchange regime can emerge.
The reason for fine-tuning flows of foreign financial capital
during the transitional stages are twofold. While the opening of a capital
account usually generates a real currency appreciation, a successful
liberalization of the trade account can require a real devaluation of
domestic currency. Thus, Dornbusch (1983) states: "The worst thing to do
is to liberalize the capital account....before the required real deprecia-
tion has been achieved." In dealing with the negative impact of opening a
capital account first, one should be aware of the fact that financial
markets adjust much faster than goods markets (Frenkel 1982). Another
important issue in opening a capital account is how to determine the
optimum level of foreign borrowing. As the recent experience of some Latin
American countries has shown, the private sector tends to overborrow due to
moral-hazard imperfections and expectations of bail-outs. Therefore, Diaz
Alejandro (1983) states: "Moral-hazard considerations...or expectations of
bail-outs reinforce the case for home-country supervision of international
financial flows."
(d) Conclusions
Several lessons can be drawn from the experiences of the success-
ful East Asian countries in exchange rate policy establishment and
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management: (i) The initial requirement for export development is to
maintain a realistic exchange rate for exporters--regardless of the trade
and foreign exchange regime employed. Although a crawling peg system is
preferable, if an adjustable peg is employed, compensatory fiscal and
financial export incentives could compensate for currency overvaluation.
(ii) The most important factors determining whether a market-based or a
managed foreign exchange regime is suitable for determining a realistic
exchange rate and achieving efficient allocation of foreign exchange appear
to be the maturity of financial institutions and markets and the level of
financial regression. (iii) Adoption of composite pegs rather than a
single peg is preferred for setting exchange rates in a floating rate,
multiple-currency world.
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CHAPTER III
ACHIEVING A FREE TRADE REGIME
An important tool for eliminating the rdisadvantages that
exporters in developing countries may face in competing on the world market
is to guarantee free access to the imported raw materials and intermediate
inputs used in industrial activities that generate export value added.
"Free access" means that such imports are free of import and foreign
exchange restrictions as well as free from tariffs and indirect taxes.26 /
Since free trade status for export activities is a step toward the first-
best situation of economy-wide free trade, and since it is designed to
reduce anti-export bias by seeking true neutrality vis-a-vis competing or
importing economies, neither GATT nor any importing developed economy or
competing developing economy objects to it. A free trade status for export
activities could also be a step to completely liberalizing imports for the
domestic market.
(a) Free Trade
A free trade status for exporters is assured if a free trade
policy is adopted for the entire economy of a country or for exporters
operating in free trade zones. Due to the small size of their domestic
markets, extensive involvement in entrepot trade, and specialization in the
26/ Indirect tax exemptions for exports merely achieve a neutral status
vis-a-vis indirect taxes for domestic sales under the destination
principle as well as vis-a-vis a free trade status.
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final stages of production, Hong Kong and Singapore rely on free trade in
virtually all commodities by providing free access to imported inputs that
are used to produce exports. Until 1967, however, Singapore had a policy
of temporary protection of imports (i.e., tariff and import restrictions)
sold domestically. Furthermore, it appears that Singapore built its
internationally competitive industries through an outward orientation
strategy before it dismantled protective measures against domestic sale of
imports, in view of the prevalence of the tariff redundancy observed in
1967 (Tan and Hock, 1982).
The free trade policies of Hong Kong and Singapore do not mean
that these economies are free from minimally required import and export
procedures, but continuing efforts have been made to streamline these
procedures. The Hong Kong Trade Facilitation Council was established in
1981, and the Trade Facilitation Committee of the Singapore Trade
Development Board was created in January 1983. Ironically, increasing
protectionism among the developed countries has resulted in the imposition
of additional administrative burdens on the developing countries. Hong
Kong's export and import licensing systems for textile products, for
example, are the consequence of the textile quotas imposed by the developed
countries.
(b) Free Trade Zone
A free trade zone (FTZ) is a special industrial area located
physically or administratively outside a country's customs barrier and is
devoted to the production of exports. Transactions in FTZs are not subject
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to tariffs, and therefore escape the delays and administrative costs often
associated with the duty exemption or drawback systems applied to firms
located outside FTZs.
FTZs usually offer prepared and fully serviced land with easy
access to port facilities and, in many cases, industrial plants.
Considerable public costs are incurred to pay for the infrastructure and
facilities of FTZs, which developing economies use as showcases to induce
foreign investments in their export industries. Additional incentives,
such as income tax holidays and unrestricted transfer of profits, are
usually offered as well. There are now at least 65 separate FTZs available
in 33 developing countries, and more are being developed (Currie 1983).
Commercial FTZs have been in existence in Singapore since 1819
and Hong Kong since 1842. When Singapore and Hong Kong adopted export-
oriented manufacturing development policies in the 1960s, their commercial
FTZs expanded to country-wide industrial FTZs. Korea's first FTZ was
created in Masan in 1971, followed by a second one in Iri in 1975. FTZs
have apparently been effective in the early stages of an export drive as a
means of attracting foreign investors and giving demonstrations of
country's export potential. Where outward-looking development strategies
have been continued and reinforced, however, the relative importance of
FTZs's exports has tended to decline as the exports of other domestic
industries have expanded (de Vries and Goderez 1978). FTZ exports in Korea
have never exceeded 10 percent of Korea's total exports, since all export
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production and sales activities (whether inside or outside FTZs) have
enjoyed free trade status. Free trade zones have been important in
inducing investments in countries that rely heavily on foreign direct
investments for export devellopment. Korea's development, however, has
relied more on foreign loans than on foreign equity investments (Westphal,
Rhee, and Pursell 1981).
Malaysia has been quite successful in inducing direct foreign
investments in its export development by means of FTZs. More than 40
percent of its 1978 exports (excluding palm oil and other oil products)
came from its FTZs (Rhee, 1980). The Bataan FTZ of the Philippines,
developed in the early 1970s, produced $76 million in exports (accounting
for 6 percent of the country's manufactured exports) in 1978. The
development of four new zones (Mactan, Baguio, Batangas, and Isabel Leyte)
suggests an expanding role for FTZs in the Philippines. The Indonesian
government recently began a study on establishing FTZs with World Bank
assistance. While the initial contribution of FTZs could be substantial,
ultimate success in the development of exports will depend on extending
neutral status to the whole economy, maximizing backward linkages with
local industries, and mastering foreign technologies.
(c) Free Trade Status
Achieving free trade by eliminating restrictions and duties on
all imports may be a desirable and rational objective for many developing
economies. However, such an objective, while certainly a worthwhile
long-term goal, often cannot be achieved if it is not pursued on a gradual
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basis. This owes to a number of factors, including political and institu-
tional rigidities. If adapted immediately, free trade would allow imports
to displace much domestic production, including production by infant
industries that could become competitive in theinear future. If not fully
"compensated" by exchange rate adjustments, immediate liberalization would
also increase balance of payments deficits, worsening already heavy
external debt burdens. Often the political and social reaction to very
rapid or ill-considered liberalization attempts results in movement back-
ward toward import and foreign exchange controls. Rather than opening
their borders immediately to free trade, many developing economies attempt
to establish free trade regimes for exporting activities while maintaining
protected trade regimes for production for the domestic market--say, by
allowing unrestricted, tariff-free imports of raw materials and interme-
diate inputs that will be used to produce exports--at least during transi-
tion periods. Below, the major "building blocks" establishing free trade
status for export industries in an economy that continues protection of
domestic market oriented activity are described and evaluated, based on the
experiences of the successful East Asian countries and, in particular, the
Korean experience.
Automatic Import License
In the successful East Asian countries, import licenses for raw
materials and intermediate inputs (and capital equipment) are given auto-
matically to producers of goods that generate export value added. Many
other developing countries do not do this, however, especially for inputs
that compete with domestically produced counterparts. The reason is that
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they want to promote local input-producing industries and increase the
export value added generated locally. As a result of such a policy,
neither export nor domestic input-producing industries have been developed
efficiently. A solution is the creation of a policy environment in which
efficient backward linkages based on a country's comparative advantage can
be exploited. To do this, industrial producers creating export value added
should be able to choose freely between imported and domestic inputs (at
world market prices), irrespective of whether their production occurs at
the final stage or some preceding stage. Empirical evidence suggests that
under a free trade regime for inputs toward all activities that generate
export value added, the export value added generated through efficient
backward linkages is much higher than that under a regime of protection for
domestic inputs.
Import Administration for Export Production
To understan& the basic administrative requirements for estab-
lishing a free trade regime for export production alongside a protected
regime for domestic production, it helps to compare the components of net
foreign exchange earnings (measured in domestic currency) under a free
trade regime with the corresponding components under a protected regime.
Under a free trade regime for export activities, the net amount
of foreign exchange earned is the difference between the gross foreign
exchange earned, based on the world market (fob) price of a product and the
foreign exchange cost of producing the product based on world market (cif)
prices of intermediate inputs. Under a protected trade regime for domestic
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goods, the gross earning is adjusted by the nominal protection rate for the
product. The corresponding intermediate input cost is equal to the foreign
exchange cost of producing the input adjusted by the nominal protection
rate for inputs. Therefore, if trade is free for export production and
protected for domestic production, an exporter can increase his net earn-
ings by selling his products on the domestic market rather than exporting
them. An exporter can also increase net earnings by selling intermediate
inputs on the domestic market rather than using them for export produc-
tion. Schemes that can maintain the integrity of the export system might
provide that:
(i) Each purchase of intermediate inputs be limited to the
amount required to produce export goods that have been
ordered or for which orders are expected.
(ii) A determination will be made of whether the goods, after
having been produced, have actually been exported.
These rules can establish the underlying bases for the adminis-
trative arrangements needed to guarantee free trade status for all activi-
ties generating export value added alongside a protected regime for
domestic sales. A discussion of the procedures for administering free
trade status for export production follows. Figure 1 is a chart showing
these procedures in schematic form.
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Documentary Evidence of Exports: At stage 1, the importation of
intermediate inputs on the basis of expected export orders is treated the
same as importing on the basis of actual export orders. In turn, a local
supplier of intermediate inputs for export is treated the same as an
exporter in importing intermediate inputs. When documentary evidence of an
actual export order is accepted, types of payment are treated the same.
Sight drafts (D/P), time drafts (D/A), construction service contracts
earning foreign exchange, and so on are treated the same as an export L/C
or a domestic L/C (the domestic L/C is explained below). An expected
export order is not a potential export order. An expected export order
means a projected export order received by an established exporter, the
projection being based on past export records. Documentary evidence of
eligibility to import intermediate inputs under this category is the
record, verified by a commercial bank, of the export or local supply
performance of a company during the preceding year.
Documentary Evidence of Input Requirements and Import Ceiling:
At stage 2, an exporter or export supplier obtains input coefficient certi-
ficates from a commercial bank (for coefficients listed in an input
coefficient book) or from a provincial government (for coefficients not so
listed). Input requirements for an actual or expected export order are
estimated by multiplying the amount of the export order by the input
coefficients.
Figure 1: AN OVERVIIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND BANKING PRDCEDURES FOR IMPORTING INTERMEDIATE INPIITS FOR EXPORTS
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The amount of imported intermediate inputs needed for expected
export orders (or for local supply, in the case of indirect exporters) is
determined according to the following formula:
Amount of imported
intermediate inputs _ Company's export (or
for an expected ex- < Input x kx local supply) re- (7)
port (or local coefficients cords during preced-
supply) order e n ing q months.a/
The amount of imported intermediate inputs needed for export production is
determined by this formula:
Total amount of Amount of Amount of imported
imported intermediate < Max imported intermediate inputs (8)
inputs allowed for intermediate allowed on actual
export production inputs allowed order basis.L _ on expected
export order
basis
where
Amount of imported Input Value of L/C, D/P,
intermediate inputs < coefficient X D/A, contract earning (9)
allowed on actual _ Jforeign exchange, or
order basis domestic L/C.
a/ k is normally 1/4
q is normally 12.
A firm usually maintains just enough intermediate inputs to
produce an export volume equivalent to an average [k x q] month's order,
based on formula (7). As soon as some exports produced with this stock of
intermediate inputs have been completed (that is, after an L/C is
negotiated), the same amount of inputs can be imported for reaccumulation.
According to formula (8), unless actual export orders at one time exceed
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the average [k x q] month's export, the company cannot maintain more
imported intermediate inputs than formula (7) permits. Note, however, that
formula (8) has a built-in allowance for export growth.
Import License: Restricted import items (designated by periodic
announcements) require licenses or some other form of approval from the
relevant ministry. But import licensing for intermediate inputs for export
production (stage 4) is made automatic as long as the documentary evidence
in stages 1 and 2 is presented. (For certain items designated as special
promotion items for local production, an exporter or local supplier of
intermediate inputs needs a letter of recommendation in order to obtain an
import license from the appropriate export association. This is also
automatic (stage 3)).
Import L/C and Export Loan: The commercial bank that is the
notifying or advising bank for the export (or master) L/C or domestic L/C
opens an L/C for the importation of intermediate inputs for export
production within 10 days of obtaining an import license (stage 5).
Because the commercial bank is guaranteeing payment to the seller (provided
the goods are shipped) by opening the L/C and providing an export loan for
importing intermediate inputs to the buyer, and accepting the export L/C
(or D/P, D/A, and so on) as collateral, it is extremely careful to verify
the authenticity of the documentary evidence obtained in stages 1 and 2
when granting the import license in stage 4.
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Export or Local Supply Completion Report: An import license in
stage 4 or an export loan in stage 8 is granted subject to the condition
that the exporter completes the export. The administrative procedures for
importing intermediate inputs for export production are unfinished so long
as the final report of export (or local supply) completion is not submitted
(in stage 15). The importer of intermediate inputs completes the corres-
ponding export within 18 months (or the corresponding domestic product
within a year) from the date of the import license and submit an export
completion report to the commercial bank. Duty drawbacks can only be
claimed after export has been completed (stage 16).
Input Coefficient Administration: An Input Coefficient Adminis-
tration is necessary for guaranteeing a free trade regime for export-
related activities in the midst of protected activities related to domestic
sales and for guaranteeing the automatic availability of short-term export
loans even if credit rationing exists. The authority to issue input co-
efficient certificates is given to commercial banks or provincial govern-
ments, but the responsibility of estimating, compiling, and publishing the
input coefficients rests with the Input Coefficient Administration.
Automatic Access to Foreign Exchange
Policies that eliminate constraints on using foreign exchange to
pay for imported raw materials, intermediate inputs, or capital equipment
for activities generating export value added have proven invaluable. If
the initial foreign exchange holdings of a country are substantial, it will
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be enough to establish correct priorities. This means that nothing in the
allocation of foreign exchange receives greater priority than the inputs
needed to earn additional foreign exchange. (This point was stressed in
previous discussions on efficient management of foreign exchange.) If
initial foreign exchange holdings are scarce, external financial assistance
can be used to create a foreign exchange revolving fund earmarked for
imports of inputs for activities that generate export value added. (The
administrative arrangements necessary to maintaining the revolving nature
of such a fund are explained later.)
The Bonded Manufacturing Warehouse System
In order to allow companies outside free trade zones to bypass
certain customs procedures when they import inputs needed to manufacture
products for the export market, a bonded manufacturing warehouse (BMW)
system is available in most of the successful East Asian countries. The
usual requirements for licensing BMWs are:
(i) a firm's factories must be exclusively engaged in manu-
facturing commodities for export;
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(ii) a firm's factories must have separate warehouses
approved by customs through inspection as appropriate
for the storage of imported inputs and finished
commodities;
(iii) customs officers must be stationed in BMWs to inspect
imported inputs and finished outputs.
There were 218 BMWs in Korea in 1981, contributing about 12
percent of the country's total exports and accounting for about 6 percent
of Korea's total imports. In Malaysia there were 22 BMWs in 1979, account-
ing for no more than 5 percent of its total exports (Rhee, 1980). In 1984,
however, the number of BMWs in Malaysia increased to about 80.
A BMW system is quite advantageous for well-established large-
scale firms that only produce exports. But it is impractical for small-
scale producers and indirect exporters, as well as for producers selling on
both export and domestic markets. As in the case of FTZs, there is no
adequate substitute for a policy of guaranteeing free trade status for all
activities generating export value added.
Duty Exemption and Drawback Systems
A duty exemption system exempts exporters outside FTZs and a BMW
system from paying duties or indirect taxes on imports used in export
production. These exemptions are granted on a case-by-case basis at the
time of importation. In a duty drawback system, on the other hand,
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exporters located outside FTZs or a BMW system obtain refunds of the duties
(and indirect taxes) they have paid on imported inputs. It is important to
realize that the GATT provisions and the framework of the Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations do not consider duty and indirect tax
exemptions or drawbacks for inputs used for export production at the final
stages of fabrication and at the earlier stages as export subsidies"
(Balassa 1982, p. 72). There are two ways of making such refunds.
Individual drawback systems refund the duties (and indirect taxes) paid by
firms, as determined on a case-by-case basis, and thus operate much like a
system of exemptions. Fixed drawback systems refund the estimated duties
(and indirect taxes) that enter the cost of production of export
commodities according to a preset schedule.
Under both systems, the value of the import duty exempted or
refunded for each unit of export commodity depends on four elements:
(i) The physical amounts of the various inputs needed for
each unit of given output, that is, an input-output
coefficient.
(ii) The import prices, converted into local currency, of
intermediate inputs.
(iii) The rates of import duties (and indirect taxes) on
inputs (as fractions of import values).
Because these three elements depend on the specifications or
quality of a product, the fourth element is:
(iv) The specifications or quality of a product, the quality
frequently being reflected by its price.
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A formula to determine the duty value for one unit of an export commodity
is given in Annex Il-B.
Under full exemption or individual drawback systems, the prices
of tradable inputs purchased domestically for export production cannot be
higher than the tariff-free import prices of those inputs, as long as
exporters have a free choice between imported and domestically produced
inputs. This is because the exemption or refund is-granted only for
imported inputs. Even in a fixed drawback system, the refund is normally
allowed only for imported inputs directly used for export production by the
final exporter. Under these circumstances the effective tariff rate for
locally purchased inputs would be zero for exporters, and no duty refund is
needed. Indirect exporters are allowed to access to duty free imported
inputs for their export value added, while their prices for inputs to be
used by final exporters are world market prices rather than protected
domestic prices. This is achieved through one of two ways. One is to
allow a prior exemption or individual drawback to indirect exporters for
duties to be paid or paid for imported inputs used for export value added.
The other is to add the duty refund to indirect exporters' selling prices
while final exporters receive individual drawbacks based on documents
supplied by indirect exporters.
In administering prior exemption systems, the completion of the
export of a commodity which uses a specified amount of imported inputs
that were exempted from duties is traced on a case-by-case basis. In
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individual drawback systems the duty on imported inputs is also traced and
refunded on a case-by-case basis.
Unlike the two foregoing systems, where the linkages between
imports of inputs and exports of outputs must be traced case-by-case, a
system of fixed drawbacks does not require a tracing of these linkages and
thus reduces the administrative burden. But it does require the prepara-
tion of fixed drawback schedules. To prepare these schedules, administra-
tive authorities collect the same information needed under the other two
systems, or at least a sample of that information.
A fixed drawback schedule is a list of the fixed money values of
duties to be refunded for one unit of an export commodity. For a commodity
of given specifications and quality, the value of duties to be refunded for
one unit of export commodity equals the sum of the import price of inputs
times the input coefficients times the duty rate. (See the formula in
Annex II-B.) To prevent the problem of under-invoicing, the government
conducts spot checks of prices for imported inputs in addition to relying
on invoice prices. Note that if import prices, input coefficients, and
duty rates remain constant, the duties to be refunded are fixed. A draw-
back is a fixed value per unit of export, and the price of the export has
nothing to do with the amount to be refunded. Drawback schedules must be
updated periodically, however, because import prices change. Countries
using such schedules usually revise them every three to six months.
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The administrative cost saving offered by a fixed drawback system
comes not in preparing the schedule but in implementing it. Import-export
linkages do not have to be traced case by case, and additional savings are
possible by aggregating products and inputs in the schedule (so long as
such aggregation does not undermine the free trade status of export
industries). To protect exporters from the possible negative effects of
aggregation, many countries that use fixed drawback schedules also offer
exporters the alternative of individual drawbacks.
Because of the administrative burdens of other arrangements,
there appears to be much temptation to adopt schemes where rebates (say, as
a percentage of export value) are applied uniformly across all products.
But it is impossible to seek a magic number that can be used to achieve
tariff-free trade status, given the existing structure of trade protection
in most developing economies. There are extremely wide variations in the
input-output coefficients for different export products and in the import
prices, duties, and indirect taxes for different inputs used for export
production. Even under a hypothetical uniform tariff rate structure,
tariff rebate rates (as a percentage of export value) might vary widely
across sectors because of wide variations in input-output coefficients.
Basically, duty exemption and drawback systems are designed to
provide a tariff-free and indirect tax-free status only for tradable
inputs. Usually, such systems do not include tradable input components
already embodied in nontradable inputs. Complete free-trade status would
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mean duty exemption or drawback systems for these components as well.
Usually, exemptions for duties on nontradable inputs are treated separately
from those for tradable inputs. For example, Korea provided exemptions for
nontradable inputs by offering reduced rates for electricity and rail
transport for export activities until the early 1970s.
Korea's prior exemption/drawback system has been characterized by
continuing efforts to streamline administrative arrangements while minimiz-
ing anti-export bias on exporters. The success of Korea's system has
depended on two major factors: (i) the government's uncompromising objec-
tive of outward-oriented development and (ii) a pragmatic, speedy, flexible
policy-making and administrative approach that is not so much a deliberate
one of careful long-range planning but more one of diving in, getting
started, observing results, adjusting policy and administrative arrange-
ments, and repeating the process until the appropriate mix is found. When
balance-of-payments problems worsened after the first oil crisis, the
government hastily replaced its duty exemption system with a drawback
system, with an intention of instituting a fixed drawback system in the
middle of 1975. That was a threat to free trade status in the name of
administrative convenience, and when exporters expressed concern, the
government introduced measures to guarantee tariff-free status. Importers
of intermediate inputs used in exports have in most cases been allowed to
defer paying tariffs for considerable periods. In turn, the fixed drawback
system was modified by combining it with an individual drawback system
(Rhee 1980). As shown in Table 3, only about 20 percent of Korea's exports
had been subject to the fixed drawback system by 1980.
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Table 3
Corposite of Fixed and Iodividual Drabwacks in Korea, 1975-1979
Fixed Drawbck Individual Drawback Total
Ahunt (Share) Amont (Share) Ahmxnt (Shre)
(bil.won) -%(bil.won) % (il.won) %
1975 (Jul-Dec) 7.1 20 28.60 80 35.7 100
1976 72.9 28 185.1 72 258.0 100
1977 80.4 26 228.2 74 308.6 100
1978 67.4 19 288.4 81 355.8 100
1979 (Jan-May) 30.4 19 126..9 81 157.3 100
Total 258.2 (23%) 857.2 (77%) 1,115.4 (100%)
=~~~ . ==
Source: Rbee (1980b), p.27.
On the basis of a complete review of its drawback system during
1975-80, the Korean government implemented a new drawback schedule in
1981. Exporters rely on individual drawbacks for major imported input
items for each export product, based on input-output coefficients listed in
a drawback schedule published every six months. Fixed drawbacks are
applied only to miscellaneous imported items. This new system appears to
have a good balance: providing a tariff-free status is given the highest
priority when major imported items are involved, while administrative
simplicity is given the highest priority in the case of miscellaneous
imported items.
Korea has also made continuing efforts to streamline its Input
Coefficient Administration. This Administration--embracing banks,
provincial governments, and the Office of Industrial Promotion in the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry--estimates, updates, publishes, and
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administers input coefficients for most export commodities. A revised
aggregation scheme implemented in 1979 reduced export commodity classifica-
tions from roughly 6,000 to 3,000 items and reduced imported input classi-
fications from roughly 17,000 to 11,000 items. At the end of 1982 the
Input Coefficient Administration published six volumesconsolidating all the
technical input-output information that had been-officially announced so
far. Other developing countries in the early stages of export development
can apparently learn much from the rich experience of Korea's input-
coefficient administration.
Singapore currently administers duty exemptions and drawbacks for
the few items on which it places tariffs, including sugar imports. One
innovative aspect of its administrative arrangements is a firm-level
accounting book method used to compute the duties to be paid at the end of
a period, based on the balance of imported inputs for an export item and
the completed export value of that item during that period. Another
important administrative instrument is a bankers' guarantee that is used as
security to cover the average amount of duties an exporter owes to the
government. As in the case of Korea, very detailed input-output coeffi-
cients are provided by the government for estimating the value of duty
exemptions and drawbacks for export items that use sugar as their major
imported input, such as candies, biscuits, and soft drinks.
Malaysia has both individual drawback and exemption arrange-
ments. Automaticity has not been guaranteed for all activities generating
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export value added that are located outside FTZs or BMWs, but import
substitution industries have enjoyed substantial duty exemptions on top of
import protection (Rhee 1980a). The requirements that the goods must be
listed in the government's schedule and must be manufactured with the prior
approval of customs appear to be the main reasons for failure to utilize
the individual drawback system for export activities before 1981. Such
requirements were eliminated since 1981, and the drawback procedures have
been rationalized. The major reasons why duty exemptions are not granted
automatically for all activities generating export value added are:
(i) Exemption applications must be submitted to the government for
case-by-case review.
(ii) Only firms directly manufacturing finished commodities exclu-
sively for the export market can apply for tariff exemptions.
(iii) The intermediate goods to be imported with tariff exemptions are
not manufactured locally, or where they are manufactured locally,
are not of acceptable quality or price.
Nor does it appear that the principles of automaticity and equal
treatment of all activities generating export value added have been per-
fectly adopted in the Philippines, due to the multiplicity of agencies
involved. Two different individual drawback schemes are administered by
the Bureau of Customs and the Board of Investments. Some of the adminis-
trative arrangements that do not appear to be consistent with the
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objective of granting free trade status for export activities are (i) the
requirement that an import license can only be issued when no local
competitive materials are available, (ii) the procedures for administering
indirect exporters' drawbacks are too cumbersome to be practical, and
(iii) the input output coefficient administration is not modernized (Cox
1980). Parallel application of the country's duty exemption system is
mainly confined to some fifty firms operating under the Embroidery and
Apparel Control and Inspection Board, due to the complicated procedures to
be followed. The Board of Investment (BOI) incentive act of 1983 proposes
the preparation of a fixed drawback schedule.
Indonesia administers both a fixed drawback system (Export Certi-
ficate system) and a prior exemption system. While the fixed drawback
system has been extensively utilized by exporters, it must extend its
coverage to a wider array of products and contribute more toward achieving
free trade status. The prior exemption system has not been used at all
because of its time-consuming procedures. Indonesia'a fixed drawback
schedule includes data on (i) the fixed drawback rate (as a fraction of
export price) and (ii) check price of product, in addition to (iii) speci-
fication of export item, and (iv) fixed money value of the duty to be
refunded (per unit of export item). Information on (i) and (ii) is simply
designed to meet legal requirements, with (i) obtained by dividing the
separately estimated (iv) with (ii), as one might expect, rather than
(iv) being estimated by an exogenously given (i). The key issue is deter-
mining the level of aggregation that is most appropriate for each product
and input in estimating (iv), based on input-output coefficients, import
prices of inputs, and duty and tax rates. What is most appropriate" is
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the level of aggregation that helps meet two objectives: guaranteeing free
trade status for all export products (maximizing the coverage of products
listed in the fixed drawback schedule) and saving administrative costs.
There are two separate administrative issues. One relates to administra-
tive efficiency in collecting and processing information for a fixed draw-
back schedule, the other to administrative efficiency in implementing a
schedule of actual rebates. The issues of parallel implementation of an
individual drawback system (or some change that would cause the existing
prior exemption system to be utilized) have yet to be resolved.
The following are some of the important lessons to be learned
from the administration of duty exemption and drawback systems in the
successful developing economies:
(a) Guaranteeing absolute free choice between imported and domestic
inputs (i.e., automatic import licensing) for both direct and
indirect exporters is the chief precondition for an efficient
duty exemption and drawback system.
(b) Since duty exemptions/drawbacks at not only final stages but also
earlier stages of export production are not treated as "export
subsidies" by GATT and developed countries, it is very important
to have an efficient system of duty exemptions/drawbacks for both
direct and indirect exporters.
(c) Input-output coefficients must be published regularly, so that
exporters can review their reliability and provide information to
government officials that can help to improve the quality of the
coefficients.
(d) Individual drawbacks should be put into place along with fixed
drawbacks in order to let exporters choose between completely
free trade and administrative cost savings.
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(e) The business community and the government must work together on a
continuing basis to improve the technical and procedural aspects
of a duty exemption and drawback administration. There is no
magic solution to this particular administrative problem.
(f) Since the administrative burden of an exemption and drawback
administration would be reduced if all redundant tariffs were
eliminated as a first step toward lowering or removing all
tariffs, the government should continuously review its tariff
schedule.
(d) Conclusions
The experiences of the successful East Asian countries provide
clear avidence of the critical importance of assuring a free trade regime
for all activities (including participation by small and indirect
exporters) that generate export value added through free trade, free trade
zones, bonded manufacturing warehouses, or duty exemption/drawback
systems. The East Asian success stories also suggest that establishment of
free trade status for export activities can lay initial groundwork for
completely liberalizing imports for the domestic market. It is the single
most important element in reducing anti-export bias and establishing
neutral status without risking retaliation from importing countries, which
is a precondition for realizing greatest potential gains from international
trade.
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The duty exemption/drawback system can be implemented success-
fully only by guaranteeing automatic import licensing and free access to
foreign exchange (i.e., unrestricted choice between imported and domestic-
ally produced inputs) for both direct and indirect exporters. It appears
that the only means for implementing an efficient duty exemption/drawback
system is simply to improve the system continuously, based on updated
information on input-output coefficients and imported input prices. On the
one hand, it is necessary to maintain a careful balance between providing
status close to free trade and structuring an administratively feasible
design and implementation of the duty exemption/drawback system. On the
other hand, there can be reductions in the administrative burden of the
duty exemption/drawback if all redundant tariffs are eliminated and tariffs
are gradually lowered and eliminated.
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CHAPTER IV
ASSURING AUTOMATIC ACCESS TO EXPORT FINANCING
In developed economies, where both money markets and overall
financial markets are well-developed, exporters have few problems obtaining
bank loans at uniform market interest rates. Preshipment export financing
is handled through normal commercial loans, like any other production
financing. In these economies, in other words, all exporters enjoy neutral
status without a special export financing system.
In most developing economies, on the other hand, money and
financial markets are not well developed and are highly segmented. Thus,
exporters cannot be assured neutral status in competitive money and
financial markets. Even where money and financial markets are developing,
they typically favor large firms over small ones and demand physical
collateral that often cannot be provided by exporters. These difficulties
can put the exporters in developing economies at a great disadvantage
vis-a-vis both foreign competitors and local beneficiaries of credit
rationing. As a consequence, a developing economy's export capability can
hardly be exploited. Guaranteeing automatic access to financing at uniform
interest rates for all activities that generate export value added is
therefore critical--providing neutral status for export activities until
the time arrives when competitive money and financial markets have been
developed. Therefore, a preshipment export financing system can assure
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neutral status as a temporary measure. Furthermore, guaranteeing automatic
access to preshipment working capital at uniform interest rates for all
activities generating export value added could be a first step toward
uniform interest rates for the whole economy. Since automatic availability
of capital at a uniform interest rate and equal treatment of all activities
generating export value added are of primary importance, the specific level
of the interest rate is of secondary importance as long as the rate is
neutral vis-a-vis beneficiaries of domestic credit rationing and foreign
competitors.
Because the first requirement of exporting is to produce export
commodities at internationally competitive costs, and because there is
relatively little need for postshipment export financing in many developing
countries in early stages of export development, the highest priority is
given to preshipment working capital loans. These loans are designed to
meet financing needs for production or sales activities from the time an
export order is received to the time the order is shipped. (As will become
clear below, in fact, the need for preshipment export financing arises long
after an export order is received.) Basically, therefore, there is no need
for preshipment financing until an exporter has a confirmed export order.
And once the export commodity is shipped, the need for preshipment finan-
cing ceases. Normally, the loan period is not more than 60 days, during
which time the preshipment export loan becomes the critical factor without
which a net foreign exchange earning based on the confirmed order becomes
difficult. In other words, receiving an export order has not much to do
with preshipment financing. However, failure to provide preshipment export
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loans means nothing less than a loss of export earnings, due to failure to
meet the order. It is important to understand this fundamental difference
between preshipment working capital financing and other working capital
financing.
For two reasons, the justification for providing unlimited access
to investment capital for export production may be less than the justifica-
tion for providing working capital. The first is the longer maturity of
investment loans; the second is the possibility that such loans may
encourage decisions to invest in capital-intensive technology. But if most
exporters (including potential exporters) are excluded from borrowing
investment capital, and constraints on production capacity are the chief
barrier to export expansion, priority should be given to channeling invest-
ment loans to export industries.
Korea's preshipment export financing system was introduced in the
mid-1960's. In light of its underdeveloped money and financial markets and
the predominance of credit rationing, Korea's export financing system has
made an enormous contribution to assuring neutral status for its export
industries. Short-term export loans accounted for 58 to 71 percent of
total export loans in Korea during 1970-79 (Table 11 of Annex I). This
predominance of short-term loans stemmed from (i) the greater importance of
operating capital (compared to investment capital), and (ii) the greater
importance of preshipment financing of exports over postshipment financing
of exports. Short-term export loans as a share of total domestic credit
ranged between 7 and 12 percent during 1970-79; short-term export loans
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outstanding ranged from 12 to 22 percent of annual exports during the same
period. Between 70 and 98 percent of short-term export promotion loans
were given to manufacturing industries during 1970-79. Short-term export
loans ranged from 10 to 14 percent of the total annual exports of Korea's
manufacturing industries during 1974-79 (Table 12 of Annex I).
Hong Kong may be the only major developing economy that does not
have a government-supported export financing system. There, where the
major commercial bank carries out the functions that would otherwise be
performed by a central bank, a well-developed network of inter-firm credit
supplements Hong Kong's well-developed financial market in meeting
exporters' financing needs. But it is important to remember that more than
a century was needed to develop Hong Kong's current financial institu-
tions. A major Hong Kong bank recently established a special "line of
credit to small manufacturers" that eschews physical collateral in order to
make funds available to firms that cannot obtain financing through normal
channels.
It is interesting to note that even though Singapore is an inter-
national commercial financing center, the government of Singapore intro-
duced a preshipment export financing system in 1975. Currently, short-term
preshipment working capital loans amount to approximately half of
Singapore's total export loans, while export loans outstanding are approxi-
mately 10-15 percent of annual exports. Malaysia introduced preshipment
export financing in 1979. Malaysia's total export loan volume granted in
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1982 and 1983 was about ten percent of total manufactures good exports in
the corresponding years. Malaysia's preshipment financing granted,
however, was only one-quarter of the total export financing in 1982 and
1983. In Indonesia, export loans outstanding for traditional and
non-traditional exports amounted to about five percent of total exports
(excluding oil and LNG) in 1980. Total export loans (mostly preshipment
working capital loans) for Philippine nontraditional exports were about 8
percent of nontraditional export value in 1982. While the export loans
granted per dollar of total industrial exports in these latter three
economies appear to be lower than in the other East Asian countries, the
major differences between them exist in the structure of financing and the
degree of modernization of export financing systems designed to provide
automatic and equal access for all exporters.
(a) Acceptance Financing versus Bank Loans
The predominance of bank loans, as compared with equity financ-
ing, in most developing economies stems from underdeveloped capital
markets. A major reason for the relative importance of short-term bank
loans, in turn, is underdevelopment of money markets. In the developed
economies, where money markets are well-established,27 / the role of
acceptance financing in export and import financing is very important. A
banker's acceptance is created when a bank agrees to pay, at a specified
27/ In the United States the term "money markets" generally refers to the
markets for short-term credit instruments, such as treasury bills,
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, negotiable certificates of
deposits, loans to or repurchase agreements with securities dealers,
and federal funds (Monhollon and Picou 1974).
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future date, a draft drawn on it. A draft bearing such a commitment by a
prime bank becomes a marketable instrument which, when offered for sale at
an appropriate discount from its face amount, is an attractive short-term
investment for a corporation, an individual, or other holder of excess
funds. As long as there is an active market for banker's acceptances, a
bank is generally willing to discount its own acceptances at prevailing
market rates.
The beneficiary of a letter of credit has an irrevocable
commitment from the issuing bank to accept drafts drawn and negotiated in
accordance with the terms of the L/C. Therefore, shipments made under an
L/C create banker's acceptances. Since time drafts drawn under an L/C
create a prime banker's acceptance, the exporter can usually find a
financial institution willing to discount the draft prior to maturity and
thus provide him with immediate cash. Therefore, the major type of
postshipment financing is acceptance financing. An exporter selling abroad
on draft terms can obtain funds before collecting on his export drafts by
drawing on his bank and using the export drafts as collateral, having his
own draft on the bank accepted by that institution, and selling the
acceptance to the bank or some other investor.
An exporter who imports inputs can also use acceptance financing
to pay for the inputs while he is processing them for export. If an
exporter importing inputs has been able to obtain a time draft for his
imports, the interval between the arrival of the goods and the maturity of
the draft may help him through this interim period. But if he has been
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asked to pay by sight draft for his imports (or if the time draft has not
given him enough time), he can draw a time draft on his bank. The latter
will accept the time draft, buy its own acceptance from the exporter
at a discount, and use the proceeds to pay the exporter's sight draft.28 /
In the absence of an active market for banker's.,acceptances, however,
acceptance financing can play no role in export and import financing. In
most developing economies, acceptance financing is not important except to
provide postshipment financing backed by the export financing system. The
alternatives to acceptance financing are working capital loans or
short-term advances. But because of the noncompetitive nature of financial
markets in mst developing countries, financing by means of working capital
loans cannot be managed efficiently without strong government involvement.
As mentioned above, a majority of the exports from developing
economies are based on the export L/C. Since an irrevocable L/C in favor
of the exporter is, in reality, a purchase order with payment guaranteed by
a bank (if the goods are shipped), commercial banks and others are ready to
provide financing if there is an automatic rediscounting mechanism and the
risk that the exporter will default is negligible. In other words, a
letter of credit can become collateral for loans to finance intermediate
inputs and to pay for manufacturing as well as actual shipment. Therefore,
the normal basis for a system of short-term export loans is the irrevocable
28/ At maturity of the acceptance, the importer's account is debted for the
amount due. If he received the proceeds of the sale before maturity of
the acceptance, he is generally expected to prepay the acceptance.
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letter of credit received by exporters and the automatic rediscounting of
export loans by the central bank, provided that the risk of a default by
the exporter is negligible or taken care of. Of course exports on a draft
basis need to be treated the same as exports on an L/C basis in obtaining
export loans, by providing export credit insurance. Commercial banks can
then accept export drafts or other documents as collateral.
(b) Automaticity and Equal Treatment
In the successful East Asian countries, several major administra-
tive instruments have been critical in establishing systems designed to
implement the principles of automatic access to financing and equal treat-
ment of all activities that generate export value added: (i) The govern-
ments have provided strong commitments to automatic and speedy rediscount-
ing of preshipment financing by the central bank. (ii) The preshipment
export finance guarantee or liberal commercial bank policies have been
instrumental in assuring equal treatment of large and small, old and new
exporters. The domestic L/C and preshipment finance guarantee systems have
been two of the most important policy tools that have encouraged potential
exporters to engage in export activities. (iii) Modernization of the
preshipment export financing system has been essential for providing
administrative convenience and preventing abuse. (iv) A domestic L/C
system has been the most effective administrative instrument for assuring
equal treatment of direct and indirect exporters. (v) The export credit
insurance and postshipment export financing systems have been designed to
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achieve equal treatment of all export sales activities, whether based on
sight or nonsight L/Cs. Table 4 lists these instruments and their major
objectives.
Table 4
MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUMENTS OF EFFICIENT EXPORT FINANCING SYSTEM
Instruments Objectives and Principles
(1) (2)
Automaticity Equal Treatment of
and speed (a) (b) (c)
All export All export All export
value added producers sales activi-
activities (small and ties (sight
(direct and large) L/C and non-
indirect) sight L/C
basis)
A. Automatic
rediscounting
by Central Bank x
B. Preshipment
export finance
guarantee x
C. Modernization
of preshipment
export financing
system x x
D. Domestic L/C
system x
E. Export credit
insurance x
F. Postshipment
export financing
system x
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(c) Preshipment Export Finance Guarantee
Physical collateral is demanded in order to cover risks that may
arise from exporters' negligence, default, or failure to comply with the
terms and conditions of export contracts. Strict demands for physical
collateral, even where an export financing system offers a very generous
spread to commercial banks by means of a low rediscount rate, appear to be
the most important reason why exporters do not receive equal treatment in
obtaining export financing. Small firms that cannot easily meet physical
collateral requirements have a particularly difficult time. Thus, alterna-
tive forms of collateral must be developed to reduce the fears of commer-
cial banks about lending to small or new exporters. Clearly, pooling the
risks that come from a lack of technical and managerial capabilities among
small and new exporters by creating a preshipment export finance guarantee
scheme is an important responsibility of the government of a developing
economy. This is little different from the role of government in export
credit insurance schemes in developed and developing countries, i.e.,
offering risk-pooling schemes in order to deal with uncertainty stemming
from imperfect information on importers and importing countries. Such a
guarantee scheme permits realization of the strong contribution that the
endogenous entrepreneurial and labor resources of developing countries can
make in export development. For example, about 40 percent of Korea's
exports are produced by small and medium-size firms. Hong Kong's exports
come mainly from small but efficient firms.29 /
29/ Average employment per industrial establishment in Hong Kong in 1982
was less than 20.
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Even though the risk-pooling scheme of a preshipment export
finance guarantee system could serve as an effective alternative to
physical collateral, such a scheme will not be successful unless (i) banks
have a strong commitment to the government's policy of promoting exports
and (ii) the risk-pooling scheme is supplemented by "risk-reducing"
activities of the government, large exporters, and commercial banks (such
as technical assistance by the government and large firms and modernization
of the export financing system). The very generous spreads allowed by
rediscounting schemes in many developing economies are precisely to
encourage commercial banks to take risks and to compensate them for such
risk-taking. The Korea Credit Guarantee Fund and the Export-Import Bank of
Korea provide preshipment export finance guarantees in Korea. For most
exporters, however, the commercial banks took the risk of exporter defaults
head-on by granting export loans without requiring any collateral other
than documentary evidence of actual or expected export orders. This
clearly evidenced the commitment of commercial banks to the government's
policy and the confidence of commercial banks in the exporters and the
integrity of the export financing system.3 0/
Because of Hong Kong's competitive loan market and network for
inter-firm credit line, exporters there do not need a government-supported
export financing system. To make funds available to firms that cannot
obtain financing through normal channels, however, a major Hong Kong bank
recently established a "line of credit to small manufacturers" that
requires no physical collateral.
30/ The unpaid balance of Korea's matured short-term export loans at the
end of 1978 was only 3 percent of the total short-term export loan
outstanding.
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In Singapore, a partial guarantee of preshipment financing can be
obtained through an endorsement arrangement. In order to obtain central
bank rediscounting of export loans based on pre-export bills of exchange,
exporters must have the bills endorsed by two institutions, one being the
negotiating bank, the other another bank or discount house.
One of the goals of Indonesia's January 1982 Export Policy is to
guarantee automaticity and equal treatment of all activities generating
export value added by providing a mandatory guarantee of preshipment export
financing. This mandatory guarantee, which appears to be without prece-
dent, reflects the strong determination of Indonesia's government to deal
with conservative banking practices. Under the program, the government
automatically guarantees 85 percent of each export loan against default.
Any losses on the remaining 15 percent are shared equally between Bank
Indonesia and the handling bank. Although P.T. Askrindo is administering
this program, the government plans to establish a new organization to
provide export credit insurance and preshipment finance guarantees. For
the success of the guarantee scheme, more concerted effort is needed in
small and new exporters' risk-reducing activities such as technical
assistance and modernization of the export financing system.
Malaysia guarantees credit for small-scale enterprises through a
Credit Guarantee Corporation created in 1972, but the corporation does not
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provide preshipment export finance guarantees (Skully 1983). A similar
failure to provide small exporters with equal access to export financing
exists in the Philippines, where a three million peso export finance
guarantee facility of the Philguarantee has been ineffective in dealing
with the problem.
(d) Modernization of a Preshipment Export Financing System
In designing efficient administrative arrangements for a preship-
ment export financing system, an imaginative approach is needed. The key
to such an approach is to utilize well-established international trade
financing mechanisms by modifying and integrating them with the govern-
ment's export financing system to achieve the goals of automaticity, equal
treatment, prevention of abuse, and administrative convenience. The
important elements in modernization are: (i) disaggregating export loans
into four categories; (ii) introducing automatic export loan disbursing
mechanisms (tied to negotiations of drafts drawn under import or domestic
L/Cs) and automatic export loan pay-off mechanisms (tied to negotiations on
bills for exports); (iii) creating quasi-physical collateral by using
commodities financed by the export loans; (iv) introducing a domestic L/C
system; (v) developing a plan to combine export loans based on actual
export orders with loans based on expected export orders; and (vi) adminis-
tering the rediscounting mechanism with speed and administrative
convenience.
- 104 -
Disaggregating Export Loans
Preshipment financing is needed to cover all production costs
(i.e., the costs of imported and domestically produced intermediate inputs
and payments of wages, interest rates, and rents) or, in the case of pure
traders, to cover the purchase costs of domestically produced finished
goods to be exported. The initial step in modernizing an export financing
system is to classify export loans into the following four categories:
(1) Export loans for generating value added (VAL).
(2) Export loans for purchasing domestically produced
intermediate inputs (DIL).
(3) Export loans for purchasing imported intermediate inputs
(FIL).
(4) Export loans for purchasing domestically produced finished
goods (DOL).
VAL, DIL, and FIL are employed in production financing, while DOL
is employed for sales (or inventory) financing.
The basis of these export loans is an actual export order (backed
by an L/C, D/A, D/P, etc.) or an expected export order extrapolated from
the past record of the company's exports or local supply. But the sum of
the export production loans (VAL + DIL + FIL) cannot exceed the value of
the associated export order. Likewise, a loan given to purchase domestic
outputs (DOL) cannot exceed the value of the associated export order.
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There is a particularly strong need to disaggregate a production
loan into its component parts in economies with foreign exchange con-
straints, extensive backward linkages between export and local industries,
conservative banking practices, and widespread abuse or misuse of the
export financing system. Such disaggregation makes it possible to separate
import financing (FIL) and domestic input financing (DIL) from pure produc-
tion financing (VAL), to separate domestic currency loans (DIL, VAL, and
DOL) from foreign currency loans (FIL), and to separate inventory or sales
financing (DOL) from production financing (VAL, DIL, and FIL).
Foreign Currency Loan Scheme: In a developing economy in which
the domestic financial market is segmented, the foreign exchange rate does
not always reflect the true opportunity cost. Since external borrowing
plays a large role in financing development projects, one way to assure
efficient management of foreign exchange is to denominate all loans that
are tied to the use of foreign exchange reserves in a foreign currency and
charge an international interest rate. Export loans for purchasing
imported inputs (FIL) must be included in this category. If the foreign
exchange holdings of a country are substantial, it will be sufficient to
establish the correct priorities in meeting the needs for import
financing--that is, nothing should receive higher priority than importing
the inputs needed to earn additional foreign exchange reasonably quickly
(within 60-90 days). But if foreign exchange holdings are scarce, external
assistance can be obtained to create a foreign exchange revolving fund
devoted to financing imported inputs for activities that generate export
value added. The revolving fund should be large enough to avoid rationing
- 106 -
of credit for import financing for export production, since rationing would
contradict the basic principle of automaticity. If foreign exchange
constraints exist, excess demand may make credit rationing inevitable for
uses of foreign currency other than short-term preshipment working capital
financing and public-supported investment financing. Given the unique
nature of short-term preshipment working capital loans (which finance
export production on the basis of confirmed export orders), the rationing
of such loans would mean a reduction in the foreign exchange earnings
expected from confirmed export orders. No government operating under
foreign exchange shortages can afford such a reduction.
Using Domestic L/Cs: The separation of domestic input financing
from financing for foreign-made inputs makes it possible to implement a
domestic L/C system,which is critical in granting export loans to indirect
exporters (see below). Such separation also makes it possible to manage
scarce foreign exchange so that the need to finance imports for export
production can be met without constraint.
Creating Quasi-Physical Collateral: The separation of import and
domestic input financing from value added financing makes it possible to
create quasi-physical collateral, with inputs or outputs financed by export
loans (FIL and DIL, or DOL) through the automatic loan disbursement mecha-
nisms (as shown in Annex II-E). Such quasi-physical collateral, created by
export financing itself, would reduce the concerns of commercial bankers
about possible defaults by exporters. This is accomplished because the
actual payment of FIL, DIL, or DOL is not made to the purchaser, but
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instead takes the form of the handling bank's making payment directly to
the supplier, thus clearing a bill on behalf of the purchaser. The
commercial bank confirms that the purchaser is in possession of the
deliverable merchandise at that time FIL, DIL, or DOL is granted.
Preventing Abuse: The automatic loan disbursement mechanism
prevents misuse or abuse of the system by eliminating the waste that would
stem from granting a loan' before an actual need for it arises. Disaggrega-
tion of export loans amounts to classifying them by type of expense and
granting these loans at the time payment is made. While the export loan
for value added (VAL) is granted only after the purchase of intermediate
inputs has been confirmed, the three other types of loans (DIL, FIL, and
DOL) are granted when a draft drawn under a domestic or import L/C is
presented for payment or acceptance. At this point, physical collateral is
being created from domestic inputs, finished export goods, or imported
inputs (see Annex II-E).
It should also be emphasized that disaggregation does not neces-
sarily create additional administrative burdens. Such disaggregation
occurs in the international trade-related activities of commercial banks in
every economy. Commercial banks open import L/Cs for exporters as part of
their normal business. In turn, back-to-back L/Cs are the basis for domes-
tic L/C systems. Indonesia's commercial banks, for example, have been
using a domestic L/C system for inter-island trade.
Korea's outward-looking development strategy has relied on two
key factors: foreign capital in the form of commercial loans, and
endogenous entrepreneurial and labor resources. By meeting foreign
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exchange constraints and pursuing efforts to maximize backward linkages to
local industries, an export financing system based on disaggregated export
loan schemes has made an enormous contribution to Korea's export develop-
ment. Without such a well-designed and well-managed export financing
system, Korea could not have achieved its export miracle. During the
period 1975-79, 35 to 48 percent of Korea's short-term export loans to
manufacturing industries were for generating value-added (VAL), 34 to 39
percent were for purchasing domestically produced intermediate inputs
(DIL), and 19 to 28 percent were for purchasing foreign-produced interme-
diate inputs (FIL). (Table 12 of Annex I).
Foreign exchange constraints have not been a factor in Singapore
because of its status as a leading international financial center.
Furthermore, Singapore's exports have not depended as much as Korea's on
backward linkages to local industries. Consequently, the need to disaggre-
gate export loans has been much less than in the case of Korea. Moderniza-
tion of Singapore's export financing system has therefore focused on
increasing the speed of the rediscounting mechanism.
The export financing systems of -Malysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines have been based on aggregate export loan schemes. Increasing
foreign exchange scarcities and the critical importance of backward
linkages for export development, however, call for serious consideration of
disaggregation of export loans. Indonesia set the stage for such moderni-
zation when it adopted a new export policy in 1982, and Bank Indonesia has
been working on detailed implementation of a modernization scheme. The
Philippines is also planning to implement a modernized export financing
scheme.
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Administration of Export Loans
The timing, amount, and maximum maturity of the various kinds of
export loans are summarized in Annex II-D. The maximum maturity of export
loans is seven days after shipment (or delivery) of the export (or local
supply), or the standard loan period (mostly 90 days), whichever is
shorter. Annex II-E provides an overview of the typical procedures of
export financing under a modernized system.
The amount of the different types of loans is obtained by multi-
plying the value of an export order (actual or expected) by the loan per-
centage (which is usually 70-90 percent) determined by the government.
Formulas to compute the maximum allowable level of expected export (or
local supply) orders for export loan purposes are given in Table 13 of
Annex I. Note that these formulas are identical to the formula applied to
imports used for export production. As indicated above, an expected export
order is not a potential export order. An expected export order is a
projected order, the projection being made with the above formula. The
financing needs of potential exporters are normally covered by investment
financing rather than preshipment short-term working capital financing. It
should be stressed that while short-term working capital loans are granted
essentially on the basis of confirmed export orders, loans based on
expected export orders are allowed: (i) to simplify procedures for well-
established large exporters; (ii) to allow production to build up inven-
tories so that export orders can be filled speedily; and (iii) to make
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it possible to check actual export orders against expected export orders on
a regular basis. Therefore, the actual export order basis for loans is a
case-by-case basis, while the expected export order basis can be considered
an aggregate basis, aggregation being done for a period of time.
The documentary requirements for loans used to purchase domestic-
ally produced products (DIL and DOL) or loans used to purchase foreign
intermediate inputs (FIL) are more or less similar to those needed for
import licensing or domestic purchase of intermediate inputs through a
domestic L/C system. In the case of export loans to generate value added
(VAL), the additional requirement is an estimate of value added.
Rediscounting Administration
Without automatic rediscounting by the central bank of export
loans granted by commercial banks, it is not possible to guarantee that all
exporters will have automatic access to export financing. Speedy and
efficient rediscounting mechanisms are essential to an effective export
financing system.
The main role of the export financing system of Singapore may be
to guarantee that exporters will be able to obtain funds quickly for export
production; simple availability of funds may not be a problem in view of
the well developed commercial loan market.31 / Commercial banks in
31/ An alternative explanation for the Singapore's export financing system
may be that, even though it is one of the international financial
centers, the domestic working capital loan market is not perfectly
competitive due to imperfect information on exporters. See Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) for a theoretical discussion of credit rationing even
in commercial bank loans.
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Singapore are able to process export loan applications and obtain central
bank rediscounting within 24 hours on' the basis of a single instrument
called "pre-export and export bills of exchange" (a sample is shown in
Annex II-C).
Korea's system for granting preshipment export loans uses
exporters' promissory notes, backed by actual or expected export orders.
In Indonesia, where a refinancing scheme that requires a separate loan
agreement between a commercial bank and the central bank for each applica-
tion has been used rather than a rediscounting scheme, speedy disbursement
of export loans has not been possible.
(e) Domestic Letter of Credit System
The single most important innovation in export incentive adminis-
tration is the domestic letter of credit. The domestic L/C is essential to
assuring automatic availability of short-term export loans and free trade
status to all firms that generate export value added but do not export
directly, i.e., indirect exporters. There are two types of indirect
exporters: (i) input-supplying indirect exporters--which supply interme-
diate inputs to final stage (or next stage) export manufacturers--and (ii)
output-supplying indirect exporters--which supply finished export products
to trading companies that export directly (or sell to other trading
companies). Indirect exporters most commonly are manufacturers, but they
can also be pure traders. Input-supplying indirect exporters, shown in the
upper part of Figure 2, are critical for achieving backward linkages from
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exports; output-supplying indirect exporters, shown in the lower part of
Figure 2, are critical for developing trading companies that specialize in
overseas marketing.
In many developing countries attempts to encourage final
exporters to pass the benefits of export incentives through to indirect
exporters have not been successful, because the systems constructed have
apparently not dealt adequately with the different needs of indirect and
direct exporters in a well-coordinated manner. The successful East Asian
countries, on the other hand, have granted equal export incentives to
indirect exporters themselves, not through intermediaries. The domestic
L/C system has been the most effective administrative tool for this direct
granting of export incentives.
Basic Principle of Domestic L/C
The principle of a domestic L/C system is the creation of "back-
to-back credit," a vehicle through which the beneficiary of an export L/C
(or other export order) can take advantage of the creditworthiness of the
importer (and the availability of export incentives tied to an export
order). When an exporter has an irrevocable L/C in his favor, the
existence of the L/C induces his bank to open a second, similar credit
account on behalf of the exporter, with the input-supplying indirect
exporter or output-supplying indirect exporter as the beneficiary. Thus,
the indirect exporter gains access to all export incentives based on the
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receipt of the domestic L/C, just as the final exporter gains such access
based on the receipt of an export L/C, (or other evidence of an export
order).
If the supplier of inputs for export production is a foreign
manufacturer, as shown in the upper part of Figure 2, the second credit is
an import L/C; if the supplier is a domestic input-supplying indirect
exporter, the second credit is a domestic L/C. The exporter, in fact,
assigns the primary credit--the master export L/C--to the bank as colla-
teral and applies for an import or domestic L/C. Generally, the bank open-
ing the second credit establishes exactly the same documentary requirements
as those under the primary credit. Note in the upper part of Figure 2 that
a domestic L/C is parallel to an import L/C. There is no difference
between them except for the fact that the beneficiary of the former is in
the country, while the beneficiary of the latter is overseas. A domestic
L/C is no different from an export L/C in that the beneficiary in either
case is an exporter (an indirect exporter for the former, a direct exporter
for the latter). Both provide a basis for opening another domestic or an
import L/C.
As one can see from the upper part of Figure 2, under a free
trade regime a garment exporter should be neutral in deciding whether to
purchase fabrics from a domestic weaver (by opening a first-stage domestic
L/C) or a foreign weaver (by opening an import L/C). Equally, a domestic
textile weaver should be neutral in deciding whether to purchase yarns from
a domestic spinner (by opening a second-stage domestic L/C) or from a
foreign spinner (by opening an import L/C).
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Let us suppose that the domestic textile weaver is a small-scale
producer (located on a back street in a suburb of a big city) equipped with
20 looms. This weaver sells his textile fabric to a garment exporter
through a first-stage domestic L/C and purchases yarns either through a
second-stage domestic L/C or an import L/C. This weaver is purchasing the
intermediate inputs and selling output under a free trade regime and
receives the same treatment as large-scale firms when he applies for export
loans. Through a domestic L/C system this small-scale weaver becomes an
important actor in international trade, because a domestic L/C system
extends free trade to domestic trade involving small-scale enterprises.
The backward linkages from garment export to domestic production of textile
fabrics, and from domestic production of fabrics to the domestic production
of yarns, are achieved through first and second-stage domestic L/Cs.
Because the backward linkages are achieved under a free trade regime, these
domestic industries should be in accordance with the principle of inter-
national comparative advantage, as will be discussed below.
If the garment manufacturer (i.e., output-supplying indirect
exporters) in the lower part of Figure 2 cannot receive the same export
incentives as the final exporter (i.e., the trading company) that purchases
the export commodities for export, then trading companies cannot be devel-
oped effectively, since the garment manufacturer would try to export
directly rather than sell to the trading company. Furthermore, if the
garment manufacturer is a small producer, the export potential would simply
be lost, since such small firms cannot afford to have an export marketing
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channel. Therefore, the domestic L/C system is critical in developing
trading companies by providing equal export incentives to output-supplying
indirect exporters.
The domestic L/C system is the most effective instrument for
meeting the two basic requirements in structuring administrative arrange-
ments that provide critical incentives for indirect exporters. These
requirements are: (i) that a means exist for independently and automatic-
ally verifying that the supply of intermediate inputs or completed export
commodities provided by the indirect exporter were in fact purchased by and
delivered to the final exporter and (ii) that both the indirect exporter
and the final exporter are strongly encouraged to use available instruments
in order to gain access to export incentives. Because the domestic L/C is
handled by commercial banks, it also offers the advantage of delegating
much of the authority for export incentive administration to the commercial
banks, which generally offer greater administrative efficiency than govern-
ment can provide.
A domestic L/C is a document created by a bank that declares to
the indirect exporter that the bank will pay, on behalf of the final
exporter, a draft drawn on it when the indirect exporter submits, together
with the draft, a receipt that commodities have been delivered to the final
exporter. Therefore, the domestic L/C is the mst reliable and automatic
instrument for verifying the transaction between the final exporter and the
indirect exporter. The mutual encouragement to use available instruments
is provided under the domestic L/C because the final exporter gains access
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to export loans for purchasing domestic inputs (DIL) or finished export
commodities (DOL) based on the domestic L/C he issues, while the indirect
exporter must be the beneficiary of the domestic L/C in order to gain
approval for his production loans (DIL, FIL, and VAL). For this mechanism
to operate, it is essential that the export financing system be modernized
along the lines indicated above.
The following additional elements are designed to treat a
domestic L/C just like an export L/C:
(a) Equal treatment of other payments methods. In other words,
purchasers of domestically produced intermediate inputs for
export production or finished export commodities must be able to
ask a commercial bank to open a domestic L/C based on a D/P or
D/A draft, a previous domestic L/C, or other foreign-exchange-
earning contracts, as well as an export L/C.
(b) Equal treatment of expected and actual orders. A purchaser of
domestically produced intermediate inputs for export production
or finished export commodities must be able to ask a commercial
bank to open a domestic L/C on the basis of an expected export
order (a specific formula representing the average export
performance of the company in the past is shown in Table 13 of
Annex I).
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Figure 2
DOMESTIC L/C: BACK-TO-BACK CREDIT
Input-Supplying Indirect Exporter
Domestic L/C
Domestic L/C Domestic Spinner
(lst Stage) Domestic Weaver (2nd stage) (yarn)
(Textile Fabric)
Exporter
(Garment Import L/C
manufacturer) Foreign Spinner
(yarn)
Import Foreign Weaver
L/C (Textile Fabric)
Export L/C
Foreign Buyer
Export L/C | Domestic L/C
I ~~~~~~~~~~~~Domestic Weaver
. Domestic L/C Ir2wd stage) (Textile Fabric)
(1st Stage)
Exporter Garment
(Trading Company) __ anufacturer _
Output-Supplying Indirect Exporter
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There are several administrative requirements for domestic L/Cs:
(a) domestic L/Cs are irrevocable, opened in accordance with internation-
ally adopted practices (see International Chamber of Commerce 1974);
(b) the beneficiary of a domestic L/C is authorized to draw a sight draft
on the opening bank; (c) once an export loan is granted on the basis of a
domestic L/C, only the lending bank may purchase the draft drawn under the
domestic L/C; (d) a bank negotiating a domestic L/C collects proceeds from
the bank opening the domestic L/C through a domestic L/C clearinghouse.
Impact of Domestic L/C System
The domestic L/C system is critical for several reasons: it
breaks the barrier that restricts free trade status and access to export
financing to a free trade zone or a final exporter; it makes domestic trade
the equivalent of free international trade as long as the domestic trade is
tied to exports; and it helps to achieve efficient industrial development
through (i) the accomplishment of more efficient backward linkages because
of export expansion, (ii) development of trading companies specializing in
overseas marketing, and (iii) the development of small and medium-scale
industries by bringing them into export production activities.
A domestic L/C system has been extensively and successfully used
by Korea. The most notable achievements of the system have been more
efficient backward linkages, development of trading companies, and the
successful development of small-scale export industries. These are
discussed below.
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Backward Linkages: By extending free trade status and automatic
availability of short-term export loans to every production process contri-
buting to the generation of export value added, the domestic L/C system of
Korea has brought about backward linkages that accord with the true compa-
rative advantage of each production process. According to Table 14 of
Annex I, about 67 percent of the total value of domestic L/Cs issued in
Korea during 1976-78 was for the purchase of domestically produced interme-
diate inputs, 31 percent was for the purchase of domestically produced
finished products, and 2 percent was for the payment of subcontract fees.
Note that for every dollar of manufactured exports, about 50 cents' worth
of domestically produced intermediate inputs were purchased. In the
textile industries the use of domestically produced intermediate inputs in
exports was even more extensive. About 60 cents' worth of intermediate
inputs were purchased from other domestic producers for every dollar of
textile exports. These figures indicate the depth of the backward linkages
associated with exports.
Development of Trading Companies: Without the domestic L/C
system, Korea could not develop its trading companies as effectively as it
did. According to Table 14 of Annex I, for every dollar of export about
24 cents worth of finished export products were purchased by trading
companies from other manufacturers.
Development of Small-Medium Scale Export Industries: According
to a 1979 survey of small and medium-scale manufacturing firms in Korea,
the total value of direct and indirect exports by the firms amounted to
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41.8 percent of the aggregate exports of Korea's manufacturing
industries.32 / What major policy factor accounted for this impressive
contribution by the smaller firms to export-led growth? The answer is
clear. By guaranteeing small and medium-scale industries absolute equality
in obtaining export incentives, the domestic L/C system brought many
potential export producers into export production activities. As far as I
know, no other developing country so successfully avoids discrimination
against small and medium-scale enterprises engaged in export activities.
The Korean experience suggests that the best policy toward such enterprises
is neither the excessive subsidizing that comes from the "small is
beautiful" notion nor the discrimination of the counter-reaction that
"small is inferior."
(f) Export Credit Insurance
After neutral status for the production of export commodities is
achieved, a developing economy should devote mDre resources to promoting
overseas sales of export commodities by guaranteeing equal treatment of all
export sales activities. To expand export sales through payment methods
other than the sight L/C (such as the usance L/C, D/A, D/P, consignment
sale, etc.), a system of postshipment financing and export credit insurance
(i.e., insurance against nonpayment by importers) needs to be developed.
32/ The survey was conducted by the Small-Medium Enterprise Promotion
Corporation at the end of 1979, covering 32,459 firms in the
manufacturing and mining industries. (Hankook Daily, December 25,
1980). Small-medium scale firm is defined by the number of employees:
less than 300, and more than 5. The total value of exports (direct and
indirect) by the small-medium scale firms in the manufacturing
industries in 1979 was $5,724 million; total manufacturers exports
in the same year were $13,680 million.
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An export credit insurance scheme that provides broad coverage against risk
enables producers and exporters to venture into new markets and new lines
of exports with greater confidence.
Even in developed economies, governments have taken an active
part in instituting export credit insurance, as exemplified by the Export
Credit Guarantee Department of the Board of Trade in the United Kingdom and
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan. Thus, the view
that the government in a developing economy should implement an export
credit insurance system can hardly be disputed.
Protection of exporters and export financing institutions against
the risks stemming from nonpayment by importing countries and importers is
provided by export credit insurance agencies in Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Korea. Recently, Malaysia and Indonesia have also established export
credit insurance organizations. Among these agencies, the Hong Kong Export
Credit Insurance Corporation (ECIC) has the longest history. The ECIC was
established by the Hong Kong government in 1966 as Hong Kong's official
export credit insurer. The corporation's paid-up capital of 20 million
Hong Kong dollars was provided by the government, which also guarantees the
liabilities created by the corporation's insurance and guarantee
operations. The statutory limit of this guarantee is 3 billion Hong Kong
dollars. Indemnity protection of 90 percent of insured value is available
against "buyer" risks (such as insolvencies, bankruptcies, defaults, and
repudiation of contracts) and against "country" risks (such as blockage or
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delay of transfer of foreign exchange, war and civil disturbances, import
bans, cancellation of import licences, and other causes of loss beyond the
control of the exporter and his overseas customer).
The Export Credit Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd.
(ECICS), established in 1976 as the first such institution in the ASEAN
region, is half-owned by the government and half by some 80 or so local and
foreign banks and insurance companies. Following the pattern of Singapore,
the Malaysia Export Credit Insurance Berhad was established in 1977 as a
joint venture of the Malaysian government, commercial banks, and insurance
companies. It is presently 50 percent owned by the government, 40 percent
by commercial banks, and 10 percent by the insurance industry.
Korea's export credit insurance organization is different from
those of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia in two respects. First, Korea
does not yet have an organization that handles only export credit
insurance, even though a legal entity to handle export credit insurance
schemes and the export credit insurance fund was established in 1969.
Currently, the Export-Import Bank of Korea (whose main function is
administering medium and long-term export loans designed to promote
overseas sales through deferred payment methods) operates export credit
insurance plans as part of its role. Second, Korea's export credit
insurance includes preshipment export finance guarantees. Although Korea
plans to create a separate organization to deal with export credit
insurance activities, budgetary considerations have so far prevented it
from doing so.
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The January 1982 Export Policy of Indonesia provided the legal
foundation for an export credit insurance plan, and work is in progress to
create a separate organization for administering the plan. Realizing the
critical importance of preshipment export credit guarantees, the Indonesian
government has given the new organization the tasks of handling both export
credit insurance policies and a preshipment export finance guarantee
scheme. For some time to come, however, the preshipment export finance
guarantee will be the most important function of the new organization. The
Philippines has yet to implement a decree issued in 1981 to establish a new
export credit insurance corporation.
Under the sponsorship of the UNCTAD, it has been proposed that an
International Export Credit Guarantee Facility be established. This agency
would guarantee export credit paper arising from exports on credit (the
duration of credit being from over six months up to ten or more years) used
by developing countries that are members of the Facility. This guarantee
would permit these countries to rediscount their export paper on favorable
terms in international capital markets. Intergovernmental experts have
undertaken a detailed examination of the operational features of the
proposed Facility (UNCTAD 1983). It has been proposed that an in-depth
study be carried out under the sponsorship of the Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, to examine the operational features of
a proposed multinational regional export credit guarantee and direct
refinancing facility 33/ with the objective of promoting exports of
developing countries on deferred payment terms (ESCAP 1982).
33/ Unlike BLADEX (the regional export bank for Latin America), which
refinances both preshipment and postshipment export financing, this
refinancing facility appears to be limited to postshipment financing of
exports on deferred payment terms.
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While it is clearly the responsibility of the governments of
developing countries are responsible for pooling the risks stemming from
potential nonpayment by importing countries and importers of export commo-
dities by developing export credit insurance plans, it is important to wait
until the benefits of such schemes outweigh their costs and to have a broad
perspective on how much such schemes can make a difference in export per-
formance in the short run. Table 5 shows export values when the export
credit insurance systems were first established in five east Asian econo-
mies and the shares of exports covered by these systems in 1981. It is
important to understand that the basic objective of an export credit insur-
ance system is to expand exports by creating additional export opportuni-
ties through non-L/C payment methods, rather than to substitute exports
based on non-L/C methods of payment for exports based on L/Cs.
Hong Kong and Korea started their export credit insurance schemes
when their exports were less than US$1 billion; Singapore, Malaysia, and
Indonesia started their plans when their exports exceeded $4 to 6 billion.
However, the composition of export commodities and payment methods is an
important as aggregate export volumes in determining the proper time to
establish export credit operations.
Export credit insurance plans covered no more than five percent
of the export of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indonesia in
1981. Of course, as exports from these economies become more sophisticated
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Table 5
COVERAGE BY EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS
Establishment of Shares of Exports covered
Export Credit by Export Credit Insurance
Country Insurance System Scheme in 1981
Merchandise f/ Insurance
Merchandise e/ Exports in Coverage (2)
Exports (1) 1981 (2) in 1981 (1) x 100
(million US (million US (million
Year dollars) dollars) US dollars) __
Hong Kong 1966 830 14,631 618 a/ 4.2%
Singapore 1976 6,187 19,499 937 b/ 4.8%
Korea 1969 703 20,881 746 c/ 3.6%
Malaysia 1977 6,035 11,092 161 d/ 1.5%
Philippines - - 5,722
Indonesia 1982 4,170 f/ 5,587 f/
a/ Hong Kong Export Credit Insurance Corporation, 1981/82 Annual Report.
b/ Export Credit Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd., Annual Report and Accounts
1982.
c/ This figure represents commitments as of December 31, 1980.
The Export Import Bank of Korea, Annual Report, 1980.
d/ M. Skully, "The Malaysian Financial Sector: Development and Institutional Structure."
The World Bank, 1983, processed, p. 67.
e/ Various issues of International Financial Statistics, except for Hong Kong and
Indonesia.
f/ Merchandise exports, excluding oil and LMG. Manufactured good exports were
estimated to be $668 million in 1981 and $758 million in 1982.
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and methods of payment become more diversified, the shares of exports
covered by insurance will increase. Apart from important gains in
institution-building, however, we should recognize that in the short run
the net impact of the insurance plans will be limited.
The most important kind of institution-building is to build the
capability to collect information on overseas buyers and importing
economies and the ability to evaluate the credit standing of potential
importers. One advantage of joining the Berne Union (The International
Union of Credit and Investment Insurers), a non-official association of
export credit insurers, is gaining access to information filed with
the Union. Currently, the Berne Union has 38 members from 30 countries,
including the developing countries of Argentina, Hong Kong, India, Korea,
Mexico, Singapore, South Africa, Jamaica and Zimbabwe. Sri Lanka and
Malaysia are observers.
It is interesting to observe that in the early 1980s there were
considerable differences among Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea in the
composition of insured exports. About 80 percent of Hong Kong's insured
exports in 1982 were light manufactured goods, such as textiles and
footwear (Table 15 of Annex I), while the corresponding figure for
Singapore was less than half (Table 16 of Annex I). While less than 20
percent of Singapore's insured exports in 1982 were related to construction
and overseas investment activities (Table 16 of Annex I), the corresponding
figure for Korea in 1981 was more than 85 percent (Table 18 of Annex I).
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Long-term postshipment insurance in Singapore (20 percent) was higher than
in Korea (10 percent). The share of export credit insurance under secured
terms in 1982 exceeded 10 percent in Singapore (Table 17 of Annex I); the
corresponding figure in Korea in 1981 was negligible.
(g) Postshipment Financing
Postshipment financing covers financing needs for export sales on
credit from the time of shipment of commodities to the time of payment.
Short-term credit at the postshipment stage is generally made available
through the negotiation of bills or advances against bills tendered for
collection abroad, backed by the rediscounting facilities available from
central banks. Discounting of bills other than those drawn on letters of
credit depends in most cases on export credit insurance policies that
provide protection against commercial and political risks. Usually, export
credit insurance is a condition for securing credits for exports based on
payment methods other than irrevocable sight L/Cs34/ from financial
institutions, irrespective of whether the credits are granted to suppliers
or to overseas buyers.
Until the end of 1976, Korea's export loans extended into
postshipment periods for exports based on time L/Cs (usance L/Cs) or
drafts (D/P or D/A), although preshipment financing accounted for the major
part of short-term export loans. Currently, postshipment financing for
34/ As one can see from Table 17 of Annex I, part of the irrevocable L/Cs
are also insured to cover country (political) risks.
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these types of exports is handled through the normal commercial banking
practice of discounting acceptances, backed by automatic rediscounting
(100 percent) by the Bank of Korea. Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Indonesia all include postshipment financing (ranging up to six months)
in their export financing systems, offering terms similar to those for
preshipment financing.
If the deferred payment period extends beyond six months, the
transaction is not eligible for acceptance financing. (In this case, an
L/C is usually used rather than a time draft.) To provide deferred payment
credits, Korea established the Export-Import Bank of Korea in 1976. Such
loans are counted with medium and long-term export loans (Annex I, Table
11). The average share of such loans was less than 15 percent of all
export loans during 1977-79, but as the Korean export structure shifts
toward technology-intensive commodities, the share of loans for deferred
export payments will increase. Singapore introduced a medium and long-term
financing facility for deferred payment exports in 1979 (see below for mre
on this facility). Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines do not have
any special arrangements for providing medium or long-term credit to-
finance exports.
Domestic Usance System. There are two kinds of short-term
postshipment financing for imported materials or capital goods: the
shipper's usance draft, and the buyer's usance draft. By means of a
shipper's usance draft, a foreign exporter provides short-term postshipment
credits to a domestic importer of intermediate and capital goods.
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Alternatively, a buyer's usance can be drawn on and accepted by the bank
that opens a usance L/C. In this case, the foreign exporter receives his
proceeds when the bank accepts and discounts the usance bill of exchange.
Short-term postshipment export credits are granted to the importer of
intermediate or capital goods by the domestic accepting bank. The domestic
usance system in Korea provides automatic rediscounting (by the central
bank) of a usance draft discounted by a commercial bank.
(h) Conclusions
An examination of the export financing experiences of the
successful East Asian countries illustrates the key role played by
assurance of automatic and equal access to export financing for all firms
that generate export value added (including small and indirect
exporters)--either through competitive financial markets or through the
modernized export financing system--rather than the granting of financial
subsidies. Automatic and equal access has not only avoided the loss of
potential foreign exchange earnings based on confirmed export orders, but
has brought large numbers of potential exporters into the export drives.
Automatic and equal access has been assured by the governments of
the successful East Asian countries by providing the supply of funds and
risk-pooling schemes to commercial banks handling preshipment export
financing, until the time when competitive financial markets were developed
and export industries matured. Assuring a continuing supply of funds for
preshipment export financing at a uniform interest rate has effectively
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created a situation close to competitive financial and money markets for
exporters. Risk-pooling schemes supplemented by risk-reducing activities
have permitted potential exporters to deal with uncertainties stemming from
infant exporters' lack of information on technology, marketing, and
management.
Export financing modernization has been critical in assuring
automatic and equal access to export financing for all firms generating
export value added by (i) eliminating wastes and abuses through automatic
mechanisms (this has been essential in light of macro monetary constraints)
and (ii) assuring automatic access to small producers and indirect
exporters. Innovative administrative tools such as the domestic L/C system
have been essential in achieving invaluable backward linkages through
export financing to input-supplying indirect exporters as well as input-
buying final exporters and in promoting development of trading companies
through export financing to output-supplying indirect exporters as well as
output-buying trading companies.
Because the first requirement of exporting is to produce export
commodities at internationally competitive costs, the highest priority has
been placed on preshipment export financing and preshipment finance guaran-
tees rather than on postshipment financing and export credit insurance in
early stages of export development in the successful East Asian developing
countries.
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CHAPTER V
KEEPING PRIMARY INPUT PRICES COMPETITIVE
If primary input markets are not competitive, exporters will be
at a disadvantage, because they will pay more than true economic prices for
inputs used in export production.
Assuring neutrality vis-a-vis competitive primary input prices is
important in promoting exports in a developing economy in accordance with
its comparative advantage. A recent NBER study (Krueger 1983c) concludes:
Perhaps the most striking findings emerging from the trade
strategies and employment project were that, on one hand, despite
factor market conditions, developing countries' manufactured
exports tend to exhibit the factor intensity consistent with
their endowment, and that, on the other hand, the scope for
further increasing their demand for labor through both trade
policies and realignment of domestic factor market incentives is
sizable.
The first-best policy for assuring true market or shadow prices
for export activities is to keep primary input markets competitive. If
such a first-best policy is not possible, the government can use export
incentives to compensate exporters for the difference between noncompeti-
tive market prices and the shadow prices of primary inputs.
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(a) Keeping Primary Input Markets Competitive
Many argue that the export success of Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Korea is due to their competitive labor markets and noncombative labor
unions, as well as the existence of private sectors that have exercised
initiative and creativity in export activities. In general, the wages of
unskilled and semi-skilled labor in these economies have been determined by
free markets rather than by institutional factors 35/ and therefore have
been close to their shadow wages. In Hong Kong there is no statutory
minimum wage rate, and the prevailing wage is essentially the result of
interplay between supply and demand.
The policy of wage restraint adopted by the Singapore Government
was supported by Singapore's trade unions in order to create a climate
conducive to foreign investment and expanded employment, and this policy
proved effective in the 1960s, when Singapore suffered from high unemploy-
ment and underemployment. In response to rapidly rising wages in the early
1970s, the government set up a National Wages Council (NWC) to recommend
orderly wage changes. The NWC is a tripartite body consisting of represen-
tatives from the government, employers, and workers. The NWC's tasks are:
(i) to formulate wage guidelines for the economy, (ii) to ensure orderly
wage increases to promote economic and social development, and (iii) to
assist in the development of incentive schemes to improve national produc-
tivity. The NWC recommended high wage increases for 1972-74, partly to
35/ See Fields (1982) for the function of labor markets in Hong Kong,
Korea, and Singapore, and their impact on industrialization and
emloyment.
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offset inflation and partly to encourage firms to use labor efficiently.
Because of the recession in the mid-1970s, the NWC recommended modest wage
increases during the period 1975-78. In 1979, as the Singapore government
shifted its strategy toward exporting goods that require greater skills to
produce and result in more value added, the NWC recommended high wages to
facilitate a restructuring of the economy in that direction. This policy
resulted in annual increases in wage rates of about 20 percent during
1980-82. In June 1982, the Singapore government announced changes in the
NWC designed to reduce the influence of the government on wage determina-
tion. Under the new NWC, wage bargaining will largely be in the hands of
employers and unions.
Western-style labor unions have not been allowed in Korea, and
the government has not imposed any minimum wage or other regulations that
have significantly affected the determination of wages. To be sure, real
wages have risen dramatically, but this appears to have been the outcome of
market forces. In order to attract highly skilled engineers and
technicians (mostly foreign-trained) and to encourage investment in skill
formation, however, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea appear to depend on
government incentives rather than purely on markets. The rationale may be
that markets tend to underinvest in skill formation, and the wages of
highly skilled workers may not reflect their shadow prices, even in these
economies.
It is important to recognize that the competitive primary input
market mechanisms, together with the outward-looking development strate-
gies, in the successful East Asian economies have resulted during the 1960s
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and 1970s in: (i) full employment despite increasing populations and
rising labor force participation; (ii) impressive rates of real wage
increases in most of the successful East Asian countries that were gener-
ally consistent with growth rates for real GNP; and (iii) improved overall
income distribution (Fields 1982).
(b) Compensating for Non-Competitive Primary Input Prices
According to a ILO report (ILO 1974), the Philippines has perhaps
the most comprehensive minimum wage legislation in Asia. In the early
1970s the government modified the labor laws to prohibit strikes and
picketing for the explicit purpose of promoting exports of labor-intensive
manufactured goods (Datta-Chaudhuri 1981). The Philippines' value-added
based income tax incentives for export industries (see below) may be partly
designed to compensate for any discrepancy between actual and shadow
wages.36 /
Labor market segmentation in Malaysia has been reported as the
major cause of the coexistence of labor shortages in one job category or
region with labor surpluses in other job categories or regions. Labor
utilization relief investment tax incentives (see below) can be considered
to be compensation for excess wage costs. In turn, tax compensation for
skill formation and upgrading has been stressed in Malaysia for the
improvement of its segmented labor market (World Bank 1981b).
36/ Medalla (1979) estimates that Philippines' shadow wages were 77% or 86%
of market wages during 1969-77.
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Minimum wage regulations were enacted in Indonesia in 1975; a law
enacted in 1964 required private firms to obtain government approval before
dismissing more than ten workers and to pay indemnities. Pitt (1981)
reports, however, that the humber of industries and employees covered by
these regulations was relatively small, and enforcement was of doubtful
effectiveness. So far, no income tax incentives have been offered to
export industries in Indonesia.
As the NBER (Krueger 1983c) study acknowledges, there is a
general lack of knowledge about primary input markets:
An equally striking finding was the extent to which our knowledge
and understanding of factor markets in developing countries is
imperfect. Analysis of the interaction between trade strategies
and domestic factor markets was generally more constrained by a
lack of data and analyses on domestic factor market conditions
than by lack of data and analyses on trade strategies.
We need to know more about the nature and causes of market failures in many
developing countries for the establishment of right policies designed to
keep primary inp"t markets competitive or to compensate for excessive
primary input prices.
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(c) Conclusions
The clear and uncomplicated lesson regarding primary input
markets in the successful East Asian developing countries is that policies
that strive to keep primary input markets competitive would be more
effective than those that strive to compensate for noncompetitive primary
input prices stemming from noncompetitive primary input markets encouraged,
created, or ignored by the government. The former policy, together with
the successful outward-looking development strategy, has resulted in full
employment, increasing real wages, and improved income distribution. We
need to know more about the nature and causes of primary input market
failures in many developing countries for the establishment of right
policies designed to keep primary input markets competitive or to compen-
sate for excessive primary input prices.
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CHAPTER VI
COMPENSATORY EXPORT INCENTIVES TO ESTABLISH NEUTRAL STATUS
So far, we have reviewed the basic foundations of export policy
and administration. The goal of such a policy is to guarantee neutral
status, which--as defined in Chapter I--can be achieved by a combination of
the following: (i) a flexible exchange rate; (ii) free trade for interme-
diate inputs and outputs; (iii) competitive money and financial markets;
(iv) competitive primary input markets; and (v) nondiscriminatory domestic
taxes for all activities generating export value added. Neutral status can
also be achieved through equivalent compensatory incentives for all activi-
ties that generate export value added if the five separate policies above
cannot be perfectly implemented due to some constraints. This chapter
presents a discussion of the compensatory incentives.
In view of the importance of institutional and administrative
arrangements in achieving elements (ii) and (iii) above, we have reviewed
in detail the basic principles and administrative structures necessary to
provide free trade status and automatic access to export financing at a
uniform interest rate for all export activities. The purpose is to assure
automatic access to preshipment short-term working capital export loans to
all exporters (direct and indirect). Otherwise, exporters may not be able
to earn foreign exchange even when they have export orders. The major
concern here is speedy and automatic availability of short-term working
capital at a uniform interest rate that ensures neutrality, rather than
interest rates that may contain preferential margins. Providing completely
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free trade status for all export activities is as urgent as providing
automatic access to export financing, but it takes considerable time and
effort to prepare a reasonably well-designed and well-managed duty
exemption/drawback system. To the extent that export activities must
suffer negative protection rates due to the incompleteness of a duty
exemption/drawback system, compensatory export incentives are frequently
used as temporary measures until exporters are guaranteed complete free
trade status. We also suggested that while maintaining a flexible exchange
rate and competitive primary input markets is desirable, it may not be
possible to do so because of various structural rigidities. If that is the
case, additional export incentives are needed to guarantee neutral status
by compensating for exchange rate overvaluation and differences between the
market and shadow prices of primary inputs:
Compensatory Loss of export Excess of Excess of
export earnings (current and primary
incentives = stemming from + capital) + input cost (10)
needed to currency input over
achieve overvaluation costs over competitive
neutral status free trade market
prices prices
Equation (10) refers to each export product or exporter.37/
Dividing equation (10) by the appropriate export value in dollars, one
obtains (for a given exporter):
37/ This formula is based on the assumption that automatic and equal
access to export loans at an interest rate which is not higher than
the nondiscriminatory rate is guaranteed for all export activities,
and that domestic taxes for exporters are nondiscriminatory except for
being used as compensatory export incentive tools.
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Compensatory Currency Excess of Excess of
export incen- over- input costs primary
tives per valuation over free input costs
dollar of ex- = per dollar + trade prices + over compe- (11)
port needed to per dollar of titive
achieve export market
neutral prices per
status dollar of
export
Note that the left-hand side of equation (11) differs for various export
products and exporters if a duty exemption/drawback system is not effi-
ciently managed or primary input markets are not competitive, since duty
rates are generally different for various inputs for export production, and
imported input-output coefficients and primary input-output coefficients
are different for various export products and exporters. Therefore, unless
free trade status and competitive primary input markets are guaranteed, it
is not possible to achieve neutral status based on uniform compensatory
export incentives per dollar of export.
Effective Exchange Rate: Let us relate the concept of compensa-
tory export incentives needed to achieve neutral status for a given
exporter (defined in (11)) to the concept of an "effective exchange rate"
for exports, which is an economy-wide average concept and is related to
observed compensatory export incentives. Aggregating the value of equation
(10) for all exporters in a country, dividing by the country's aggregate
export value, and replacing the desired value with the observed value of
compensatory export incentives, one can define an "effective exchange
rate":
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Effective Official Average observed
exchange rate = exchange rate + compensatory (12)
for export export incentives
_L export per dollar of
The concept of an effective exchange rate defined in equation (12) is con-
sistent with that in the NBER study (Krueger 1978, Bhagwati and Srinavasan
1978).38/ Comparing equation (11) with equation (12), one can see that as
long as the national average differs from individual exporters' averages on
compensatory export incentives and the observed average differs from the
desired averages, the estimated effective exchange rate can hardly show a
true picture on neutral status for export activities. The effective
exchange rate will only show clearly whether neutral status has been
achieved or not if:
(i) the second and third elements on the right-hand side of equation
(11) are close to zero (i.e., free trade status for exporters is
guaranteed, and primary input markets are competitive); and
(ii) nondiscriminatory tax and financial incentives are employed.
The level of compensatory export incentives, then, simply
indicates whether currency overvaluation is fully compensated or not, and
the resulting effective exchange rate is the sum of the official exchange
rate and the compensation for currency overvaluation:
38/ The effective exchange rate for export is defined as the units of
domestic currency that can be obtained for a dollar's worth of
exports, taking into account compensatory tax, financial, and other
export incentives.
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Effective Official Compensation for
exchange rate =exchange rate + currency over- (13)
for export valuation perL 
_ L 
_ dollar of export
Korea's export incentives, more or less, have always met the conditions
underlying equation (13), and its compensatory export incentives have been
mainly designed to compensate for currency overvaluation. As indicated in
the exchange rate section, the Korean government has maintained stability
in real effective exchange rates (i.e., purchasing power parity-adjusted
effective exchange rates) by means of periodic devaluations and by
compensating for currency overvaluation through tax and financial export
incentives (Westphal and Kim, 1982).
The following discussion groups compensatory export incentives in
three categories: (a) final incentives, (b) tax incentives, and (c) other
incentives.
(a) Financial Incentives
Short-Term Working Capital Export Loans (Pre- and Postshipment)
As Primary Instrument for Automatic Access at Neutral Rate. A
means of guaranteeing that exports will have neutral status vis-a-vis
foreign competitors is to assure automatic access to short-term working
capital export loans should at an interest rate that is close to the
short-term international market interest rate. Certainly, foreign exchange
components of short-term working capital export loans should not carry a
- 142 -
higher interest rate than the international interest rate. LIBOR is
usually considered a parameter representing the international rate. A
means of achieving the parallel objective of guaranteeing neutral status
vis-a-vis domestic competitors, including the beneficiaries of preferential
credit rationing, is to assure automatic access to short-term working
capital export loans at an interest rate that is close to the average
interest rate of domestic bank loans, including various preferential
loans. At the very least, the domestic currency components of these
short-term loans should not carry higher interest rates than the average
rate of domestic bank loans. This does not mean, however, that the
existing interest rate structure for domestic credits in many developing
economies is ideal. Our concern is neutrality for exports, given the
existing structure.
As domestic money and financial markets become competitive and a
single prime market interest rate prevails, the uniform neutral interest
rate charged for short-term working capital export loans should be the
prime rate. (The rationale for guaranteeing a neutral interest rate for
exporters vis-a-vis other beneficiaries of credit rationing will become
more evident in Chapter 7 of the paper.) Domestic beneficiaries of credit
rationing in many developing economies--that is, import substitution
industries-- receive favorable interest rates in addition to other
protection. Therefore, a neutral interest rate offered to exporters is a
first step in equalizing incehtives between exports and import substitutes.
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Table 6 shows the interest rates on short-term working capital
export loans in five East Asian economies as of June 1983. In Korea and
Singapore the interest rates for export loans were either equal to or very
close to the corresponding prime rate. In Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines the differences between interest rates on export loans and
average interest rates on bank loans or various preferential loans did not
appear to be large, even though the differences may be substantial if one
compares these rates with free market rates. In the Philippines, the
interest rates on export loans as of June 1983 were 12-14 percent, while
the weighted average interest rate of commercial bank loans at the end of
1980 was 13.5 percent. Commercial bank loans with preferential interest
rates ranging from 0 to 14 percent were about 60 percent of total
commercial bank loans in 1980, while export loans with interest rates of
12-14 percent made up only 7 percent of total commercial bank loans. It
therefore appears that the interest rates on the export loans were not
higher than the median of the interest rates on different types of loans.
In the case of Indonesia, the government announced a number of sweeping
financial reforms on June 1, 1983. The main reforms were the removal of
ceilings on interest rates on rupia time deposits and the removal of all
quantitative ceilings on bank loans. However, the government retained a 12
percent interest rate ceiling for various preferential loans, compared to a
9 percent interest rate ceiling for export loans.
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Table 6
INTEREST RATES FOR SHORT-TERM WORKING CAPITAL EXPORT LOANS
IN 5 EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES (AS OF JUNE, 1983)
Singapore Korea Malaysia bt Indonesia Philippines f/
Export Loan
For Exporters
(1) Annual Rediscount 10% 4.5% 9% 12%
interest rate + 1.5% (Nontradi-
rate tional exports)
14%
(Traditional
exports)
(2) Export 100% VAL:83%(fl)
Loan as % DIL:90%(f3)
of export FIL:68%(f4) 50% 85% 80%
order(f)a/ DOL:75%(f 2)
For Handling
Banks of Export
Loan
(1) Rediscount 6.5% 5% 3% 3% 3%
rate (Nontradi-
tional exports)
8%
(Traditional
exports)
(2) Rediscount 100% 70% 100% 60% 80%
amount as
percentage
of export
loan
Commercial Bank
Loans
o Weighted Average
Rate 9% 10% 12%C/ 13.5%d/
o Prime Rate 9% 10% 7.5% 18% 17.5%e/
a/ f = fl = f 2 = f 3 ' f4 in Annex II-D.
b/ As of June 1981. Currently, the annual interest rate for exporters is 5%
and the rediscount rate is 3.5%.
c/ Interest rate of all preferential loans refinanced by Bank Indonesia other
than export loans after June 1983.
d/ (Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical Bulletin, 1981).
e/ As of June 1980.
f/ In November 1983 the export loan interest rates were changed as shown
below:
Export Loan for Exporters: MRR (Manila Reference Rate) - 2% for
nontraditional exports
MRR for traditional exports
Rediscount Rate: 7% for nontraditional exports
8% for traditional exports
(MRR was 16% in November 1983)
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As a Subsidiary Compensatory Instrument: The use of short-term
working capital loans as a compensatory instrument to achieve neutral
status for exports is less important than guaranteeing automatic access to
short-term financing at neutral rates. However, short-term working capital
export loans have been utilized as a compensatory instrument in many
developing countries at the early stages of their export development. The
following are the major reasons for doing so:
(i) In an economy in which the export financing system is successful
in achieving the task assigned to the aforementioned primary
instrument, it is most convenient administratively to use the
well-designed and well-managed export financing system as the
subsidiary instrument, because all one has to do is to change the
neutral interest rate to a lower rate.
(ii) A preferential interest rate for short-term working capital
loans is neutral with respect to choice of techniques, unlike
preferential investment capital loans, which are capital-biased.
(iii) Since commercial banks in developing economies generally have
better human resources than, say, customs or internal revenue
services, one can expect better administrative efficiency if a
compensatory incentive tool is managed by commercial banks.
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(iv) It has been assumed that preferential interest rates may be less
controversial than alternative compensatory tools (such as
reduced taxes or cash rebates) in dealing with potential retalia-
tion from importing countries (except for the United States),
since developed countries offer preferential interest rates on
exports sold on credit.39 / (Balassa and Sharpston 1977).
From Table 19 of Annex I, one may infer that (i) a neutral
interest rate has been assured for export loans in Korea, and (ii) interest
rates have been used at times as a supplementary instrument to compensate
for exchange rate overvaluation. The gap between the prime rate and the
interest rate on export loans has declined monotonically during the last 12
years (and was completely eliminated in the middle of 1982); preferential
loan interest rates have gradually become more uniform, and exchange rate
overvaluation has gradually been reduced due to a more flexible exchange
rate. In turn, Korea's interest rate for working capital export loans in
foreign currencies (for importing intermediate inputs for export
production) has been based on the LIBOR since the middle of 1970 in order
to reflect the scarcity of foreign exchange (as shown in Table 20 of Annex
I).
39/ For example, GATT has never effectively come to grips with the subject
of export finance, even though it has been active in tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers, maybe because export credit has usually been
regarded as an OECD responsibility.
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In the case of Singapore, the gap between the prime rate and the
export financing rate has never exceeded one (or one-and-a-half) per-
cent.40/ While there has been no need for government-supported export
loans in Hong Kong because of easy access to local financial institutions
and a free flow of international financial resources (the results of
efficient financial institution development), the market interest rate is
not uninfluenced by government policies. At least two instruments are
being used to influence effective interest rates on deposits. One is the
Hong Kong Association of Banks' Interest Agreement, which sets the maximum
interest rates that can be paid by banks on various types of deposits. The
other is manipulation of the tax rates on interest income. In 1982 the
government abolished the tax on interest on foreign currency deposits held
in Hong Kong. The tax had tended to impede local financial institutions in
competing with other international centers for funds, particularly funds
for large syndications. At the same time, the government reduced the
withholding tax on Hong Kong dollar deposits from 15 percent to 10
percent. This policy stimulated deposits (estimated to be in the range of
15 billion Hong Kong dollars in early 1983). An administered interest
structure for local deposits has been defended because of a lack of
monetary alternatives in the form of more stringent liquidity
requirements. Total abolition of the withholding tax on local deposits has
been objected to on the ground that it would reduce government revenues.
40/ There may be two explanations for Singapore',s export financing system
and its interest preferences. One is the compensatory export
incentives argument under externality associated with exporting. The
other is the less-than-perfectly competitive money and financial market
argument under the imperfect information (see Stiglutz and Weiss,
1981).
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The interest preferences on export loans in the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Malaysia do not appear to be very significant when compared
with interest rates on local preferential loans in light of the various
anti-export bias created in these economies through other policies. Since
short-term working capital export loans are for periods of no more than two
or three months, the average annual loan balance used to estimate the
magnitude of the incentive stemming from preferential interest rates is
only one-sixth to one-quarter the loan amount.
We reemphasize here the importance of having a proper perspective
on the relative administrative difficulties involved in achieving the
primary objective of automatic access to financing and the secondary
objective of compensating for non-neutral elements, as well as the relative
importance of these loans. Changing an export loan interest rate upward or
downward can be done overnight: all that is required is a new central bank
decree. But such action does not influence export performance
significantly, since there are alternative instruments to compensate for
anti-export bias. To achieve the primary objective of assuring automatic
access to working capital loans at a neutral interest rate for all
activities generating export value added demands painstaking institution-
building efforts that may take anywhere from a few to a great many years,
depending on conditions that vary from country to country. But the
consequences of failing to achieve this objective are far more serious than
the impact of interest rate changes.
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Medium- and Long-Term Loans for Exports on Deferred Payment Basis
The use of preferential interest ratesron medium and long-term
loans on a deferred payment basis are merely designed to compensate expor-
ters in developing economies for any disadvantages they may suffer in the
world market when developed economies use similar practices. OECD's
attempts to harmonize and regulate the terms of export credits among the
developed economies have made clear the extent to which preferential loans
are used by developed economies to promote their exports. In 1978, the
OECD countries established voluntary guidelines setting up minimum interest
rates and ceilings on maturities and stipulating minimum down payments and
maximum local cost financing for officially supported export credits.
Rapid changes in interest rates, inflation, and exchange rates have made it
difficult to establish international norms for credit terms. This question
has been the subject of extensive discussions and studies in the OECD; the
Wallen report has drawn attention to the deficiency of arrangements
stemming from lack of definition of such key concepts as "interest rates"
and "official support" (Dunn and Knight 1982).
Additional problems have been raised by the creation of "mixed
credits," a technique in which public funds are combined with private
export credits to finance down payments and the local costs associated with
large projects. Mixed credits have substantially reduced the effective
borrowing costs of importers to levels well below those established in the
OECD arrangements and are generally contrary to the practice of official
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export credit agencies. Protracted negotiations led to the adoption of a
new agreement that established three categories of importing countries:
those in the first category represent relatively rich countries, those in
the second category include some of the more rapidly industrializing
countries, while the third category represents relatively poor countries.
Each category has corresponding interest rates and maturities that apply to
it. A comprehensive revision of these guidelines was made in October
1983. One key element of the revised new agreement was to introduce the
automatic semi-annual interest rate adjustment mechanisms so as to reflect
changing money market conditions for different currencies (Table 21 of
Annex I). It should be kept in mind that most of the transactions covered
by this agreement involve capital goods exported by OECD countries on a
deferred payment basis.
Since exports made on a deferred payment basis are mostly capital
goods, plant exports, or overseas construction projects, the amount of
medium- and long-term loans from developing economies for such exports is
not large compared to the amount of short-term working capital export loans
(mostly preshipment). The relative shares of such loans made by advanced
developing economies is increasing, however.
The Export-Import Bank of Korea provides medium and long-term
loans for Korean exports on a deferred payment basis. The major export
items covered are ships, plants, rolling stock, machinery, and technical
services. The annual interest rate charged for local currency loans is
generally nine percent, while interest on foreign currency loans is based
on the LIBOR. The Export Credit Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd.
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introduced a Fixed Rate Export Finance Scheme in 1979 that provides
exporters with medium and long-term financing at fixed preferential rates
of interest for capital good exports sold on credit for two years or more.
Only exports that are guaranteed by the ECICS are eligible for this type of
financing. The scheme was suspended in February 1981, reintroduced in July
1981, and then suspended again. Under the scheme, ECICS would underwrite
bank loans up to 80 percent of the Singapore content of the contract value,
subject to a maximum of $40 million for each contract at a fixed interest
rate. The difference between the fixed interest rate and the market rate
would be paid by the government. As indicated above, there is no medium or
long-term export financing scheme in Malaysia, Indonesia, or the
Philippines.
Investment Capital Assistance
As pointed out above, the justification for establishing
unlimited access to investment capital financing for export industries may
be less than the justification for working capital financing. But due to
the underdevelopment of the capital market in most developing economies,
neutrality vis-a-vis investment capital financing must be assured to
exporters as well. This is especially true if most exporters are having
difficulties obtaining investment capital and if constraints on production
capacity are the chief obstacle to export expansion.
- 152 -
Korea has made three types of investment capital loans available
for export industries: (i) foreign currency loans to finance imports of
capital goods for export industries, (ii) investment loans for export
industries, (iii) loans for small and medium-scale export industries. Even
though these three types together did not exceed 15-20 percent of total
export loans during 1975-79 (as shown in Table 11 of Annex I), suggesting
that short-term working capital loans accounted for the major share, the
government's attempts to establish neutrality were reflected by these
arrangements. These loans provided the support that exporters (including
potential exporters) needed to expand their operations, based on their
export targets or plans. In particular, investment capital loans were
critical in bringing new small exporters into export activities at the same
time that the domestic L/C system provided them with preshipment working
capital financing. Preferential interest rates for investment capital
loans for export industries, as well as for all other types of loans, were
abolished in 1982.
Singapore provides no special capital assistance for export
industries. However, in view of the small size of Singapore's domestic
market and the country's heavy reliance on exports for GNP and employment,
it may be reasonable to assume that most preferential investment capital
schemes are related to exports, directly or indirectly. Unlike Korea,
Singapore's financial assistance to private firms, administered by an
Economic Development Board (EDB) established in 1961, includes both loans
and equities. (Virtually all exporting firms in Korea are privately owned
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except for one integrated steel mill and one agricultural product process-
ing corporation.) The Board's Capital Assistance Scheme, established in
1975, provides financial assistance in the form of term loans up to 10
years or equity participation of up to 50 percent to medium-scale, high-
technology projects which may have difficulty in raising funds from commer-
cial sources. The Small Industries Finance Scheme of the EDB is a loan
scheme with low interest rates aimed at encouraging the further development
and technical upgrading of the operations of small industries which serve a
vital role in providing supporting services for larger companies. Thus,
even in an international financial center like Singapore, it appears that
equal availability of long-term financing and EDB's less stringent
standards of creditworthiness have been important, due to the non-neutral
status of small industries and the externality involved in technology
development (Tan and Hock 1983).
Currently, there appear to be no special investment capital
financing schemes for privately owned export firms in Malaysia, Indonesia,
or the Philippines. In view of the underdeveloped status of capital
markets for long-term financing and the predominance of credit rationing in
working and investment capital financing granted to import substitution
industries in these countries, it appears important to assure exporters of
neutrality in obtaining both working and investment capital financing.
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Other Financial Incentive Schemes
Financial assistance for overseas marketing, new product develop-
ment, and R & D is given to export-related firms in certain countries.
Korea gives general trading companies access to foreign currency loans to
promote their overseas marketing and information-gathering activities. The
Product Development Assistance Scheme of Singapore's EDB offers financial
assistance to cover up to 50 percent of the direct costs of a product
development or process improvement project. Singapore's Skills Development
Fund, set up in 1979, offers three kinds of financial assistance, a
"training grant scheme," an "interest grant for mechanization scheme," and
a "development consultancy scheme." These schemes may be designed to
compensate for externality of technology mastery or private risks that are
higher than social risks. There appear to be no similar schemes available
for private exporters in Malaysia, Indonesia, or the Philippines.
(b) Tax Incentives
Table 7 provides an overview of the various tax incentives being
implemented as of June 1983 for export industries in the six East Asian
economies discussed in this paper. Because indirect tax exemptions for
export industries merely provide tax neutrality vis-a-vis import substitu-
tion industries paying indirect taxes where the destination principle 41/
41/ The destination principle of indirect taxation entails levying indirect
taxes on goods consumed locally, whether they are of domestic or of
foreign origin, and rebating indirect taxes paid on exports and their
inputs.
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of indirect taxation is applied, they are not genuine tax incentives.
Therefore, income tax reductions of one form or another are the major tax
incentives for exporters. Depending on the basis for tax reductions or
deductions, we classify tax incentive schemes as follows: (i) profit-based;
(ii) sales-based; (iii) value added-based; (iv) specific expense
(noncapital) based; and (v) investment-based.
At the outset of this paper we stressed domestic tax neutrality
as one key element in maintaining neutral status for export activities.
This can be achieved only if compensatory tax incentive measures result in
tax neutrality, with differential tax treatment being used strictly to
maintain neutrality in exchange rates, trade, financing, and primary input
prices.
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Table 7
TAX INCESrIIUS F. ER URr INmiuIsnES IN SIX EASr ASIAN C RIES
(AS OF JUNE 1983)
Singapore Korea g Kg Malaysia Pilippines Indonesia
(a) Profit-Based
(1) Low Uniform x
incane tax
rate.
(2) Income Tax x
Reduction for
Marufactured
Exports
(3) Income Tax x x
Reduction for
Special Foreign
Exdcange Earnirg
Activities
(b) Sales-Based
74) Income Tax x
Deduction for
Export Alloawnce
(Proportional to
Sales Level)
(c) Value Added-
Based
(5) Income Tax x
Credit on Net
Local Content
of Export.
(d) Specific
Expense-Based(6) Income Tax x x
Reduction for
Overseas Market-
irg or Promotional
Expenses
(7) Reserve Account x
for Marketirg
Expenses
(e) Investient-
Based
(8) Accelerated x
Depreciation
Allowance for
Export
Industries
(9) Investment Tax x
Credit
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Profit-Based Incentives
The simplest and most straightforward tax incentive is the income
tax reduction for export profits currently being implemented in Singapore.
A Singapore manufacturing company designated as an export enterprise enjoys
a concessionary tax rate of 4 percent instead of the normal tax rate of 40
percent, which is equivalent to a 90 percent reduction on profits earned
for a period of five years. If the company is already qualified for
completely tax free operations for five years under what is called pioneer
status (see below), this concession may be granted for another three
years. Tax relief periods of up to 15 years may also be granted to export
enterprises which have incurred or intend to incur substantial fixed
capital expenditures. This tax reduction scheme in Singapore is a marked
contrast to Hong Kong's tax incentives, which rely on a low uniform rate
rather than on differentiated rates for different activities. The tax
rates on profits in Hong Kong are a uniform 15 percent on individuals and
partnerships carrying on a business, and 17 percent on corporations.
Singapore's income tax relief system for exporters started in 1967 under
the Economic Expansion Incentives Act. In Korea, income tax reduction
incentives (a uniform 50 percent reduction on all income tax liabilities on
export activities) were used very effectively during a period of about 10
years from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, which was a critical stage in
export development there.
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In addition to the 90 percent reduction offered to export enter-
prises, Singapore provides a 50 percent income tax reduction for certain
foreign exchange earning operations, such as trading companies, inter-
national consultancy services, and warehousing and servicing operations.
For these operations, a concessionary tax of 20 percent on foreign exchange
earning profits for five years is permitted to substitute for the standard
rate of 40 percent. A similar tax incentive (a 50 percent income tax
reduction for five years) is available in Korea for construction and plant
export operations. These income tax reductions have two advantages when
used as export incentives: (i) the scheme is administratively simple and
easy to manage42 / and (ii) it rewards greater efficiency because it is
based on profit.
Sales-Based Incentives
Malaysia's income tax deduction for export allowances is a
sales-based tax incentive. The allowance consisted of 2 percent of a
company's total export sales (ex-factory value) during the basis year, and
10 percent of any increase in export sales in the basis year over export
sales in the immediately preceding year until 1982. Since 1983 the
allowance is 5 percent of total export value. This export allowance is
given as a deduction from gross income. It can only be claimed by
manufacturer-exporters of manufactured products. Companies that have been
granted pioneer status, labor utilization relief (see below), or locational
42/ For a company selling on both the domestic and export markets, the
sales share of exports is usually used to estimate export profits as a
share of total profits in light of the administrative burden of using
other sophisticated criteria.
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incentives do not qualify. Logically, any method of compensating for
anti-export bias to achieve neutral status must be based on value added or
net foreign exchange earnings rather than gross sales. But questions can
be raised as to why an increment in foreign exchange earnings should
receive a greater incentive than other foreign exchange earnings. This
scheme therefore appears less appealing conceptually than a value added-
based incentive scheme, even though it is easier to administer.
Value Added-Based Incentives
The Philippines' system of granting income tax credit on the net
local content of exports is a value-added based incentive scheme.
According to the 1983 Investment Incentives Policy of the Philippines, for
the first five years of commercial operation or registration, all new or
expanding export producers are entitled to a tax credit equivalent to 10
percent of net local content.43/ For another period of five years
immediately following, the tax credit is computed on the basis of the
increment in real terms over the average net local content for the
immediately preceding three years. Registered indirect export producers
are granted a tax credit of five percent of net value earned.44 / The
value added-based tax incentive is the most ideal form of tax incentive.
43/ Net local content means value of export sales less depreciation of
capital equipment and the value of imported raw materials and supplies
and indigenous commodities which the government may exclude if they are
not available under clearly more favorable terms in the international
market.
44/ Net value earned means value of sales less cost of raw materials and
components, supplies and utilities, and depreciation of capital
equipment.
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However, highly efficient administrative arrangements are needed to
implement. this particular type of scheme. A modernized export financing
system would provide an important basis for such administrative
arrangements by linking export, import, and domestic L/C mechanisms to the
value added-based tax incentive instrument.
Specific Noncapital Expense-Based Incentives
Singapore's system of double income tax deductions for overseas
marketing expenses, Malaysia's similar scheme for certain export promotion
expenses, and Korea's income tax allowance for various "reserve accounts,"
including overseas marketing expenses, are specific noncapital expense-
based tax incentives. Singapore's double tax deduction scheme for R & D
expenses is another specific expense-based incentive, even though it is not
directly related to exports.
Investment-Based Incentives
Singapore's investment tax credit scheme and Korea's accelerated
depreciation allowances are investment-based tax incentives. Singapore's
investment tax credit is an alternative to using pioneer status incentives
or tax reductions for export profits. Pioneer status tax incentives, which
are being implemented in Singapore and Malaysia, are the most important
investment-based tax incentive scheme not directly related to export
activities. Singapore's pioneer status incentive provides for complete
exemption from income tax (i.e., a tax holiday) for a period of 5 to 10
years from initial production by a manufacturing company. Since longer
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pioneer periods are offered for projects involving higher fixed investment,
the resulting incentive value is proportional to the size of the
investment. Therefore, this type of incentive is biased toward
capital-intensive projects.
Malaysia's investment incentives not directly related to exports,
other than its pioneer status incentive (which allows 2 to 12 years tax
holidays), are the investment tax credit, the increased capital allowance,
the accelerated depreciation allowance, and the reinvestment allowance
(Rhee 1980a). In addition, Malaysia's labor utilization relief plan can be
considered a labor-based incentive scheme. In this scheme, the number of
income tax holiday years is proportional to the number of jobs created.
Since the scheme is based on the absolute size of employment (and not on
the employment/capital ratio), its impact is capital-biased in the sense
that it favors the large firm that is able to make large investments.
(c) Other Compensatory Export Incentives
Besides financial and tax incentives, other types of compensatory
export incentives are also used to achieve neutral status for private firms
engaged in export activities. These other types of compensatory export
incentives may be grouped as (i) import protection-related incentives, (ii)
infrastructure support and, (iii) technical or marketing assistance.
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Import Protection-Related Incentives
A wastage allowance scheme allows additional wastages on top of
the normally required input-output coefficients in administering duty-free
imports of intermediate inputs for export production. Through this scheme,
efficient firms can benefit by selling the residual inputs imported duty-
free that have been saved in the process of producing export commodities in
the protected local market. Input coefficients are set in such a way, how-
ever, that some inefficient firms would suffer from negative effective pro-
tection rates in the event that the coefficients were not sufficient to
produce given export items due to extra wastages caused by inefficient
operations. An Import-Export Link System permits the import of prohibited
or restricted items that can be sold in the domestic market at protected
prices in exchange for exporting specified goods. On a highly selective
basis, Korea used these compensatory tools in the early stages of its
export development. This incentive scheme is not easy to implement in a
developing economy in which administrative arrangements for export incen-
tives are not modernized and not well-managed.
Infrastructure Support
Industrial parks and infrastructure facilities for export indus-
tries can be important compensatory incentives. Singapore's Jurong Town
Corporation, established in 1968, has provided industrial sites and facili-
ties that can be purchased or rented at reasonable prices by exporting
firms. Infrastructural support for the Singapore Science Park is one of
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the most recent attempts by the Singapore government to redirect its indus-
tries toward high technology. Korea's export development has benefited
much from its well-designed and managed port facilities, export processing
zones, and other infrastructures. As of March 1983 there were two free
trade zones, seven specialized manufacturing processing zones (mostly
export-oriented), and 14 regional industrial estates in Korea. Even the
Hong Kong government, which does not provide any special financial or tax
incentives for exporters, has been involved in industrial parks and factory
development for priority industries. Malaysia and the Philippines have
been active in providing industrial park and infrastructure facilities,
including FTZs for manufactured goods exporters. Currently, the Indonesian
government is keen on developing export processing zones for manufactured
exports.
Technical Assistance
Government assistance on such matters as product engineering,
quality control, skill upgrading, marketing, accounting, and management is
very important to manufacturers and traders, especially in the early stages
of export development. However, the fact that Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Korea still provide such assistance implies that its importance extends
beyond the early stages. Singapore's Economic Development Board operates
its own training centers and institutes of technology in collaboration with
the private sector and other governments. The Hong Kong Productivity
Center (which is the executive arm of the Hong Kong Productivity Council
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financed by an annual government subvention and fees earned from its ser-
vices) provides consultancy and technical services on subjects ranging from
electronics data processing and production management to technology trans-
fer. It also conducts a wide range of training programs in industrial
technology, management techniques, and electronic data processing. Korea
has public agencies (such as the Advanced Institute of Science and Techno-
logy) that are engaged in technical assistance and training for many
manufacturing firms, most of whom are exporters. Korea also operates an
efficient quality control inspection agency for exporters. In the area of
public assistance for overseas marketing, the activities of the Korea Trade
Promotion Corporation, the Korea Traders Association, the Singapore Trade
Development Board, and the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (discussed
below) are most notable. But it appears that there is much to be done in
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines in these areas of technical
assistance for export manufacturers and traders.
(d) Conclusions
An examination of the successful East Asian countries' compensa-
tory export incentives shows that guaranteeing automatic and equal access
to preshipment short-term working capital export loans to all firms
generating export value added is much more important and difficult than
adjusting interest rates of these loans as a compensatory incentive instru-
ment. This examination also shows that, while various tax incentives have
been quite effective at certain stages of export development in establish-
ing neutral status, the importance of other compensatory export incentives
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such as import protection-related incentives, infrastructure support, and
technical assistance should not be overlooked.
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CHAPTER VII
EXTENDED NEUTRAL STATUS
Extended neutral status was defined in Chapter I as a situation
in which the level of export incentives is as high as the level of incen-
tives for import substitution activities. The theoretical justification
for implementing extended neutral status for export industries is that
unless the effective incentives for export activities are close to the
corresponding effective incentives for import substitution activities,
private producers will prefer to sell their products in the domestic
market. As for the empirical justification for extended neutral status for
export industries, there are at least two hypotheses: the incentive
neutrality hypothesis and the allocative and X-inefficiency hypothesis. As
explained in Chapter I, the three major empirical studies on trade regimes
and the industrial development performance of developing countries have
reached the same conclusion: the economies that have maintained extended
neutral status for industrial export industries have performed far better
in terms of exports and economic growth than the economies that have failed
to do so. The incentive neutrality hypothesis claims that these studies
provide empirical support for the aforementioned theoretical reasoning. It
argues that economies that have maintained extended neutral status for
export industries will perform better because they have achieved optimum
allocation of resources and maximization of economic efficiency by
following the theory of incentive neutrality. On the other hand, the
allocative and X-inefficiency hypothesis stresses the misallocation of
resources and chronic inefficiencies found in economies that have failed to
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achieve modified neutral status due to excessive protection for import
substitution industries. Therefore, these two hypotheses do not conflict
with each other, even though the emphasis in each hypothesis is somewhat
different. These studies, however, have generally defined extended neutral
status at an aggregate level.
But extended neutral status that is not built on neutral status
at the micro level incorporates many elements that are inconsistent with an
efficient incentive system, because such extended neutral status results in
tremendous variation in effective incentives for different exporters.
Under neutral status at the firm and product level, on the other hand,
effective incentives are uniform across the board for all exporters.
Returning again to the example first presented in Chapter I, in a
country in which exporters must pay duties that are the same as those paid
by import substitution firms (meaning that neutral status at the product
and firm level has not been achieved), economy-wide extended neutral status
can be achieved by conferring huge cash grants on a few exporters. This
results in an aggregate effective subsidy rate for export that is equal to
that for import substitution. Under such extended neutral status, however,
the maximum contribution of all exporters to export success can hardly be
expected: those exporters with negative effective incentives are not on an
equal footing in regard to undistorted markets and policies with both
foreign competitors and domestic import substitution firms.
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(a) Empirical Evidence
Before we review the empirical evidence on neutral status and
extended neutral status for the export industries in the six East Asian
economies, let us first examine the empirical evidence on the critical
importance of the internal structure of modified neutral status for export
activities.
We can do this by comparing Korea with another developing
country at a similar stage of industrial maturity, Brazil. According to
the NBER study, Korea and Brazil have both maintained Phase IV systematic-
ally since the latter half of the 1960s (Krueger 1978). Phase IV precedes
the most liberal of the five phases outlined in that study. World Bank
studies on Korea and Brazil indicate that the gap between effective incen-
tives for import substitution and effective incentives for export in the
two countries has been almost negligible at the aggregate level in recent
years (Westphal and Kim 1982, World Bank 1983). Therefore, one can con-
clude that Brazil and Korea have more or less achieved extended neutral
status (defined at the aggregate level) for their export industries. How-
ever, as far as extended neutral status at the micro level is concerned,
there is a marked difference between the two countries. Whereas Korea's
extended neutral status has been built on neutral status as defined at the
firm or product level, Brazil's aggregate extended neutral status had no
micro-level counterpart until 1982.
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More specifically, Korea's administration of exports has been
based on the basic principles of automaticity and equal treatment of all
activities generating export value added. Thus, Korea has succeeded in
achieving neutral status for all activities generating export value added
at the product and firm level, even though it has not assured extended
neutral status across the board at that level.
Brazil's export incentive system, on the other hand, has used
financial and tax incentives to achieve an aggregate extended neutrality.
Instead of automaticity and equal treatment of all export activities, such
elements as the "law of similars" and "enterprise-specific" discretionary
assistance have been built into Brazil's export incentive system. As a
result, neutral status for export industries at the product and firm level
has not been achieved. Many exporters could enjoy neither duty-free and
restriction-free imports (until 1982) nor automatic access to export
financing, while large discretionary tax and financial incentives were
provided for selected exporters. At the aggregate level, negative and
positive incentives cancelled each other, yielding extended neutral
status. The result, however, was extreme variation in incentives among
exporters and potential exporters, discouraging participation in the
country's export drive by those firms subject to negative incentives of
less than free trade status. This comparison between Korea and Brazil
suggests that guaranteeing neutral status for all activities generating
export value added at the product and firm level is much more important
than providing a extended neutral status for export industries at the
aggregate level.
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Singapore has been similar to Korea in guaranteeing neutral
status for export activities by (i) providing free access to intermediate
inputs and export financing, (ii) paying competitive market wages to
workers, and (iii) compensating for exchange rate overvaluation (before a
competitive foreign exchange market was developed) by means of compensatory
export incentives (Tan and Hock 1982). If there have been differences
between Singapore and Korea, they may be that Singapore has placed rela-
tively greater importance on tax and financial incentives, while Korea has
placed relatively greater importance on selective import protection.
Singapore still maintains substantial tax and financial incentives for
export industries in a virtually free trade economy; Korea maintains
selective import protection for domestic sales, but differential tax and
financial incentives for exporters have almost been eliminated. What, one
may ask, is the rationale for tax and financial incentives for export
industries in Singapore, with its free trade? To answer this question, we
have to rely on the externality hypothesis, which is discussed in Chapter
VIII.
Hong Kong is a classic case in which an extended neutral status
for export activities collapsed to neutral status for all activities. Hong
Kong's impressive export and economic development has been based on the
neutrality of incentives maintained by free international trade and compe-
titive markets for money, finance, capital, labor, and foreign exchange
(Geiger and Geiger 1975, Little 1981). Of course, one should not overlook
the historical, cultural, locational, and other factors that have made such
free market mechanisms possible. The Hong Kong government's contribution
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to such areas as infrastructure and technical assistance cannot be ignored
either. Furthermore, the institutional mechanisms (public and private)
that have resulted in dynamism and vitality in private enterprise and
induced foreign participation must be carefully examined (see Chapter
VIII).
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia are all attempting to
move toward neutral or extended neutral status as part of their effort to
rationalize trade and industrial policies. However, in light of their
legacies of inward-oriented policies, export strategies based heavily on
free trade zones, and primary good export-oriented policies, it will take
these countries quite some time to achieve aggregate extended neutral
status (see Rhee 1980a, Bautista, Power and Associates 1979, World Bank
1981a). In light of the experiences of Brazil, Korea, Singapore, and Hong
Kong, it clearly seems important to provide neutral status at the product
and firm level in most developing economies.
(b) Threats for Retaliation and Policy Options
In principle, any compensatory export incentives designed to
achieve neutral status in developing countries should not be subjects of
dispute with importing countries on grounds that such incentives constitute
unfair trade practices. If one takes one compensatory financial or tax
incentive instrument (designed to achieve neutral status for exporters)
separately and argues that it is an "export subsidy," then such argument
appears to be partial since an export subsidy can be evaluated properly
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only by comparing the parameter values of all compensatory export incentive
instruments with currency overvaluation, the excess of current and capital
input costs for export production over free trade prices, and the excess of
primary input costs over competitive market prices. By definition, neutral
status means zero export subsidies. In fact, the spirit of the Code on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties agreed upon at the Tokyo Round of trade
and tariff negotiations recognizing the special position of developing
countries appears to be compatible with our view on the temporary role of
compensatory export incentive instruments designed to achieve neutrality.
While the Code prohibits the use of "export subsidies," it recognizes
"domestic subsidies" as legitimate policy instruments so long as their use
does not lead to an adverse effect on other countries. Here, the term
"export subsidies" appears to mean aggregate export incentives that exceed
neutral status. The "domestic subsidies" appear to be equivalent to
compensatory -export incentives designed to achieve neutral status.
Therefore, the code, in principle, appears to recognize the right of
developing countries to use compensatory incentive tools to achieve neutral
status. This right is subject to the qualifications that (i) compensatory
incentives should not have an adverse effect on the production or trade of
another signatory and (ii) the developing countries should endeavor to
reduce or eliminate such compensatory incentives when they are
"inconsistent with their competitive and development needs." These
qualifications appear to suggest that so long as compensatory export
incentives do no more than assure neutral status for exporters, they'do not
harm any importing or competing country producers and therefore are
acceptable as temporary measures (Kemper 1980, Nayyar 1979).
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In practice, however, agencies investigating charges of unfair
trade practices often base their arguments on the reasoning which may be
different from our reasoning on neutral status. If one argues that the
existence of export subsidies is proved by isolated compensatory tax or
financial incentive instruments, and neglecting the existence of currency
overvaluation, excesses of current and capital input costs for export
production over free trade prices, and excesses of primary input costs for
export production over competitive market prices, such an argument appears
to be tantamount to an unwillingness to recognize and accept the
second-best policies that are sometimes used by the developing countries as
interim measures before they can adopt first-best policies. The
development process is always a transitional process moving from one
equilibrium to another, and compensatory export incentives must be
understood as the temporary measures needed in such a transitional
process.
But, in light of threats of retaliation, various definitions of
export subsidies which may be different from our definition of "aggregate
export incentives that exceed neutral status", and the conventional wisdom
based on classical welfare economics, developing countries are well advised
to do their best to achieve neutral status for export industries at the
micro level, with minimum utilization of compensatory tax and financial
incentive tools. They can achieve this by: (i) making the exchange rate
more flexible, (ii) modernizing their export financing system, including a
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nondiscriminatory interest rate, (iii) assuring that the administration of
export production and duty exemption/drawback systems is well-designed and
well-managed, and (iv) making the labor market more competitive. If
compensatory export incentives are absolutely essential to achieving
neutral status, they are best employed as temporary measures. The danger
of retaliation is greater if a developing country relies heavily on
compensatory fiscal and tax incentive instruments to achieve extended
neutral status for export industries under a very high import protection
wall. In that case, highest priority on the export side should be given to
assuring neutral status at the product and firm level.
The burden of narrowing the gap in effective incentives between
exports and import substitution can be accomplished largely by lowering
import protection levels. To the extent that protection for an infant
industry is justified (Westphal 1981 and 1982), some of the burden of
narrowing the gap in effective incentives between exports and import
substitution can be shared by such indirect and temporary means as import
protection-related compensatory export incentives. Such import-export
related incentives are feasible if a producer sells in both the export and
domestic markets.
Finally, developing countries are advised to put more resources
into indirect export incentives that are not controversial, such as
infrastructures, technical assistance, and institutional mechanisms for
private and public collaboration in overseas marketing, foreign factor
inducements, and private sector mobilization. Institution-building for
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efficient administrative arrangements designed to provide free access to
intermediate inputs and financing for all activities generating export
value added should also be emphasized. Investments for domestic L/C,
preshipment guarantee, modernized exort financing, export credit insurance,
and duty drawback systems do not arouse controversy.
Since the possibility of retaliation depends on the product and
the market for which exports are destined, it is an important function of
the government of a developing country to collect and disseminate to its
exporters timely information on potential retaliation. Also, it may be
necessary to fine-tune compensatory tax and financial incentives by care-
fully evaluating the risks of retaliation for different products in
different markets.
(c) Conclusions
The experiences of the successful East Asian countries show us
that guaranteeing neutral status at the product and firm level for all
activities that generate export value added is much more important than
achieving extended neutral status at the aggregate level, and that focusing
on the former rather than the latter offers the additional advantage that
neutral status at the product and firm level, when achieved without relying
on compensatory export incentives, does not invite any retaliation from
importing countries, while extended neutral status at the aggregate level
may bring about complex controversies and risks of retaliation.
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A first step for a country that wishes to achieve extended
neutral status is to maintain neutral status at the product and firm
level. A second step is to place the major burden of achieving extended
neutral status on lowering import protection. A third step, if additional
export incentives beyond neutral status are sought, is to adopt noncontro-
versial and less risky incentives such as institutional support, overhead
structure, and technical assistance.
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CHAPTER VIII
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
The conventional export incentives and administrative arrange-
ments discussed earlier are the necessary conditions for successful export
development and rational industrial and trade policies. However, without
two additional (and unconventional) elements, the conventional incentives
can hardly assure success. First, the conventional export incentives and
administrative arrangements will be useless unless they are effectively
implemented through sound institutional mechanisms. Therefore, identifica-
tion of the factors determining effective implementation of export policies
and administration is as important as designing incentive instruments and
systems for rational policies. Second, the conventional export incentives
and administrative arrangements will make little difference in export
development (even if well-implemented) if producers, investors, and traders
in a developing economy do not respond aggressively to rational incentive
policies. The key to export success is the ability of producers and
traders to respond to incentives as well as price and quantity signals in
the internal and external markets. If such ability does not exist in the
business community, then it is also a responsibility of the government to
become a catalyst in creating it.
Two things appear common to the success of Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Korea: (i) a stable and efficient government that is committed to an
outward-looking development strategy and (ii) a synergistic partnership
between the government and the private sector in export development.
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Although political leadership may be committed to an outward-
oriented development strategy, what institutional mechanisms translate that
commitment into actions by the bureaucracy and by business firms? The
export incentives designed to achieve neutral status or extended neutral
status may be satisfactory, but what institutional mechanisms make it
possible to implement export policies effectively? Private firms may be
full of vitality and dynamism, and the relationship between business and
government may be very close, but what institutional mechanisms support the
private sector's vitality and dynamism, and make the relationship between
business and government possible?
These are the kinds of questions we attempt to deal with here.
In many developing countries, many institutions deal with export incentives
that fail to achieve neutral status for export activities, and there are
also numerous export promotion agencies that neither function well nor
contribute much to generating vitality and dynamism. We are not interested
in simply listing such institutions or agencies, describing their legally
defined tasks, or drawing their organization charts. We are interested in
the key institutional mechanisms that can result in effective action. As
Lewis (1984) states, "At issue is the working of institutions that
influence decisions, and the changing of these institutions through time."
(a) Commitment to an Outward-Oriented Strategy
Without a strong -political commitment to an outward-oriented
development strategy, a developing economy can hardly expect to have the
- 179 -
efficient institutional mechanisms it needs to implement export policies
designed to achieve neutral status or extended neutral status for export
industries. The analytic and empirical basis of an outward-oriented
strategy is either the incentive neutrality hypothesis or the allocative
and X-inefficiency hypothesis. Therefore, an outward orientation is merely
designed to prevent mistakes stemming from excessive protection for import
substitution industries. Consequently, it is wrong to interpret outward
orientation as a policy of "export at any cost." In fact, an outward-
oriented strategy encourages efficient import substitution as much as it
encourages efficient export. An outward-oriented strategy therefore never
condones export development based on "subsidies" properly defined, since
any export development that needs such subsidies must be inefficient. An
inward-oriented strategy tends to support inefficient import substitution;
an outward-oriented strategy supports neither inefficient import substitu-
tion nor inefficient export, while it supports both efficient export and
efficient import substitution. Thus, an outward-oriented strategy means
the optimum strategy that supports only efficient outward orientation and
efficient inward orientation.
One cannot argue, therefore, that an outward-oriented strategy is
not needed for a country with a huge domestic market. While an efficient
inward orientation is necessary in such a country, an efficient outward
orientation should not be discouraged. Malaysia's "Look East" policy,
announced in late 1981, appears to reflect its commitment for an outward-
oriented strategy (Asian Wall Street Journal, Nov. 11-12, 1983).
Indonesia's January 1982 Export Policy (Government of Indonesia, 1982)
- 180 -
reflects that government's intention to promote export. The Philippines'
recent reforms of duties and BOI incentives reflect the government's policy
to move toward an outward orientation.
(b) Externality of Export Activity
One important aspect of an outward-oriented strategy is closely
related to the externality hypothesis. According to the externality hypo-
thesis, the overwhelming superiority of an outward-oriented strategy stems
from the beneficial externality of export activity. Such externality is
found in the tremendous efficacy of export activity as a means of acquiring
industrial competence because of easy access to overseas information and
technical knowledge, and because of the competitive attitude generated by
going into the world market. Whereas the allocative and X-inefficiency
hypothesis has largely been based on the empirical evidence of the poor
development performance in the Latin American economies in the last
decades, the externality hypothesis is based on the empirical evidence
associated with the impresswive performance of the-east Asian economies
during the 1960s and 1970s. Thus so far, the beneficial externality of
export activity has largely gone unnoticed in the literature on trade and
development. But the experiences of Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong
indicate that it is very real (Westphal, Rhee, and Pursell 1981, Westphal
1982). The empirical evidence that tariff and import restriction
redundancies were widespread in Singapore and Korea suggests that efficient
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production had been achieved through exporting before imports (for domestic
sales) were fully liberalized.45 /
Among the various elements that contribute to the externality
associated with export activities, the most important one appears to be the
"vitality" or "dynamism" in institutional mechanisms that embraces private
firms as well as government agencies. There are at least two reasons why
this is so important. First, anyone who observes the activities in the
private as well as the public sectors in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea is
immediately impressed with the vitality that underlies them. The vitality
in these economies appears to be the outcome of competing in the world
market and the additional gains of exporting. Second, in a stagnant and
depressed economy, neither rational incentives nor anything else will be
sufficient to bring about immediate change unless the institutional
mechanisms that generate vitality are in operation. Of course, one could
argue that before a developing economy adopts an outward-oriented strategy,
it must have effective institutional mechanisms to start with. However, it
is precisely in those economies that have not had any effective institu-
tional mechanism that an outward-oriented strategy could make the greatest
contribution to the development of such mechanisms. In such economies,
experience in the world market would be an eye-opener; going into export
markets could become an agent for change. But for this to happen, a strong
political commitment to an outward-looking strategy is mandatory. Without
such commitments, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong would not have developed
45/ See Tan and Hock (1982) for Singapore and the preliminary findings of
the quantitative part of the Korea Study under the World Bank research
project, Export Incentives in Developing Countries.
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the effective institutional mechanisms that have played a catalytic role in
carrying out such a strategy.
If a country is to exploit the externality of export activities,
the neutral status and extended neutral status discussed earlier must be
redefined by taking externality into consideration. In other words,
compensatory export incentives must include an element designed to
compensate for the externality. As indicated above, one might interpret
the tax and financial incentives provided to Singapore exporters as
incentives designed to compensate for the externality of export activities,
in light of free trade and competitive markets in financing, exchange
rates, and primary inputs. In turn, one might argue that the externality
of export activities provides an empirical basis for protection of an
infant export industry (Westphal 1981 and 1982).
In reality, however, it is hard to believe that a concept of
neutrality that incorporates externality would be used by importing
developed countries in determining whether compensatory tax and financial
incentive parameter values granted to developing country exporters exceed
neutral status (i.e., whether subsidies are given). Thus, to minimize any
risk of retaliation, it would be better to give emphasis to putting public
resources into the development of effective institutional mechanisms for
the purpose of exploiting the externality of export activities.
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(c) Implementation of Export Policy
The institutional mechanisms for implementing and maintaining
export incentives are essential for getting those incentives right.
Instrumental to this is developing institutional mechanisms that gather and
disseminate the information needed to implement incentives and the
administrative arrangements for those incentives. A developing economy
must consciously develop institutional mechanisms that are compatible with
the particular conditions of the country.
Two institutional mechanisms have been particularly important in
the Korean export drive: a system of setting export targets and the
practice of holding monthly trade promotion meetings46 /. These two
mechanisms have provided some of the most important information needed to
administer the Korean export drive. Perhaps most important is the
up-to-date information provided on export performance by firm, product, and
market, and on the reasons for discrepancies between targets and perform-
ance (targets are set mostly by firms). Through these meetings the govern-
ment has obtained much solid information about what has been going on in
the world, and the firms have received much solid information about
shifting priorities and new undertakings by the government. But the
government has not only acquired this information, it has acted wisely on
it. The ministries, in concert with the firms, have sought to identify
46/ Chaired by the President of Korea, the monthly trade promotion meetings
are select gatherings of ministers and top bureaucrats; the chief
executives of export associations, the heads of export firms, and
representatives of research and educational institutions.
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problems and opportunities and to determine appropriate actions. These
actions have been characterized by:
(i) Pragmatism. The government has been willing to try any
method that might achieve a desired end.
(ii) Speed. The government has preferred the immediate implemen-
tation of policies that might work to the delayed. implementa-
tion of policies whose effectiveness could only be determined
by protracted study.
(iii) Flexibility. The government has been willing to modify its
policies and programs and to retreat from mistakes, an
essential trait when new policies are speedily implemented.
The export target system and the monthly trade promotion meetings have
helped translate political resolve into bureaucratic resolve and provided
the information needed for bureaucratic action. Without these two
mechanisms, Korea's system of export promotion probably would not have been
so effective, the various conventional export incentives would not have
worked as well as they have, and Korea's export performance would not have
been what it has been (Rhee and Others forthcoming).
Singapore's institutional mechanism for incentive administration
is also characterized by flexibility, both in initiating required changes
and in responding to new problems, and the process of decision-making is
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distinguished by efficiency, pragmatism, and a "top-to-bottom" approach.
The administrative style is to treat policy alternatives as "in-house"
matters to be resolved by an elite. Generally speaking, the institutional
mechanism in Singapore is very much project-oriented; that is, a project is
initiated to deal with some well-defined task. Such projects may be
initiated by a ministry, a department, or a statutory board. Statutory
boards in particular play a crucial role in Singapore. In the process of
implementing public policies, coordination is speedy and very close because
statutory boards are composed of members of both the public and private
sectors, and there are a relatively small number of people in policy-making
positions (Chen 1983).
Even though the Hong Kong economy is a classic example of effi-
ciently functioning competitive market mechanisms, the economic affairs of
the city remain firmly in the hands of a small elite, highly ordered and
predictable in important respects. Interlocking directorates are common
among British-owned firms as well as those owned by Chinese (Hofheinz and
Calder 1982). The interaction between business and government is very
close (see below).
Korea's export target system and monthly trade promotion meetings
have made possible the use of unconventional export incentives as well as
conventional ones. Public exhortations by political leaders about the
importance of exporting and public awards given to exporters who set export
records are examples of the unconventional incentives that have imbued the
export drive with a powerful team spirit and simultaneously unleashed the
- 186 -
natural competitiveness of heads of firms. Another unconventional
incentive is encouraging firms to export in the early stages of production
of goods for sale on the domestic market. Using this method very
selectively, the government was able to spur some big firms into starting
up new lines of export production that might otherwise have languished. By
so doing, the government was able to prevent the inefficiency that so often
plagues infant industries. To manage the informal system of encouraging
exports in the early stages of production, the government needed some
institutional mechanisms to link export sales to domestic production. The
export targets and monthly meetings provided this link. This system has
ensured that the ultimate criteria in deciding whether to provide an infant
industry with protection is its international competitiveness.
(d) Partnership Between Business and Government
In the early stages of export development, it is essential to
have a strong partnership between the government and business in the common
goal of working toward producing internationally competitive products and
competing in the world market. The fact that a synergistic partnership
between business and the government exists, even in Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Korea (which are in mature stages of their export development), is
evidence of the critical importance of such a collective approach. The
monthly trade promotion meetings and export target-setting of Korea have
contributed to the collective efforts of the public and private sectors in
export promotion. While production and trade are handled mostly by private
enterprises in Hong Kong, export and investment promotion efforts are
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considered the collective tasks of the government and private firms in
these economies. Singapore established a new Trade Development Board in-
January 1983 with the objective of accelerating the collective efforts of
the public and private sectors in export promotion. The Singapore Trade
Development Board is similar to the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (or
the combination of the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation and the Korea
Traders Association) in conducting overseas trade promotion activities and
playing the role of catalyst in carrying out export development strategies
in the field. (See Annex III-A for more information on the Singapore Trade
Development Board; Annex III-B for the Hong Kong Trade Development Council;
Annex III-C for the Korea Traders Association; and Annex III-D for the
Korea Trade Promotion Corporation.) The previously mentioned "Look East"
policy of Malaysia may also be an attempt to learn the Japanese approach to
a strong partnership between government and business as well as the
Japanese management system.
(e) Export Promotion Institution
The efforts of Singapore, Hong Kong, and Korea to mobilize both
the government and private firms are reflected in the organizational
structures and revenue sources of the Singapore Trade Development Board,
the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, and the combination of the Korea
Traders Association and the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation. All of
these trade promotion agencies are financed by the net proceeds of an ad
valorem levy on exports and imports. The Singapore Trade Development Board
and the Hong Kong Trade Development Council are composed of representatives
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of major trade associations, leading businessmen, and senior government
officials. The chairman of the Korea Traders Association is usually a
former Deputy Prime Minister, while the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation.
is a quasi-governmental agency.
As one can see from Annex III-C, the activities of the Korea
Traders Association (which has 3,500 member firms) are diverse, ranging
from coordination between the government and business circles in general
economic policy-making as well as export policy administration to trade
missions. The Korea Trade Promotion Corporation played a key role in
overseas marketing by Korean exporters in the early stages of export
development, but the function of KOTRA has gradually been taken over by 10
general trading companies being promoted by the government through special
incentives--except for such activities as overseas exhibition and informa-
tion collection on import restrictions. Korea's policy of using general
trading companies follows Japan's pattern and is an attempt to exploit
economies of scale in overseas marketing and information-gathering.
The functions of the Singapore Trade Development Board and the
Hong Kong Trade Development Council appear to be similar to the functions
of KTA and KOTRA. It is apparent that Singapore established its trade
promotion agency after learning lessons from the activities of the trade
promotion agencies of Hong Kong and Korea47 /. It is highly significant
47/ Intraco Limited of Singapore is a government-owned trading company
whose function is similar to the function of Korea's general trading
companies.
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that Singapore, despite its impressive export performance, established a
new export promotion agency as recently as 1983. This suggests that
institutional development is a continuing process. There is no question
about the potential lessons to be learned by other developing economies
(including the three Asian countries covered in this paper) from the
experiences of the export promotion agencies of Korea, Singapore, and Hong
Kong. Indonesia's National Agency for Export Development (NAFED),
Malaysia's Export Trade Center, and the Philippine International Trading
Corporation are government agencies engaged in export promotion and
overseas marketing activities.
It is important to recognize that the most important function of
an export promotion agency is to play the role of catalyst in carrying out
an outward-oriented strategy. Therefore, its function as a marketing
organization should not be stressed too much. In the early stages of
export development, the marketing agencies of a developing country govern-
ment can play a catalytic role in collecting overseas marketing information
and disseminating it to exporters. As exporting firms mature and a
country's export volume increases, the marketing function can gradually be
taken over by private trading companies and exporters. But the experience
of the developing countries that have succeeded in export development shows
that marketing is not the first priority in export promotion. The is
because foreign buyers will perform many, if not all, of the marketing
tasks. The experience of these countries also shows what is needed to
attract foreign buyers, mainly, the ability to produce internationally
competitive products and the desire to do everything needed to satisfy
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foreign buyers. Therefore, a selective approach to marketing is needed. A
country should initially rely on foreign buyers rather than investing large
sums to set up its own elaborate marketing network, and it should gradually
have its private trading companies and exporters take over the marketing
function as they learn marketing techniques by observing foreign buyers
(Rhee and Others forthcoming). In this regard, some argue that Malaysia's
decision to promote five general trading groups similar to Japan's general
trading companies might have been somewhat early (Asian Business, Sept.
1983).
(f) Organizing the Private Sector
It is hard to believe that the economies and export trade of Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Korea would have reached such impressive levels with-
out the vitality and dynamism of their private sectors. By the same token,
it is difficult to believe that the private sectors would have achieved
such vitality if they had not chosen to compete in international markets.
Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how the private sectors of these
economies could have competed in the world market if they had not organized
themselves, as they have done so impressively.
Take the case of Hong Kong's private sector. One must be able to
understand the intricate roles and inner workings of more than two hundred
industrial and commercial associations and chambers of commerce covering
more that seven thousand member firms if one wants to comprehend the
much-talked-about market-oriented economy of Hong Kong, which is by no
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means a laissez-faire economy. The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
for example, is virtually a small government itself in terms of its diverse
activities.
In the case of Korea, besides the Korea Traders Association,
there are more than thirty specialized exporter associations, such as the
Korean Knitted Goods Exporters Association, the Korea Electronic Products
Exporters Association, and the Korea Footwear Exporters Association. These
associations are private organizations, but they were established under the
government's trade promotion law. Most of these associations, like KTA and
KOTRA, are housed at the World Trade Center in Seoul. Their activities are
similar to those of KTA, but they focus on their special fields.
As in Korea and Hong Kong, Singapore's private sector is well-
organized. The major private sector associations--such as the Singapore
Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Singapore Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
the Indian Chamber of Commerce, the Malay Chamber of Commerce, and the
Singapore Manufacturer's Association--reflect the diverse ethnic
composition of the private sector as well as differences in firm size. The
Singapore International Chamber alone embraces 600 member firms and is
engaged in very diverse activities, from maintaining a close dialogue with
the government on policy matters to endorsing certificates of origin and
other shipping documents for exporters.
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The importance of organizing the private sector for export promo-
tion was also recognized in the Philippines, where the Confederation of
Philippine Exporters (CORE) was established in 1973. In order to assure a
close' link between the government and exporters, government representation
on the board of CORE was authorized in 1975. Fourteen private sectors
(such as agriculture-edible and cottage industries for handicraft products)
are also represented on the CORE council. Indonesia and Malaysia also
appear to realize the need to organize their exporting firms better. The
key to the success of such efforts is how well the government and private
organizations work together to develop the institutional mechanisms that
generate vitality and dynamism in the private sector.
(d) Inducing Foreign Factors
Development experience in recent decades suggests that foreign
sources of production factors and export sales can effectively supplement
the initial endowment of domestic factors and capabilities, while the
domestic capabilities can gradually be improved through deliberate effort.
At the early stage of export development, in particular, the complementa-
rity between domestic and foreign factors is very high, and therefore the
government and the private sector of a developing country must adopt a very
progressive approach to bringing foreign factors into the country.
Direct foreign investments are packages of such foreign factors
as foreign capital, technology, management (entrepreneurship), and
marketing. Thus, if a country needs all these factors, direct foreign
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investments are the most ideal way to induce foreign factors for export
development. In order to induce direct foreign investments, most host
governments place their emphasis on very generous tax incentives. However,
empirical studies show that, in general, foreign investors consider the
most important inducements to be political stability; continuity of the
announced development strategy; favorable terms for the transfer of profits
and repatriation of capital; nondiscrimination against foreign ownership
and control; freedom from detailed and burdensome regulations on organiza-
tion, ownership, and management; protection of their share of a domestic or
export market; and favorable wage rates, workers' efficiency, and infra-
structures (Lim 1980). Therefore, the only justification for offering
special tax incentives to foreign investors would be to compete with neigh-
boring countries. Other things being equal, a country that does not grant
such incentives would be at a disadvantage. In any event, the emphasis
here is on effective institutional mechanisms that attract direct foreign
investments, rather than on tax incentives.
Of course, developing countries must employ selectivity in trying
to induce direct foreign investments. Regarding the importance of selecti-
vity, Carlos Dias-Alezandro (1981) states: "Suitably directed by respon-
sible host-country planning and channelled selectivity, Transnational
Enterprises (TNEs) can contribute to achieving specific development targets
by supplying clearly defined services and expertise .... LDC selectivity
regarding TNEs should become as expected and acceptable in the interna-
tional community as the selectivity industrial countries apply to immigrant
labor." In turn, for an economy that needs only some of the above foreign
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factors to supplement its local factors, unpackaged foreign factors are
sought. In the case of capital, foreign loans are an alternative source.
In the case of labor, expatriates not employed by a multinational company
are an alternative source. In the case of technology, licensing agree-
ments, capital good imports, or imported turn-key plants are an alternative
source. Finally, in the case of marketing, foreign buyers or foreign
trading companies are an alternative source.
Table 8 (mostly based on impressions rather than statistical
analysis, except for Korea) shows the relative importance of domestic and
foreign factors for manufactured export good production or sales activities
in the six East Asian economies. Singapore has relied extensively on
direct foreign investments for its export development, while Korea and Hong
Kong have more or less utilized unpackaged foreign factors. Similarly,
Malaysia and the Philippines have relied more on direct foreign investments
for their export development than Indonesia has.
Singapore's high dependence on multinational companies for its
export development is evidenced by the share of its manufactured exports
accounted for by foreign firms; these are estimated to be around 70 per-
cent, compared to 10 percent for Korea and 15 percent for Hong Kong (Lee
1981). Singapore's heavy reliance on direct foreign investments may have
been dictated by its relative lack of local entrepreneurs compared to Korea
and Hong Kong. Korea's industrial experience before the end of the Second
World War led to the emergence of entrepreneurial and managerial factors
that allowed it to carry out its development strategy without relying on
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foreign entrepreneurs. In the case of Hong Kong, there was an influx of
entrepreneurs from mainland China, although the political leadership was
composed of foreigners. Singapore aggressively encouraged foreign invest-
ments through foreign offices of its Economic Development Board, offering
such additional incentives as concessionary tax arrangements for non-
residents, double taxation relief, no capital gains tax, property tax
relief, and foreign investment guarantees on top of the various tax and
financial incentives described earlier. However, the factors most
responsible for the active and successful participation of multinational
companies in Singapore's development have been political stability and
institutional mechanisms, which are characterized by being efficient,
pragmatic, reasonable, consistent, and predictable. In turn, it is no
small achievement on the part of Singapore to have succeeded in letting the
rest of the world see its future in alliance, not competition, with foreign
multinationals.
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Table 8
RELAIIVE MEO14ANC1E OF DOMESTIC AND FCREIGN FACMTRS FOR
NAN1UFED EXP0RT GOCW PRCD L(ON (R SAIES ALTIVITFS
IN SIX EAST ASIAN E(UIS
Factor Source Hbng Koqg Singapore Korea Malaysia. Indonesia
(a) Capital D x x
F DFI x x x
lown x
(b) Labor D x x x x x
F x
(c) Inter-
n-diate
Input D x x
F x x x x
(d) Technolgy D x
F DFI x x x
Licersirg
or
Capital
Gbod x x
(e) PlrYgemea
and
Entrepren-
aership
Gov. D x x x x x
F x
Private D x x x
F IFI x x x
(f) Marketing
D
F DFI x x x
Buyer or
Trading
Co. x x x
Note: D - domestic factor; F foreign factor; DFI - direct foreiga investent
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Singapore tried to maintain leverage against foreign companies,
especially banks, by financing the bulk of its domestic investments intern-
ally rather than borrowing abroad (unlike Korea, which borrowed heavily).
Also, it sought to maintain its autonomy through the active use of public
corporations and by encouraging joint ventures between foreign firms and
the Singapore government in strategic sectors. In short, the institutional
mechanisms of Singapore can truly be characterized as "Singapore, Inc."
(Hofheinz and Calder 1982).
Developing countries at an early stage of export development have
a lot to learn from Singapore's pragmatic approach to direct foreign
investments, which was well expressed in a lecture ("Extrapolating From the
Singapore Experience") given by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew in 1978: "This develop-
ment would not have been possible if Singapore had not been able to plug
into the world grid of industrial powerhouses in America, Europe, and
Japan. Other developing countries should be encouraged and helped to plug
into this grid. How soon and how effectively they can tap this world grid
depends upon them, upon how realistic and pragmatic their governments are
in their policies, so as to strike a bargain with those who have the
capital, technology, and management, to help produce goods for their own
people, and perhaps also for export in the competitive international
markets" (Lee 1978).
Hong Kong's multinational chemistry, characterized by its unique
status as a free port and international financial center, in combination
with its free market mechanisms, has contributed greatly to inducing
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foreign factors for development. For example, the Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation currently holds assets that are well over twice as
large in amount as the economy's annual GNP. The government does involve
itself in foreign investment promotion activities by providing preferences
in infrastructure and training facilities for the technology intensive
industries and establishing industrial investment promotion offices over-
seas, in addition to offering a low uniform income tax rate. However, the
most important element in inducing foreign factors appears to be an
enlightened administration that gives full play to individual entrepreneur-
ship within a stable and secure environment.
Korea's export-led industrialization has been directed and
controlled largely by nationals. However, foreign resources have made
substantial contributions since the early 1960s. Korea has relied rather
heavily on inflows of investment resources in the form of debt, not
equity. Except for industries established during the colonial period,
technology has been acquired from abroad largely through means other than
direct foreign investments. The purchase of technology through licensing
has been of modest importance. Turkey plant construction has been of much
greater consequence in the transfer of technology, and a tremendous amount
of know-how has entered with Koreans returning from study or work abroad.
Overseas marketing has largely been performed by overseas firms, even
though the acquisition of marketing savvy is well under way, mainly through
Korea's general trading companies. In Korea, unlike in Singapore, an
abundance of entrepreneurial resources in effect have removed a major
advantage of direct foreign investments, the possibility of substituting
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foreign for domestic entrepreneurship. Currently, the Korean government is
promoting direct foreign investments in the area of high technology more
actively than before because of the apparent difficulties in divorcing high
technology from foreign management.
Malaysia's successful inducement of foreign direct investments
into its export industries has been achieved through its policy of promot-
ing FTZs. As we indicated above, the contribution of FTZs to export devel-
opment at the early stage of export development may be very high. In
Malaysia, however, measures may be needed to expand the contribution of
multinational companies to export development beyond the FTZs in order to
ensure efficient backward linkages with local resources. The majority of
companies located in the export processing zones at Bataan are foreign-
owned. The foreign share in total investment approved under the Export
Incentive Act (from December 1970 to December 1974) exceeded 40 percent. A
study based on a sample of Philippine manufacturing firms in 1972 showed
that large-sized firms with foreign management tended to have a higher
degree of export orientation. Some argue, however, whether Philippine
exports based on foreign direct investment have made a maximum contribution
to employment by generating backward linkages and utilizing local primary
factors (Datta-Chaudhuri 1981). In the case of Indonesia, there appears to
be a growing feeling that a more concerted effort to induce foreign
involvement in manufacturing would maximize the contribution of foreign
factors to export development.
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(h) Conclusions
We learn several unconventional lessons in examining institu-
tional mechanisms established in the successful East Asian countries.
First, strong political commitments to outward-looking strategies and
efficient institutions (public and private) and development of well-managed
administrative arrangements were critical for effective implementation of
export policy. Second, specific institutional mechanisms have been key
factors in creation of a synergistic partnership between government and
business that has stimulated vitality in the export community and exploited
the externality of exporting. Third, the private sectors have been
organized effectively and foreign factors absent in domestic economies have
been induced with marked success.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUS IONS
The important lessons from the experiences of the successful
East Asian countries can be summarized under three general headings:
(a) neutral status as the centerpiece of export policy and administration,
(b) export as a first step for rationalization and efficiency, and
(c) institutional mechanisms as a catalyst for implementing export policy
and administration.
(a) Neutral Status as the Centerpiece
The cornerstone of the development strategies of the successful
East Asian countries has been guaranteeing neutral status at the individual
product and firm level for all activities that generate export value
added. This objective has anchored their export development. Neutral
status has been achieved by a combination of the following or equivalent
compensating incentives: (i) flexible and realistic exchange rates,
(ii) free trade in inputs and outputs, (iii) competitive mDney and finan-
cial markets, (iv) competitive primary input markets, and (v) non-discri-
minatory domestic taxes.
Flexible and realistic exchange rates for export activities have
been maintained either through a free market-based foreign exchange regime
(for countries with mature financial markets and institutions) or through a
managed foreign exchange regime employing a crawling peg, supported by
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various compensatory export incentives when an adjustable peg resulted in
exchange rate overvaluation. Free trade status for all activities
(including participation of small and indirect exporters) that generate
export value added has been provided by free trade, free trade zones,
and/or a well-managed duty exemption/drawback system.
Competitive money and financial markets can only be developed
over time. Their absence in early stages of export development has been
compensated for in the short term with automatic and equal access to bank
loans at a neutral interest rate for all activities that generate export
value added. This has been provided by modernized export financing
systems, the major components of which have been undisrupted and speedy
rediscounting by central banks, preshipment export finance guarantee
systems, automatic loan disbursement and liquidation mechanisms tied to
import and export bill negotiations, and domestic L/C systems. Competitive
primary input prices have been assured through government policies that
have attempted to keep primary input markets competitive. Uniform tax rate
systems or compensatory tax incentives designed to achieve neutral status
have been employed to achieve' neutral domestic taxes.
A most impressive fact of export incentive administration in the
successful East Asian countries is the innovative schemes employed, such as
the domestic L/C systems. These were instituted as key components in
providing modernized export financing systems. Such schemes have been
invaluable in establishing neutral status in the absence of competitive
markets.
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During transitional periods (i.e., until the institutions and
administrative arrangements needed to achieve neutral status are developed
and managed efficiently), compensatory tax and financial export incentives
have also been successfully employed, as temporary measures, to achieve
neutral status. In light of threats of retaliation by the developed
countries and the incompleteness of the analytic framework employed by the
developed importing countries to define export subsidies, however, it may
be advisable in the future for developing countries to put more resources
into indirect export incentives that are not controversial, such as
infrastructures, technical assistance, and institutional mechanisms.
Attempts to achieve extended neutral status selectively have been
built on existing neutral status at the individual product and firm level.
In turn, the task of narrowing the gap in effective incentives between
exports and import substitutions has been gradually or within very short
periods accomplished largely by lowering import protection levels and by
implementing relatively uncontroversial export incentives.
(b) Export as a First Step
Policy reforms that have transmitted efficiency throughout the
economies of the successful East Asian countries have been instituted in a
sequence that has been quite productive. Export has been dealt with
first--to provide neutral status and encourage production efficiency by
competing in the world market. Then, gradually, neutral status has been
imposed and efficiency has been transmitted to the entire economy
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(including import substitution industries). Because international
competitiveness is the name of the game for exports, there has not been
much room for inefficient import substitution industries to survive.
Therefore, export policy has led to overall policy reforms, and export
development has led to restructuring throughout the economies.
It clearly appears, then, that entry into export markets has been
a powerful agent for change in the successful East Asian countries.
Several factors appear to be responsible for this successful strategy:
(i) successful exploitation of the tremendous externality associated with
exporting, (ii) a relatively low or negligible level of domestic protection
or a commitment to maintain protection only as a temporary measure for the
sake of infant export industries, and (iii) introduction of efficient
institutional mechanisms--both public and private--that have led firms to
view the domestic and export markets as equally essential to their success,
rather than as distinct entities that offer the choice of competing in
either one market or the other.
(c) Institutional Mechanisms as a Catalyst
An important unconventional lesson to be learned from the
experiences of the successful East Asian countries is that effective
institutional mechanisms--both public and private--have been critical,
acting as catalysts for (i) implementing export policy and administration
and (ii) developing the ability and desire of producers and traders to
respond to opportunities in the world market.
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A strong political commitment to an outward-looking development
strategy has been critical in developing such institutional mechanisms. A
synergistic partnership between business and government has also been a key
factor. The chief function of the export promotion agencies of the
successful East Asian countries has been to play the role of catalyst in
carrying out an outward-looking strategy, rather than to specialize in
overseas marketing promotion. In order to compete effectively in the world
market, the developing East Asian countries have organized their private
sectors well and maximized the contribution of foreign factors.
(d) Implications for Other Developing Countries
The institutional structures, resources, markets, and other
conditions of other developing countries are different from those of the
successful East Asian countries. Therefore, it may hardly be possible to
attempt to duplicate exactly the specific East Asian performance or the
policies and administrative arrangements. But in considering rational
development strategy and policy, there appears to be no other alternative
than to attempt to adopt similarly rational approaches. In pursuing such
approaches, the lessons from the East Asian experience can be extremely
valuable.
The critical role of public and private institutions and of
efficient administrative arrangements in the successful implementation of
rational policies must also be recognized and understood. While it is true
that institutional and administrative capabilities of the developing
countries vary tremendously, this fact actually strengthens the argument
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for the importance of institution-building, because the alternative--when
faced with a lack of institutional capability--would be to abandon
development efforts altogether.
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Table 2
TABLE 2: PcrcentaRe Shares of t.S. Exports by DifEcrent Type of Payments_ Third Quorter, 1975
Cash Basis Deferred Payment Rasti
Total (Less than (I - 4 (5 - 9 (10 years (Unknown)
1 year ) years) years) or more
Co=wodity Group (2) (Z) (% (%) (Z) (Z1 (h)
Total, all commodities 64 36 (49), (6)1/ (6)1' (3)1/ (37)-V
Food and live animals, beverages
and tobacco 68 32 (54) (4) - (4)
Crude materials, inedible,
except fuels 54 46 (50) (15) _ - (25)
Mineral fuels, lubricants &
related products 71 29 (84) - - (7) (16)
Animals and vegetable oils and fats 37 63 (31) (5) _ - (64)
Chemicals 58. 42 (64) (2) - 11
Manufactured goods classified chiefly
by material, except iron and steel
and manufacturing of metals, n.e.c. 66 34 (74) (6) (3) (6) (23)
Iron & steel & manufacturers of metals,
n.e.c. 61 39 (44) - (3) (3) (52)
Power generating miachinery and switch
Sear equipment 63 37 (18) (2) (26) (12) (63)
Metal working machinery 44 56 (D) - (D) (9) (63)
Special industry machinery 59 41 (33) (5) (17) - (45)
Ocher nonelectrical machinery 59 41 (43) (D) (D) (1) (39)
Telecomaiunications apparatus 59 41 (43) (D) (14) (D) (37)
Other electrical machinery, apparatus
and appliances except electric power
generating machinery 60 40 (60) (2) (9) (1) (28)
Railway vehicles 43 57 (D) - (D) (4) (85)
Aircrafts 54 46 (9) (D) (D) (33) (40)
Other transport equipment 80 20 (50) (D) (6) (D) (32)
Mtiscellaneous manufactured articles,
n.e.c. and special transactions,
not classified by kind 71 29 (64) (6) (4) _ (24)
1/ As percent of category total.
- Represents zero
D: Withheld to avoid disclosing information for individual respondents.
Sn2u=: Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Comnaerce Clharacteristics of Financing U.S. Exports:
Thiird 0uarter 1975. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.
TARRE 3
PAT1l CF OWT(S IN POW?M: SHARES OF E BASED) ON DIFFEW
1ED1 OF PA I1S: CAS CF MMREA, 1968-1980.
1qpmiet Variables
T I I zSamof1eq/ X wb H11 l Il dcDip ent Variables CaLtanit Per Capita Bhrt a/ For CapiLa &-rt IrdLtry sport Y Year C/  Ajaus R2 F Watsm Pattern
(1) loge (Z slare of diEt 1/C) 4.492 -0.(XXKX)79 0.300 5.717 1.185 mW ntial,(0.248) (O.OMQ033) 0.30D 5.717 1.185 decreasing
(2) loge (Z share of umaee I/C) 4.419 741.128 0.051 1.592 0.854 Asyptotic,(O.023) (587.354) decresirg
(3) log (X share of D/P) -3.111 O.0fXlO33 0.761 36.104 2.174 bEmntial,(0.417) (0.000M6) ncreaizg
(4) 1oge (X share of D/A) 2.035 
-59715.482 0.881 82.474 0.8555 Ayqptotic,(0.259) (6575.92) lncmlrg
(5) loge (% share of pre-psyamlt) -0.795 0.0010D46 0.177 3.367 2.261 BreP t1Al,(0.187) (0.1ODM025) increasirg
(6) loge (X share of deferred -18.75 0.610 0.694 25.999 1.678 Eiqxnetpaysent) (3.001) (0.120) increaxw
(7) S share of red clae IIC 1.635 3.159 0.206 4.108 1.512 Asaptotic,(0.542) (1.559) d weairg
(8) 2 share of mtaitary 5.869 
-1.756 0.859 73.807 0.8C9 Lfrear
Note: FgiresI the parenthees are standard errors of the etimdates.
a/ In 1,000 v. (1975 prices) equivalent to $2.07 (1975 primw)
b/ S. .T.C.s ( of tle hvq yInstries lued ae: 66, 67, 6S, 69 7, a 86.
c/ 1968 - 1. 196 - 2 ......... , 1980- 13.
I3
TABLE 4: KOREAN DIPORTS BY TYPES OF PAYMENTS AND USERS, 1968-1972
(Unit: $ million)
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
A. For governitIent use 44.6 (5.0) 72.5 (7.5) 40.9 (3.5) 54.8 (4.0) 56.4 (3.7)
1. Sight Draft 37.9 (4.2) 40.7 (4.2) 40.9 (3.5) 48.9 (3.5) 56.1 (3.7)
2. Time Draft 6.7 (0.7) 31.7 (3.3) 0.0 (0.0) 5.9 (0.4) 0.3 (0.0)
B. For Commercial Use
(Domestic Market) 663.6 (74.0) 621.9 (64.3) 764.8 (66.3) 879.2 (63.7) 881.5 (58.3)
1. SighIt Draft 333.9 (37.2) 390.4 (40.4) 405.3 (35.1) 459.6 (33.2) 431.0 (28.5)
2. fime Draft (excluding D/A) 195.2 (21.8) 114.3 (11.8) 158.9 (13.8) 245.6 (17.8) 318.9 (21.1)
(a) Grain 75.2 (8.4) 23.9 (2.5) 26.2 (2.3) 52.2 (3.8) 58.3 (3.9) -S
(b) Fuel 46.6 (5.2) 55.7 (5.8) 81.8 (7.1) 136.8 (9.9) 209.6 (13.9)
(c) UthIers 73.4 (8.2) 34.7 (3.6) 50.9 (4.4) 56.6 (4.1) 51.0 (3.4)
3. D/A 134.5 (15.0) 117.1 (12.1) 200.7 (17.4) 174.0 (12.6) 131.6 (8.7)
C. For Export USe 189.1 (21.1) 272.6 (28.2) 348.8 (30.2) 446.0 (32.3) 573.1 (37.9)
1. Sight Draft 173.6 (19.3) 259.4 (26.8) 318.3 (27.6) 395.0 (28.6) 498.9 (33.0)
2. Time Draft (excludil1g D/A) 9.8 (1.1) 10.1 (1.0) 25.6 (2.2) 42.1 (3.1) 47.2 (3.1)
3. D/A 5.6 (0.6) 3.4 (0.4) 5.0 (0.4) 3.9 (0.6) 26.8 (1.8)
TOTAL IMPORT 897.2 (100.0) 967.0 (100.0) 1154.6 (100.0) 1380.0 (100.0) 1510.9 (100.0)
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentage shares
Suurce: The Banik of Korea
m x
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TALE 5: yiMEAN ]PioKrS BY IYPES OF PAYfNT.S AND USERS, 1975-1980
(Unit: $ million)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
¶lYIii Uk I'AiIlE1'JS
1. Sight Draft 3,027.7 (54.1) 3,308.4 (49.2) 4,853.0 (55.2) 8,797.6 (70.8) 9,975.8 (59.1) 9,053.6 (47.2)
(a) .Sight 1C 2,884.3 (51.6) 3,044.9 (45.3) 4,611.7 (52.5) 8,458.3 (68.0) 9,683.7 (57.4) 7,567.4 (39.5)
(b) DUP 15.6 (0.3) 15.9 (0.2) 29.4 (0.3) 46.3 (0.4) 44.9 (0.3) 52.7 (0.3)(c) Otfiers 127.8 (2.3) 247.5 (3.7) 211.8 (2.4) 293.0 (2.4) 247.1 (1.5) 1,433.5 (7.5)
2. 'Time Draft 2,564.0 (45.9) 3,417.0 (50.8) 3,938.3 (44.8) 3,635.9 (29.2) 6,893.4 (40.9) 10,116.8 (52.8)
(a) UJsance i/C 2,247.9 (40.2) .3,185.4 (47.4) 3,758.2 (42.7) 3,539.6 (28.5) 6,698.8 (39.7) 9,870.6 (51.5)
(including lag-term
deferLed pawent)
(b) D/A 316.1 (5.9) 231.7 (3.4) 180.i (2.0) 9%.2 (0.8) 194.6 (1.2) 246.1 (1.3)
TUrAL JIA{r 5,591.7 (100.0) 6,725.4 (100.0) 8,791.3 (100.0) 12,433.5 (100.0) 16,869.2 (100.0) 19,170.4 (100.0)
TYPE OF USEK
A. IOr GvberuiLJItL Use 289.0 (5.2) 345.6 (5.1) 432.7 (4.9) 676.7 (5.4) 959.5 (5.7) 1,116.5 (5.8)
B. For Gcmxitercial Use
(lWrebtic tIarket) 3,485.3 (b2.3) 3,816.3 (56.8) 5,265.4 (59.9) 7,867.2 (63.3) 11,395.9 (67.6) 13,098.1 (68.3)
C. fIbr ExOit Luse 1,817.7 (32.5) 2,563.6 (38.1) 3,093.2 (35.2) 3,889.6 (31.3) 4,513.8 (26.7) 4,955.7 (25.9)
iute: Fi8irus bi. preLltheses are perceiLtage shares. m >x
Sourcu: Jlh i onlk of Korea.
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Table 6
IH lGNO'S EIANWZ RAMIE R£DCS AND EXWIZ RA4S
Par malue Trade-%eighted
:1 of the HKS Hl per HK per IK per Indlex I/
Date EcwW Rate Regie in gramr of Poad USS SDR 18.12.71 -100
* fine gold
A. Urder Fixed Ehange Rate Regime
Dec. 18, 1946 1Fr parities established
Hog KaE dolar is pegged
to sterlirg 0.2U834 16.00 3.970
Sep. 18, 1949 Hbig KnIg dollar devalued
pari pass with sterling
by 30.5% 0.155517 16.00 5.714
Nov. 20, 1967 Hag Kong dollar devalued
pari passu with sterlirg
by 14.32 0.133300 16.00 6.667
Nov. 23, 1967 Hong Kong dollar revalued
by 1(%, including against
sterling, but uonties
pegged to sterling, at
new rate 0.146631 14.55 6.061
Dec. 18, 1971 As part of the general
rqy realigm-t, Hong
Kbng dollar and sterling
appreciate by 8.57% agairst
US doUar. As a rvesult of
USA teminatirg, in Aug. 71,
the onvertibility of US
dollar into gold, gold par
value on logr has a prac-
tical maning. DF begins
to adopt the SDR as its
accamtin unit. 14.55 5.582 6.061
Jul. 6, 1972 Hong KEx dollar pegged to
US dollar follwirng the
floatirg of sterling 5.650 6.134
Feb. 14, 1973 US dollar devalued: Hong
lKag dollar reains pegged,
at new rate 5.085 6.134
Nov. 26, 1974 Hxa Koxg dollar allo to
float, i.e., the govt. no
logar udertakes to maintain
a particular rate sgainst
ary other arency
B. Utder Floatin hdmre Rate Regim
1974 (end of period) 11.53 4.910 6.012 105.9
1980 (end of period) 12.27 5.130 6.543 88.2
1981 (end of period) 10.88 5.675 6.605 85.9
1982 (end of period) 10.58 6.495 7.165 80.1
1/ The trade-wighted exchan rate index is derived from a wa±hted average dE runal eange rates of
the HXw g doa Ir agsinst the currencis of 15 principal trading partners.
Sa:rce: KxW KVag Gornient, HIg Ion 1983, p.280.
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Table 7
Table 7: SINGAPORE'S EXCHANGE RATE (1963-1980)
Year Singapore Dollar per U.S. Dollar
(As of End of Year)
1963 3.06
1964 3.07
1965 3.06
1966 3.08
1967 3.07
1968 3.08
1969 3.09
1970 3.08
1971 2.90
1972 2.82
1973 2.49
1974 2.31
1975 2.49
1976 2.46
1977 2.34
1978 2.16
1979 2.16
1980 2.09
1981 2.05
1982 2.11
Source: IMF, International Finance Statistics, various issues.
..Table 8: MALAYSIA'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE INDEX (1975 = 100)
OfIFCICL CCPOSITE OF FOEIGN CURRENCIES PER MAIAYSIAN RINCGIT (1970-1979)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
(a) Nominal exchago rate
Index */ 93 93 95 102 105 100 103 102 99 103
(b) CPI b/ 70 71 74 82 96 100 103 108 113 117
(c) Export price index c| 76 71 67 88 115 100 121 142 151 172 d/
(d) Import prlce lndex c/ 51 55 57 67 94 100 102 104 107 112 d/
(a) Price-adjusted exchange
rate Index for export 86 93 105 95 88 100 88 78 74 .70 H
( (a) t l
(f) Price-adjusted exchange
rate Index for import 127 120 123 125 107 100 105 101 105 108
( (a) t
a/ Official composite of foreign currencies per Malaysian Ringgit; increase in index represents
Appreciation of Ringgit. Source: Bank of Negara Malaysia.
b/ DIPF-InternatIonal Financial Statistics, 1970-1980.
cl Department of Statistlcs.
dI Jam-August Average.
Source: Rhee (1980), pp. 3-15.
mC
Go-
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Table 9
KOREA'S OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES, 1960-1983
Effective From Official Exchange Rate
(Won per U.S.Dollar)
January 20, 1960 50.0
February 23, 1960 65.0
January 1, 1961 100.0
February 2, 1961 130.0
May 3, 1964 256.02
December 31, 1964 256.02
December 31, 1965 272.06
December 31. 1966 271.46
November 25, 1967 271.50
December 31, 1968 281.50
November 3, 1969 304.35
December 31, 1969 304.45
December 31, 1970 316.65
June 28, 1971 370.80
December 31, 1971 373.30
December 31, 1972 398.90
December 31, 1973 397.50
December 7, 1974 484.00
December 31, 1974 484.00
December 31, 1975 484.00
December 31, 1976 484.00
December 31, 1977 484.00
December 31, 1978 484.00
December 31, 1979 484.00
January 12, 1980 580.00
December 31, 1981 700.50
December 31, 1982. 748.80
December 31, 1983 795.50
Note: Rates for 1960 and 1961 are "official rates." Rates for 1964, 1965,
and 1966 are "Bank of Korea's selling rate to foreign exchange
banks." Rates since 1967 are "Bank of Korea's standard concentration
rates.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1983 and Bank of
Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, January 1984.
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Table 10
Table 10
KOREA'S OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES, JANUARY 1980-DECEMBER 1983
At the End Of Official Exchange At the End Of Official Exchange
Rate Rate
(Won per U.S.Dollar) (Won per US Dollar)
January 1980 580.00 January 1982 708.30
February 1980 580.70 February 1982 712.00
March 1980 586.10 March 1982 718.30
APril 1980 590.50 April 1982 721.30
May 1980 596.20 May 1982 733.10
June 1980 603.00 June 1982 740.80
July 1980 612.70 July 1982 741.30
August 1980 616.30 August 1982 741.90
September 1980 625.00 September 1982 742.90
October 1980 651.60 October 1982 744.90
November 1980 658.80 November 1982 744.70
December 1980 659.90 December 1982 748.80
January 1981 665.20 January 1983 751.50
February 1981 670.50 February 1983 753.10
March 1981 672.80 March 1983 763.40
April 1981 678.90 April 1983 767.90
May 1981 683.80 May 1983 771.10
June 1981 685.10 June 1983 776.70
July 1981 686.90 July 1983 783.10
August 1981 685.50 August 1983 790.10
September 1981 685.50 September 1983 789.30
October 1981 687.20 October 1983 792.90
November 1981 689.90 November 1983 796.90
December 1981 700.50 December 1983 795.50
Note: Rates are "Bank of Korea's standard concentration rates."
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statiscal Bulletin, various issues.
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TABLE 12 OUTSTANDING BALANCES (AT THE END OF THE YEAR) OF KOREA'S SHORT-TERM
EXPORT LOANS FOR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (UNIT: MILLION WON), 1974-1979
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
a. Loans for generating value-added 76,683 114,111 187,356 .237;,574 340,988 380,516
(VAL)l/ (28.6%) (35.2%) (41.0%) (46.8%) (40.8%) (39.1%)
b. Loans for purchasing domestically. 47,260 118,762 162,452 172,608 288,797 333,193
produced intermediate inputs (DIL) (17.6%) (36.6%) (35.5%) (34.0%) (34.5%) (34.3%)
c. Loans for purchasing foreign 28,589 14,886 31,157 26,913 90,002 104,897
produced intermediate inputs on (10.7%) (4.6%) (6.8%) (5.3%) (10.8%) (10.8%)
actual export order basis (FILA) I
d. Loans for purchasing foreign 112,372 76,812 76,027 70,106 116,901 153,468
produced intermediate inputs on (42.0%) (23.7%) (16.6%) (13.8%) (14.0%) (15.8%)
expected export order basis (FILE)
e. Total short-term export loans for 267,904 324,571 456,992 507,201 836,688 972,074 F
manufacturing industries (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
f. Total annual commodity export2/ 2,158,§19 2,459.212 3,734,112 4,862,485 6,151.951 7,286.839
g. Total short-term export loan 12.4% 13.2% 12.2% 10.4% 13.6% 13.3%
outstanding as % of total annual
export (= ((e)/(f)I x 100)
Source: The Bank of Korea
I' lncludes loan for purchasing domestically produced finished products (DOL).
2 Total annual export of manufactured goods was 87.5% in 1977 and 89.8% in 1978 of total annual commodity
export.
F4X
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Table 13
Table 13
FORMULAS TO COMPUTE THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE LEVEL OF EXPECTED
EXPORT (OR LOCAL SUPPLY) ORDER (FOR THE EXPORT LOAN PURPOSE)
Basic formula for the maximum allowable (k)x preceding (g) months'
level of expected export (or local performance of company's
supply) order a/ exports (or local supply
Normal Values of k and q for
1. Export loan for 2. Export loan for 3. Export loan
purchasing inter- generating value for domes-
mediate inputs on added on an expected tically
an expected export export (local supply) produced
(local supply) (DILE order basis (VALE). finished
and FILE).-/ commodities
on an
expected
export order
basis
(DOLE) c/
k q k q k q
1/4 12 1/6 12 1/4 12
Example: a/ The formula is basically applied at the product-level.
However, the use of the formula at the firm-level must be
allowed for the firms exceeding certain level of exports in
order to reduce the administrative costs.
b/ This formula is applied also for obtaining import license or
opening local L/C for the purchase of intermediate inputs.
c/ This formula is applied also for opening local L/C for the
purchase of domestically produced finished commodities on an
expected export order basis. Past performance refers only
the exports of finished commodities purchased from the other
firms.
Table 14
lbestic IJC Istied D.nlg 1976-78: Korea
DIhestic W/C Issues (ii) (iii)
(i) Correspondirg Domestic 1/C
ETcport WiC Based ?N-xtport W/C Eased Total Damestic l/C vnafactured 
Purdcases Value (Share) Value (Siare) Value (Share) (Share) good exports a/ -)od exports
(billion wn) (Z) (billion wn) (%) (billion Wn) (%) (%) (billion vnr t - (i) + (ii)]
(a) lbimtically produced
interudiate inputs
in the textile industries 1,997.0 (65.4) 1,047.9 (34.6) 3,024.9 (100.0) (31.3) 5,056.3 0.60
(b) Domestically produced
intermedlate inputs
in the otber mamifac-
turing industries 1,787.7 (52.5) 1,594.7 (47.5) 3,402.4 (100.0) (35.2) 7,866.2 0.43
(c) DIbestically produced
intenrEdiate inputs
in all nnlfacturing
lnrdustries 1= (a) + (b)I 3,764.7 (58.6) 2,662.6 (41.4) 6,427.3 (100.0) (66.5) 12,922.6 0.50
(d) Domstically produced
fiiished products 842.36 (15.9) 2,557.3 (84.1) 3,039.7 (100.0) (31.5) 12,922.6 0.24
(e) Processing fee
(su'-contract) 28.78 (15.0) 163.3 (85.0) 192.1 (100.0) (2.0) 12,922.6 0.01
(f) Total
I= (c) + (d) + & 1)1 4,275.86 (44.4) 5,383.2 (55.7) 9,659.1 (100.0) (100.0) 12,922.6 0.75
a! Paynent basis.
Smrce: The Baik of Korea.
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Table 15
TABLE 15- HONGKONG'S INSURED EXPORTS BY PRODUCTS IN 1982
Value of Insured
Products Exports in 1982 %
(Million Hong Kong Dollar)
1. Textiles 1,627 43
2. Toys 427 11
3. Plastic, Metalic and Leather Goods 280 7
4. Cameras and Capital Goods 212 5
5. Flashlights and Household Appliances 114 3
6. Machinery and Transport Equipment 141 4
7. Footwear 153 4
8. Travel Goods 165 4
9. Radios and Electronic Components 213 6
10. Watches and Jewelry 107 3
11. Miscellaneous 378 10
TOTAL 3,817 100
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Table 16
TABLE 16: EXPORTS INSURED BY COMPOSITION OF GOODS IN 1982: SINGAPORE
(Unit: 1,000 Singapore Dollar)
Types of Products 1982 
1. Textile, Clothing, Footwear
and Leather Goods 112,669 6.5
2. Plant, Machinery and Mechanical
Appliances 410,644 20.8
3. Paper Materials and Articles 74,756 3.8
4. Timber and Wood Articles 79,439 4.0
5. Chemicals, Paint and Plastic 244,987 12.4
6. Building Materials 16,890 0.9
7. Metal and Articles 96,024 4.9
8. Foodstuff and Vegetable Products 26,746 1.3
9. Mineral Products 7,486 0.4
10. Services 4,863 0.2
11. Oil Rigs and Allied Constructions 299,314 15.1
12. Other Constructional Works 22,063 1.1
13. Miscellaneous 566,087 28.6
TOTAL 1,976,968 100.0
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Table 17
TABLE 17: EXPORTS INSURED BY TERMS OF PAYMENT IN 1982: SINGAPORE
(Unit: 1,000 Singapore Dollar)
TERMS OF PAYMENT
Secured Terms
Sight Term 175,819
30 Days Term 2,542
90 Days Term 25,847
180 Days Term 36,154
360 to 720 Days Term 814
Sub-Total: 241,176 (12%)
Unsecured Terms
CAD/Sight Term 99,478
30 Days Term 105,083
90 Days Term 279,253
180 Days Term 798,095
360 to 720 Days Term 68,668
Sub-Total: 1,350,577 (68%)
Long-Term Credit
2-10 Years 385,215 (20%)
Overdue Amounts -
TOTAL 1,976,968 (100%/o)
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Table
TABLE 18.
Commitments by Insurance Type: Korea's Export
Credit Insurance
Dec. 31, 1979 Dec. 31, 1980
Amount Amount
($ mil.) (Percent) ($ mil.) (Percent)
Pre-Shipment Insurance 4.2 0.7 0.4 0.1
'o General export insurance 1.8 -
o Export finance insurance 2.4 0.4
Short-Term Post-Shipment
Insurance 34.2 6.4 25.9 3.5
(Export bill insurance)
Long*-Term Post-Shinment
Insurance 60.5 11.3 77.1 10.3
o Medi'um & long-term
credit insurance 60.5 77.1
o Consignment sale
export insurance
Other Insurance 436.6 81.6 642.3 86.1
o Overseas construction
insurance 423.4 124.6
. o Export bond insurance - 506.1
o Overseas investment
insurance 13.2 11.6
Totals 535.4 100.0 745.6 100.0
1/ Converted into U.S. dollar based on the official exchange rate.
Source: The Export Import Bank of 1Rorea, Annual Rert, 1980.
- 225 - ANNEX I
Table 19
TABLE 19-: INTEREST RATES OF KOREA'S SHORT-TERM EXPORT LOANS, GENERAL
BANK LOANS, AND CENTRAL BANK REDISCOUNT RATE FOR EXPORT LOANS
(1970-1982)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Annual Discount
Annual Interest Rate Annual Interest Rate Rate for the
of the Short-T rm of the 7eneral Bank Export Loans by 1/ tA (C)Month/Date/Year Export Loans 1 Loans 2. the Bank of Korea- (B) (A)
(2) (Z) 
- - (2)
06/18/70 6 24 3.5 0.25 0.58
06/28/71 22 " 0.27 "
01/17/72 19 0.32 "
08/03/72 15.5 0.39 "
05/14/73 7 it 0.45 0.50
01/24/74 9 
" 0.58 0.39
04/17/75 7 " " 0.45 0.50
08/02/76 8 17 0.47 0.44
09/01/77 " 16 0.50
10/04/77 " 15i 0.53
06/13/78 9 18.5 4 0.49
01/12/80 15 3/ 24.5 10 0.61 0.67
06/05/80 23.5 " 0.64
09/16/80 " 21.5 0.70
11/08/80 " 19.5 " 0.77
01/14/82 12 15.5 5 0.77 0.4203/29/82 11 13.5 " 0.81 0.45
06/28/82 10 10.0 " 1.00 0.50
1/ The export loan for purchasing imported intermediate inputs (FIL) is not included
here. The annual interest rate applied to the standard loan period.
2/ Commercial bank loan with less than one year maturity. From 08/02/76 refers to theprime rate.
3/ Temporary rate of 12% applied up to 12/31/80.
Source: The Bank of Korea.
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Table 20
TABLE 20: TERMS OF KOREA'S SHORT-TERM EXPORT LOAN FOR IMPORTING
INTERMEDIATE INPUTS, (FIL) 1972-1978
Amount of Loan Annual Loan Interest Rate -
Month/ Actual Export I Expected Export Actual Export Expected Export
Date/ Order Basis I Order Basis Order Basis(FILA) Order Basis(FILE)
Year (FILA) t (FILE) (B.O.K. Discount Rate)(B.O.K. Discount Rate:
I .I. 
03/02/72 350 Won X $ value 0.9 X official 6% (3.5%) ' 9% (6.5%)
of import draft exchange rate X
$ value of import
draft (< 350 Won)
01/24/74 [$ Value of import draft - " ( " ) " (" )
$ import guarantee money]
,X current TTSR (< 350 Won)
11/12/74 " (< 380 Won) 9% ( " ) ' )
12/02/74 " (< 420 Won) 12% C ) 12% ( " )
01/16/75 [$ Value of import draft - 2
$ import guarantee money]-/ (6.5%)
04/17/75 " 6 months
LIBO rate + 2.5%
(6 months
LIBO rate + 0.5%)
07/22/76 0.85 X
01/04/77 " " 6 months
LIBO rate + 2%
(6 months
LIBO rate)
04/20/77 " " " (6 months
LIBO rate + 0.5%)
05/12/77 " 6 months
LIBO rate + 1.5%
08/01/77 ($ value of import draft -
$ import guarantee money] X 3/
current TTSR (< 420 Won)- 8% (3.5%)
10/11/77 [ " 
(I 380 Won) "
01/04/78 I " "
CR 400 Won)
1/ Annual interest rate applied to the standard loan periods.
2/ The short-term export loan for importing intermediate inputs switched from a domestic
curreiey loan to a foreiga currancy loan.
3/ FIL switched from a foreign currency loan to a domestic currency loan.
Source: The Bank of Korea.
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Table 21
Table 21
MINIMUM INTEREST RATES FOR THE REVISED NEW OECD AGREEMENT
ON EXPORT CREDITS AND THEIR ADJUSTMENTS
Maximum repayment terms (years)
Country classification 2 - 5 5 - 8.5 Over 8.5
Oct. 83 July 84 Oct. 83 July 84 Oct. 83 July 84
I. Relative rich a/ 12.15% 13.35% 12.40% 13.607% Not applicable
II. Intermediate b7 10.35% 11.55% 10.70% 11.90% Not applicable
III. Relatively poor c/ 9.50% 10.70% 9.5% 10.70% 9.5% 10.70%
a/ Defined as countries with a 1979 GNP per capita of over $4,000 as shown in the World
Bank Atlas for 1981.
b/ All countries not in the relatively rich or relatively poor category. Countries
moving from Category III to II as from 6 July 1982 benefit from somewhat lower
interest rates until 31 December 1982; maximum maturity of ten years will continue to
be allowed for these countries.
c/ Countries eligible for IDA credits (i.e., the World Bank's concessional funds) and any
others whose income levels would meet the IDA eligibility criterion.
Note: The interest rates were revised with effect from July 15, 1984, based on the
following automatic adjustment guidelines agreed on in October 1983:
(i) The minimum interest rates would be adjusted semi-annually if the weighted
average of the monthly average of interest rates of the SDR currencies differ
by 50 basis points or more from the weighted average for the month of May
1983.
(ii) There would be complementary upward adjustments of 50 basis points in the
interest rates applicable to Category III countries in4 respect of long-term
export credits (i.e., over 5 year repayment periods) and of 65 basis points
for Category II countries over the next 2 or 3 years.
(iii) Where commercial lending rates for a currency fall below the relevant minimum
level, the member countries can provide official support to export credits in
that currency at an interest rate below the minimum level provided that the
interest so charged is 0.2% p.a. above the commercial interest reference
rates.
Source: UNCTAD 1983 and I.B.R.D., World Bank Cofinancing with Export Credits, October 12,
1984, pp. 7-8.
(D-53h)
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ANNEX TT-A
WEIGHTS FOR BASKET CURRENCIES 1/
Balance of Trade Weights
Xk(l+sx)ai - Mk'(l+dm)bi
W i = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Xk(1+sx) - Mk'(l+dm)
Terms-of-Trade Weights
kai - k'bi
Wi =
k -k'
Weights Stabilizing the Relative Price of Traded Goods
zxkai + zmk'bi
Wi = _
zxk + zmk'
where
Wi = weights for the currency of ith country (to be given when
the home country's basket peg is considered) 2/
X,M = export and import quantity of the home country
k = dx/(dx - Sx), an inverse index of export market power
of the home country
dx, sx = price elasticities of export demand and supply in the
home country
ai, bi = Home country's export and import shares from/to country i
k' = Sm'(sm - dm), an inverse index of import market power of
the home country
dm,sm = price elasticities of import demand and supply of the
home country
Zx,zm = weights of exports and imports in total trade in value
terms
1/ For the derivation these weights, see Branson and Katseli (1981).
2/ i = 1,.--,N, where Nth country is the numeraire.
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VALUE OF DUTY TO BE EXEMPTED OR REFUNDED FOR ONE UNIT
OF THE EXPORT COMMODITY
£ci Xjj ti
where
ci = import price (converted into local currency) of input i;
xij = input (i) - output (j) coefficient;
ti = rate of import duty on input i (as fraction of import
values).
Note that above value of duty to be exempted or refunded for one unit
of the export commodity has nothing to do with the price of the
product.
BILL TO BE DISCOUNTED UNDER
THE MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE REDISCOUNTING SCHEME
FRQOIT (12 cm x 21 cm)
Bill No. _ Singapore (Date)
-change for S$ (Amount in f.iguros)
On (Duo Date' Pay to the order of
|LO (_l_un of bank ef - prrinted in Block Lotters)
the sunm of Sinigaporo Dollars _ (Anount in WorCl3)
ril 4, h 2.
_-~ Woi tvalue received in *(axport/Pro-ExportJ Financa
n ao CGoods to bo exportod __(D_scri___ion o
_ Country of destination 
_ 
-
To : (Eanorterts nuno I. ddro U For
* jl - _i__ _ _ _
0 4-).O
Id f
+J- t4' (Dramer's authorisod
o > ' o(Industrial Clasaificationi
* To fill in with "Export" or "Pro-Dxport", whichever is applicable.
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ANMF 11-0
1TE OF PRE-HU*M EXFE IDANS
Amomt of Lioan Mmdnn Maturity
Type of Loan Tlming of Lomn (in local currency) (within 90 days)
1. Lorus for genrat- (a) Actual Ca,firimtion of fl x value 7 days after
ing value ade export necesaary :ided shipment or deli-
(VAL) order intermadiate very of goods.
basis inpt purchases
(VALA) (i.e. opering of
import I/C or
dacestic VC)
(b) Expected fl x k x value of Shippirg date
export certificate of of the exports
order past q mDnthas
basis export (or supply
(VALE) of local inputs)
reoords x average
value added ratio
2. Loans for pur- (a) Loans Presentation of draft For (a) maxdmn
chasing dc er- for purchas- drawn urder local L/C matbrity is 30
tically produced ing doeastic- for payment or accep- days
products ally produced
firiLshd
outputs (DOL)
Ci) Actual f2 x value of 7 days after
export draft drawn under shlpent of goods
order domestic tC
basis
(DMA)
(ii) Expected f2 x value of Shipping date of
export draft drawn under the exports
order duoestic L/C
basis
(DOLE)
(b) Loans for
purchasib
domstically
produ I
intermediate
inputs (DIL)
(i) Actual f3 x value of draft 7 days after
export drawn under shipment of
order domestic TSC goods
basis
(DnA)
(ii) Expected (For new purchase it f3 x value of draft Shipping date
export is necessary to drawn under of the exports
order confirm exports domestic LVC
basis ar±factured by the
(DILE) inputs previo-mly
purchased)
3. Loans for pur- (a) Actual Presertation of f4 x value of 7 days after
chasing foreign export order import bill for isport draft shipent of
produced inter- basis (FIIA) payment/acptance goods
mBdiate inputs or B/L
(b) Expected f4 x value of Shippirg date
export order For new parchase, it import draft of the exports
basis (FIZ) is recessary to
orof ire export
iamifactured by the
inpms previ-sly purchased
Note: fl- f2 , f3 , ard f4 are the loan peroertages which are umally 70-90%.
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-232- Page 1 of 4
Procedures for Export Financing:
The following figure provides an overview of typical procedures
for export under the modernized system. In the typical case of figure 2,
there are three producers -- an exporter, a domestic producer of
intermediate inputs, and a foreign producer of intermediate inputs -- and
their banks. While the exporter purchases the domestically produced
intermediate inputs for export production, the domestic producer of
intermediate inputs imports the earlier-stage intermediate inputs for the
domestic production of later-stage intermediate inputs. The flow chart
shows the sequence of opening export, domestic, and import L/Cs as well as
obtaining and paying off the export loans (VAL, DIL, and FIL). The
following are brief explanations of the steps in figure 2.
(1) A foreign buyer orders goods, and an exporter agrees to fill
orders.
(2) The foreign buyer arranges an L/C (master export L/C) with his
bank.
(3) An exporter receives the master export L/C. Usually the issuing
bank sends the L/C to a bank abroad for delivery to the
beneficiary. In some cases the importer takes the L/C from the
issuing bank and sends it directly to the exporter.
(4) The exporter orders domestically produced intermediate inputs,
and a domestic producer agrees to fill orders.
(5) The exporter arranges a domestic L/C with his bank for the
purchase of domestically produced intermediate inputs.
(6) A domestic producer of intermediate inputs receives the domestic
L/C.
(7) The exporter obtains an export loan for generating value added
(VAL).
(8) The domestic producer of intermediate inputs orders foreign raw
materials and intermediate inputs, and a foreign producer agrees
to fill orders.
An Overview of the Procedures for
Opening Domestic L/C and Financing
Exports with the Short-Term Export Loans
. ~~~Domestic Inter-
Exporter's Bank mediate Input
Producer's Bank
Domestic
.
______ ~~~~~~~~Domestic Producer
Exporter' of Intermediate
. ( ~~~~~~~~Inputs.l
Foreign Foreign Inter- l
Buyer's Foreign Buyer Foreign Producer - mediate Input I
Bank ,of Intermediate Producer'sl
_ _ _ _ -s . ~~~~~~~~~~Inputa Bank.
Foreign M .
s ls. : DExport Loan
Note: Numbers correspond to those of the
steps listed-in the text. 4-z Doetc / 
ANNEX II-F
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(9) The domestic producer of intermediate inputs arranges an L/C
(import L/C) with his bank.
(10) The foreign producer of intermediate inputs recieves the import
L/C.
(11) The domestic producer of intermediate inputs obtains an export
loan for generating value added (VAL).
(12) The foreign producer of intermediate inputs ships the foreign-
made intermediate inputs to the domestic producer of intermediate
inputs.
(13) The foreign producer of intermediate inputs presents the draft
drawn under the import L/C to his bank for payment or acceptance.
(14) The bank of the foreign intermediate-input producer forwards the
draft drawn under the import L/C to the bank of the domestic
producer of intermediate inputs for reimbursement.
(15) The domestic producer of intermediate inputs honors the draft
drawn under the import L/C with an export loan for purchasing
foreign-made intermediate inputs (FIL) obtained from his bank.
(16) The domestic producer of intermediate inputs delivers the
domestically produced intermediate inputs to the exporter.
(17) The domestic producer of intermediate inputs presents the draft
drawn under the domestic L/C to his bank and liquidates the
export loans obtained in (11) and (15).
(18) The bank of the domestic producer of intermediate inputs forwards
the draft under the domestic L/C to the exporter's bank for
reimbursement.
(19) The exporter honors the draft drawn under the domestic L/C with
an export loan for purchasing domestic intermediate inputs (DIL)
obtained from his bank.
(20) The exporter ships the goods to the foreign buyer.
(21) The exporter presents the draft drawn under the master export L/C
to his bank and liquidates te exporrt loans obtained in (7) and
(19).
(22) The exporter's bank forwards the draft drawn under the master
export L/C to the foreign buyer's bank for reimbursement.
(22) The exporter's bank forwards the draft drawn under the master
export L/C to the foreign buyer's bank for reimbursement.
(23) The foreign buyer's bank presents the draft drawn under the
master export L/C to the foreign buyer for reimbursement.
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Note that although the loans for generating value added (VAL) are
handed over directly to the exporter and to the domestic producer of
intermediate inputs for their payments for wages and nontradable goods,
those for intermediate inputs (FIL or DIL) are not. Such loans are used
directly to honor the draft drawn under the import L/C by the domestic
intermediate input producer's bank or the draft drawn under the domestic
L/C by the exporter's bank. The FIL (or DIL) and VAL are paid off directly
with the proceeds of sales (or exports) in the bank, when the domestic
producer of intermediate inputs presents the draft under the domestic L/C
to his bank (or the exporter presents the draft drawn under the master
export L/C to his bank).
The sketch shows that as long as production capacity to produce
exportable commodities is available and export orders are forthcoming, the
producers (whether large or small, whether exporter or local suppliers),
can export or supply local inputs based on the export loans.
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ANNEX III - A
SINGAPORE TRADE DEVELOPMENT BOARD
Establishment
The Trade Development Board of Singapore came into existence on
January 1, 1983, based on the Trade Development Board Act 1982 (No. 29 of
1982). The TDB has absorbed virtually all the functions carried out by the
former Department of Trade, together with the functions of the former
Timber Industry Board. The new TDB is oriented toward helping the private
sector and looks for maximum private sector input.
Organization
The twelve TDB members appointed by the Minister for Trade and
Industry are composed of private sector representatives, Members of
Parliament, and current and former government officials, in order to
achieve maximum public and private interface.
Under the new Board, there are six Committees:
Ci) Administration and Finance Committee;
(ii) Trade Facilitation Advisory Committee, which embraces
the functions of the former Free Trade Zone Committee;
(iii) Timber Advisory Committee, to provide expertise now that
the Timber Industry Board is merged with the TDB;
(iv) Textile and Garment Advisory Committee;
(v) Electronics and Electrical Advisory Committee;
(vi) Printing and Publishing Advisory Committee.
The TDB office structure involves two divisions. They are:
The Trade Development Division, with three departments as
follows:
(i) Market Development, responsible for establishing
overseas trade offices, and all aspects of market
development;
(ii) Information and Services, responsible for participation
and arrangements for trade fairs, etc., commodities,
rubber, coffee, timber and shipping; and
(iii) Trade Relations, responsible for bilateral trade
relations, GSP, GATT, UNCTAD and ASEAN Regional
Cooperation.
The second TDB Division is the Secretariat Division, responsible
for finance, staff recruitment, training and documentation. The Import and
Export Office inherited from the former Department of Trade also comes
under this division.
Functions
Among the activities and services which the TDB aims to provide
are:
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(a) Activities
(i) Trade promotion
(ii) Trade exhibition
(iii) Trade missions
(iv) Negotiations and attending overseas conference relating to trade
(v) Assist in the development/improvement of distribution,
transportation and warehousing
(vi) Overseas representation
(vii) Publications films and other forms of trade information media
(viii) Training - will liaise with SDF for grants
(b) Services
(i) Marketing and overseas liaison
(ii) Computerized information services (by end of 1982)
(iii) Marketing research
(iv) Market development
(v) Setting up more overseas trade offices - presently in service are
offices in Bonn, Jeddah, Los Angeles, New York, Rotterdam, Tokyo
and Beijing
(vi) Appointment of Honorary Trade Representatives
(vii) Library services - providing market and product research reports
(viii) Incentive schemes - trade missions are eligible to claim double
tax deduction or International Home Incentive Scheme
(ix) Documentation services - procedures will be streamlined and
applications can be processed in 2 to 2-1/2 hours time
(c) Group Promotion
(i) Task forces on fact-finding mission for on-the-spot market
surveys to be accentuated towards non-traditional markets (Latin
America, Socialist countries, and Asian countries)
(ii) Trade fair participation - will be on the increase in 1983 and
1984
(iii) Product display, including permanent display on rotation - this
was strongly emphasized as experience showed that the West Asian
market inclines to see first before buying
(iv) Selling missions
(v) In store promotion in foreign markets - enlisting help from
department stores
(vi) Incoming buying missions - organizing this type of mission to
come to Singapore. Requires the help of Chambers of Commerce
and SMA.
Financial Provisions
Part V of the Act lays down that:
(1) The Board may, with the approval of the Minister, make an order
published in the Gazette for the imposition of a levy on the export of such
goods as may be specified in the order.
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(2) Any order made under subsection (1) may provide:
(a) for different rates of levy in respect of the export of
different goods;
(b) for the recovery of the levy by the Board in such manner
and through such channels as may be specified in the
order; and
(c) for the exemption of any person or class of persons from
the payment of the levy.
(3) The levy collected under this section shall be paid to the Board.
(4) The Board shall, in every year, prepare and adopt annual
estimates of income and expenditure of the Board for the ensuing financial
year.
(5) Supplementary estimates of expenditure may be adopted by the
Board.
(6) A copy of all annual and supplementary estimates shall, upon
their adoption by the Board, be sent forthwith to the Minster who may
approve or disallow any item or portion of any item shown in the estimates,
and shall return the estimates as amended by him to the Board, and the
Board shall be bound thereby.
(7) For the purpose of enabling the Board to carry out its functions
under this Act, the Minister may from time to time make grants-in-aid to
the Board of such sums of money as the Minister may determine out of moneys
to be provided by Parliament.
(8) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1):
(a) all costs of works involving capital expenditure,
including the costs of building and equipment; and
(b) such other costs and expenditure as the Minister
considers necessary to improve the services rendered by
the Board shall be defrayed out of moneys provided by
Parliament.
(9) The Board may, from time to time, for the purposes of this Act
raise loans from the Government or, with the consent of the Minister, from
any other source.
The TDB is to be funded initially by a government grant in aid,
and it is therefore not the immediate intention to invoke the power under
Section 11 to impose a levy in respect of the export of goods. This
reliance upon government funds is not intended as a permanent solution to
funding the TDB, and the private sector could well find that the TDB
imposes such a levy in due course, as is the practice with the similar
organization in Hong Kong (The HK TDC).
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ANNEX III - B
HONG KONG TRADE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
Establishment
The Trade Development Council was established in September 1966
under the Hong Kong Trade Development Council Ordinance (Cap. 1114 of the
Laws of Hong Kong) for the purpose of coordinating the trade promotion
activities previously undertaken by various government departments and
trade associations. The statutory functions of the Council are:
(a) to promote, assist and develop Hong Kong overseas trade, with
particular reference to exports; and
(b) to make such recommendations to the Government as it sees fit in
relation to any measures which it considers would achieve an
increase in Hong Kong's trade.
To fulfil these functions, a program of trade promotion projects is planned
each year which provides a comprehensive mix of activities throughout the
world. The program is designed to expand trade with traditional markets to
consolidate market penetration in territories that hold promise of a
profitable trading relationship, and to seek opportunities for developing
new markets and new sources of supply for Hong Kong industries.
Organization
Council's chairman is appointed by the Governor, and the other 16
council members include representatives of major trade associations,
leading businessmen and industrialists, and two senior government
officials.
The Council usually meets once a month to decide on the strategy
and policies of trade promotions on a worldwide scale and to oversee the
operation of its executive. It is assisted by a Program Committee and a
Staff and Finance Committee. The tasks of these Committees are
sufficiently defined by their titles.
Trade Services Department: It is mainly responsible for
preparing and executing the annual trade promotion program of the Council,
with the assistance of the Council's overseas offices and consultants and
the support of various Head Office departments. It also develops and
advises the Council of new promotional opportunities in Hong Kong and
overseas markets.
Overseas Section: In the year 1981/82 it organized over 60
promotional projects, approved by the Council.
Local Section: It has responsibility for the trade enquiry
service, local projects, field activities, incoming missions, and the Tsuen
Wan Office, New Territories.
HEAD OFFICE
Exocutl va Diretrx
Ocputy EAecutlWa Diroctor
i ~~~~~~I I I I .. I 
De.ien Puulilcty Sorvicos Trade Services. Overseas Trade Sereces. Local Resaerch Administration Accounts
;C.r.o Ces"g.', 'Sen.r Manager) (Senof Manager) (Senor Manag.r) (Ctel Cconomrsl) (Sesof Manager) hatLccaaruntanmr
< ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Me.a { est, rn E a ~rui zF~ Iser ,a .lfI 
D-<n L & Adve.(r&n AMOaS Wes5-n Easwm Re&of Trade Frt Irenrcr3g Local Tsuen Wan Research L.Drary Personrel AcmmnSlraIon Couni AC ccoW.r l
-Tur"1g PLbcIalons Pres tim alrcns EuroPe EurUeeJ;pan theWorld Enq-,firs S,cion M,ssors & Projacis Otce Se.retar.al 8Er: Un;rol
Auslraba S Pu.bi Anlatons
Newr Zeclarld
OVERSEAS REPRESENTATIVE OFFICES
uE.cu::oa O,ructor
Deputy Esecutivo Dirrctor
Assislrrtl Director.
S6ni-r Rprp.sar.tnlro. Senior raprosntattiro I
No lrn A.:r;,.ca L3:n A;elu,
F- -t 7I I I II III I I I -
Caa.Yi OWlaS UL. NU.w Tcronio M&Cnro Panama N:rcorA Sicr.e/ Tryk y nsse Fn rarklurl HarnDug Los,". U(lSan Pars S hocirom V.er.a Zurcr
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Publicity Services Department: It acts as the communications arm
of the Council, and is responsible for a wide range of activities which
include the Council's own trade publications and local and overseas
publicity through its press offices located throughout the world. The
department is also responsible for advertising relating to Council's
promotions and services worldwide.
Research Department: It is responsible for meeting the
information needs of the Council's Head Office and overseas offices, as
well as providing trade-related information to the business and trading
community at large.
Design Department: It is responsible for the corporate visual
image of the Council both locally and overseas. Its aim is to create and
sustain an international standard of design and visual presentation
throughout the Council's promotion activities.
Overseas Representative Offices: The Council is represented in
twenty-two overseas cities, viz., Amsterdam, Chicago, Dallas, Frankfurt,
Hamburg, London, Los Angeles, Manchester, Marseilles, Mexico City, Milan,
Nairobi, New York, Osaka, Panama, Paris, Stockholm, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto,
Vienna and Zurich. It also maintains consultants in Athens, Barcelona and
Dubai.
Overseas offices supply trade information to businessmen, handle
trade enquiries, publicize Hong Kong-made products, facilitate contacts
between foreign traders and Hong Kong manufacturers and exporters, and
provide logistical support for special overseas promotional projects. The
offices also inform Hong Kong businessmen about trading conditions and
export opportunities in their market areas. Close contact is maintained
with Head Office. Staff posted overseas make periodic visits to Hong Kong
to bring themselves up-to-date on commercial and industrial developments,
while overseas recruited local staff are given familiarization training in
Hong Kong.
Financing
The Council's three sources of revenue are: (a) a Government
subvention of $1.275 million; (b) the net proceeds of an advalorem levy on
exports and on imports other than foodstuffs; and (c) minor income from
miscellaneous sources such as advertising fees and sales of publications.
The net proceeds of the levy provided 89% of the Council's revenue for
1982.
Activities in 1982
The Council carried out an extensive trade promotion programme in
1982, organizing about 80 major international projects. These included an
economic mission to Europe, covering Austria, Belgium, France and the
Netherlands, and another to Australia and New Zealand. These missions were
aimed at developing trade opportunities by strengthening high-level
contacts with senior government officials and business and industrial
leaders in the host countries.
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In addition to activities in Hong Kong's major trading partner
nations, the council also mounted a number of promotions in less-developed
markets during the year, including a major exhibition of Hong Kong-made
products in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with a view to helping manufacturers
diversify their export markets. Reflecting the growing role of China in
Hong Kong's external trade, members of an official mission of the Council
to China held meetings in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou in late October
and early November to discuss the development of mutually beneficial trade
between Hong Kong and China. Other promotional activities organized in
1982 included promotions of Hong Kong products, particularly garments, with
chain stores in Japan, and participation in many international trade fairs
around the world - notably the Nuremburg International Toy Fair, the
American Toy Fair in New York, the Swiss Industries Fair in Basle, MACEF
International Fair in Milan, Birmingham International Spring Fair,
Frankfurt Spring Fair, Summer Consumer Electronics Show and National
Hardware Show in Chicago, Winter Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas,
Tokyo International Toy Fair, and Cairo International Fair.
In addition, the Trade Development Council organized business
group visits to Europe, North and South America, the Middle East, Africa,
Japan and Australia both to explore new markets and consolidate existing
trade ties. Similar groups from overseas regularly visit Hong Kong, and in
1982 the Council received inward missions from Panama, Britain, France,
Germany, China, Japan, Mexico, Austria, Sweden and the USA.
The Council organised the eighth Hong Kong Toy and Gift Fair and
acted as advisor to the Hong Kong Electronics Fair and to the first Hong
Kong Watch and Clock Exhibition. All three were held in Hong Kong in
October.
The Trade Development Council produces four regular publications,
mainly for circulation overseas. They are the monthly Hong Kong
Enterprise, the half-yearly Hong Kong Apparel, the annual Hong Kong Toys
and the two-monthly news magazine Hong Kong Trader. It also puts out
several newsletters in various languages to keep overseas businessmen
informed of the latest financial and industrial developments in Hong Kong.
In 1982, the Council expanded and upgraded its international
network with the opening of a new office in Mexico City and a move to
larger premises in Sydney. Besides its headquarters in Hong Kong, and a
local branch in Tsuen Wan, the Council has staff in 22 cities, and
consultants in three cities, throughout the world.
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ANNEX III - C
KOREA TRADERS ASSOCIATION
History
The Korean Traders Association was established on July 31, 1946
as a nonprofit, private economic organization. Starting with little more
than 100 members, KTA has kept pace with the growth of Korea's foreign
trade, and now embraces over 3,500 member firms, comprising all licensed
exporters and importers in Korea.
Functions
1. Trade Promotion and Membership Service
(a) Recommendations to the Government: One of the important
functions of KTA is to play the role of a bridge between business
circles and the government. KTA, therefore, frequently organizes
meetings of member companies to uncover their problems. It then
makes appropriate recommendations to the government to help find
a solution to their problems.
(b) Trade Law File: KTA collects information on domestic and
international trade-related laws and distributes information to
member firms and companies. Latest changes in such laws and
regulations are made public in appropriate KTA publications. It
also maintains a file system on trade laws so that its members
may have immediate access to the latest changes in trade laws and
regulations.
(c) Consultation: KTA operates a trade counseling office to help
members solve their trade problems. Counseling services cover
trade transactions, tariffs, foreign exchange, financing, and
taxes. KTA also organizes group meetings on occasion to keep
members informed of relevant changes in the corporate and market
environments. I
(d) Government-delegated Functions: On behalf of the government, KTA
is empowered to issue trade-related certificates, trade
performance certificates, and recommends the use of VIP room at
Kimpo Airport by influential persons from abroad and the customs
clearance of foreign commodity samples.
(e) KOSTPRO: The Korean Committee for Simplification of
International Trade Procedures (KOSTPRO) was established and
operated by KTA to help reduce manpower and incident expenses
required by trading circles, through the simplification and
standardization of export and import paper forms.
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(f) Training and Education: In order to ensure the improvement of
Korean merchandise, both in productivity and quality, KTA
provides to its member firms and companies study tours and
practical training programs both at home and abroad for guidance
workers on productivity.
KTA also provides educational programs for practical trading
business, business English, international marketing, and
practical tax affairs. It also provides language training for
staff of trading firms to be sent abroad under a contract with
the Hankook University of Foreign Studies.
2. International Cooperation
(a) Trade Missions: KTA forms private-level trade missions
comprising directors and staff of its member firms and companies;
and it sends them abroad to explore new export markets and expand
existing ones.
It also provides its assistance in business talks by
visiting trade missions from abroad with its member firms and
also in their courtesy calls at the government departments
concerned. KTA also provides conveniences such as a guide to
industrial facilities for them, contributing greatly to bilateral
economic cooperat-4on and to boosting trade.
(b) Bilateral Economic Councils: KTA promotes mutually beneficial
trade relations between trade partners by sponsoring bilateral
economic cooperation groups. KTA operates the following
cooperative councils:
o The Korea-Philippines Economic Cooperation Council.
O The Korea-Venezuela Economic Cooperation Council.
O The Committee for Balanced Expansion of Korea-Japan Trade.
In addition, KTA advises a number of other groups on
bilateral economic cooperation activities.
In 1972, KTA joined the WTCA; and in 1976, it hosted the
WTCA's General Assembly in Seoul.
(c) Korean Shippers Council: The Korean Shippers Council was formed
by KTA in 1977 to protect the rights and interests of Korean
shippers. The organization engages in tariff negotiations with
international freight conferences and domestic carriers, makes
recommendations to the government, assists members with shipping
problems, and makes other activities related to cargo
transportation.
(d) Overseas Publicity and Inquiry Service: KTA runs advertisements
in leading mass media of the world in order to promote exports of
Korean-made goods and expand Korea's overseas markets. KTA also
distributes promotional publications such as "the Korea Export"
and "the Korean Trade Directory" to buyers abroad.
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KTA handles more than 10,000 trade inquiries from abroad
annually, successfully leading to trade contacts and business
arrangements.
(e) Diplomatic Activities at Private Level: KTA develops its
diplomatic activities to promote economic cooperation at private
levels. To this end, KTA invites Korean overseas mission chiefs,
foreign diplomatic mission chiefs and economic officers in Korea
to roundtable meetings, to provide opportunities for discussing
ways and means to promote bilateral trade.
3. Research and Survey
(a) Research Reports: KTA prepares the following periodical research
reports:
o Export industry trends
o Analysis of the latest economic trends
o Trade indices and trends in trade conditions
o Analysis of the beneficial effects of exports
on Korean industry
o Analysis of export and import structures
o Major indicators of the Korean economy
(b) Seminars and Symposia: KTA frequently holds seminars and
symposia for trade promotion, which are attended by civil
leaders, journalists, and members of trade information networks.
Prominent personalities are invited to participate in these
seminars and symposiums. The results of these discussions are
forwarded to appropriate government offices for consideration in
the formulation of trade policies.
(c) Relations with Foreign Research Institutes: KTA has established
cooperative arrangements with the prominent research institutes
and been engaged in the exchange of necessary economic data.
(d) Trade Library: KTA maintains a trade library, the only one of
its kind in Korea.
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4. Publication
(a) Trade Newsletters: English and Korean trade newsletters are
published by KTA for domestic distribution. The English version
entitled the "Daily Korean Trade News," is published once a day,
while the Korean version is published twice a day.
In order to supply trade information to branches of KTA
member firms and companies in Europe and Southeast Asia, KTA
publishes and distributes biweekly trade newsletters in
Dusseldorf and Hong Kong.
For the publication of those trade newsletters, KTA has
correspondents assigned to Tokyo, New York, Dusseldorf, and Hong
Kong.
(b) Publications: KTA publishes the following periodicals for the
speedy dissemination of economic information:
o Monthly International Trade
o Korean Trade Yearbook
o Domestic and Foreign Economic Trends
o Korean Trade Directory (in English)
o Laws and Regulations Relating to Trade (in Korean
and English)
o Introduction to Export-Import Procedures
o Monthly Trade Statistics
o Trade Business Guide
o Korea Export
o Quarterly Shippers
(c) Data Processing by EDPS: KTA operates an EDPS to analyze and
process various trade-related data and statistics. It supplies
the processed information to the government and member firms for
use in formulating trade policies and for their conduct of trade
business.
(i) Principal statistical data
Export-import statistics
(ii) Research and analysis
o Trade indices
o Research and analysis of trends in export industries
o Survey and analysis of the status of exporters and
importers
o Preparation of world trade matrix
(iii) On-line inquiry system
KTA "On-line Inquiry System" provides information on imports
and exports, international economic trends, and imports and
exports of OECD countries.
(iv) Export Administrative Management and On-Line Network
For efficiency in export-import related control service, such
as the allotment of quotas, KTA has established its on-line
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network with related export associations. Under this network,
the computerization of export quota service and export-import
administrative affairs is now under way.
(d) Telex Service: The KTA telex service is offered to member firms
and companies in Seoul and in Pusan without their own telex
facilities.
5. Branches
(a) Overseas Branches: Activities of the overseas branches in Tokyo,
New York, Hong Kong and Dusseldorf are to explore international
markets for Korean products and to collect information on local
trading procedures and market trends.
Branches conduct researches and surveys of current
international economic problems and also sponsor seminars and
meetings in order to exchange ideas on problems arising from the
rapidly changing economic environment.
They provide various facilities to support the overseas
activities of member firms and companies. Not only that, the
branches also provide their support in their commercial
transaction activities through assistance in transactions.
KTA branches also provide various information on Korea and
business in Korea, thereby serving as a dependable channel for
foreign businessmen interested in commercial trade with Korea.
(b) Domestic Branches: Domestic branches are located in Pusan,
Taegu, and Chonju. The functions and activities of the domestic
branches are to encourage exports of local products, to acquire
information concerning provincial export industry zones, and to
do research on special industries of the provinces.
The branches sponsor other trade-related activities
including meetings, seminars and the collection of trade
information; and generally help the local business communities.
(c) Trade Centers: In March 1973, KTA completed construction of
22-story World Trade Center Korea building, the home base of all
Korean traders. Similar-size office buildings were also
purchased by KTA in New York in 1974 and in Hong Kong in 1970 to
serve as bridgeheads for development of the all-important U.S.
and Southeast Asian markets.
In January 1972, KTA became a member of the World Trade
Centers Association (WTCA) and in 1976 hosted the WTCA general
assembly in Seoul.
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6. KTA-Related Organizations
(a) Korea Trading International, Inc.: KOTI is a general trading
house which handles a great variety of commodities ranging from
light industry products to heavy-chemical industry items.
(b) The Korea Exhibition Center: The largest facility of its kind in
the Orient, KOEX was opened in 1978 to stimulate international
trade by providing spacious, ultramodern facilities for
international display, trade fairs, and exhibitions.
(c) Korean Commercial Arbitration Board: K-CAB helps settle
international trade disputes involving Korean merchants.
(d) Korea-U.S. Economic Council: KUSEC was established as a
non-government organization to promote trade and technological
cooperation between Korea and the United States.
(e) The Korea Herald Inc.: One of the two English language daily
newspapers in Korea, the Korea Herald presents Korea's political,
economic, social, and cultural news to the international
community. It boasts an extensive circulation overseas.
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ANNEX III - D
THE KOREA TRADE PROMOTION CORPORATION
Establishment
The Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) was established in
1962 as the non-profit trade promotion organization of the Korean
Government. Through its worldwide network of Korea Trade Centers, KOTRA
offers, free of charge, a wide range of services to both overseas and
Korean businessmen. With its 21-year experience in trade promotion, KOTRA
assists foreigners to do business with Korea in such diverse fields as
trade investment and international tender bidding as well as turnkey plant
exports.
1. Trade Promotion Activities
The Trade Promotion Department, consisting of the General
Marketing Division and the First, Second, Third and Fourth divisions,
provides various services including:
° Conveying inquiries from abroad to Korean Businessmen
o Introducing reliable Korean exporters to foreign
importers while on business tours in Korea
The various divisions and their areas of responsibility are as
follows:
o General Marketing Division: General business information
o First Division: Steel, metal, agricultural products,
footwear, sporting goods, furniture, musical instruments
o Second Division: Electric & electronic products,
machinery, stationery, handicraft goods
o Third Division: Forestry & marine products, textiles,
medical instruments, toys and dolls
o Fourth Division: Chemical & mineral products, personal
accessories, optical equipment, wallpaper and other
miscellaneous products
2. Overseas Project Development Activities
The Overseas Project Development Department, comprising five
divisions - Market Development Division, Commodity Development Division,
Overseas Cooperation Division, Counter Trade Division and Special Marketing
Service Division - undertakes the following tasks:
o Promoting the export of Korean heavy and chemical
industry products through establishing Korean Permanent
Exhibition Centers abroad
o Compiling international tender and plants projects
information for prospective Korean bidders
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Assisting the activities of trade missions from abroad
and promoting joint ventures and technical ties between
foreign and Korean firms
Dealing with import and export transactions involving
counter trade and answering inquiries about imports to
Korea
o Promoting trade with those countries which have centrally
planned economies through handling inquiries,
participating in trade fairs and exhibitions, and
arranging exchanges of visits by businessmen
o Providing guidance to improve the quality of export
products and develop new products
o Holding exhibitions for purchasing parts in Korea in
cooperation with major foreign companies to enable these
companies to contact Korean suppliers
3. Overseas Exhibition Activities
The Exhibition Department consists of the Exhibition Planning
Division, the Overseas Exhibition Division, the Domestic Exhibition
Division, and the Special Exhibition Division - all dedicated to promoting
Korea's trade with foreign countries by carrying out the following
activities:
o Holding special international exhibition in Korea and
making arrangements for foreign and domestic firms to
participate in such exhibitions
o Sponsoring domestic exhibitions held by foreign
organizations
o Holding domestic exhibitions in conjunction with foreign
organizations
o Making arrangements for Korean firms to participate in
international trade fairs overseas and organizing Korean
product exhibitions abroad
o Holding the Seoul International Trade Fair
° Sponsoring Korean participation in world's fairs
4. Domestic Exhibition Activities
The Exhibition Center Management Department consists of four
divisions: The First Division, the Second Division, Design Division and
Maintenance Division. Its main tasks are the following:
o Maintaining a permanent display of representative
products of Korea
o Organizing domestic and international exhibitions to
promote trade
° Seeking mutual cooperation and information exchanges with
foreign exhibition centers and international exhibition
organizations
o Providing exhibition facilities to foreign and domestic
exhibition participants
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5. Overseas Market Research Activities
The Overseas Market Research Department, which consists of the
International Economic Affairs Division, the Asia Division, the Africa &
Middle East Division, the Europe Division, the Americas Division and the
Commodity Research Division, handles the following tasks:
° Studying measures to promote trade with foreign countries
o Researching trade policies, trade-related laws and
regulations of foreign governments and international
economic organizations
o Reviewing of international economic and trade trends
o Collecting overseas market information for major Korean
export items and providing it to domestic firms
° Analyzing and evaluating commodity information to assist
domestic firms' export efforts
6. Trade Information Service
The EDPS & Information Department consists of the EDP Planning
Division, the EDP Development Division, the EDP Operation Division, and the
Trade Library. Its main services are:
o Developing and planning trade information control
o Setting up and implementing plans for computerization of
trade information
o Analyzing and designing programs for development of the
EDP system
o Operating the trade library.
7. Public Information Activities
The Public Information & Publications Department consists of the
Public Relations Division, the Publications Division and the Photography
Division with the following functions:
o Distributing press releases and placing advertisements in
leading domestic and foreign publications
o Conducting briefings on Korean industry and KOTRA's
activities for visitors
o Producing films, slides and video tapes related to trade
promotion
o Publishing for overseas distribution the bi-monthly
"Korea Trade" (a catalogue of Korean products), the
monthly "Korea Trade and Business" and various additional
publications in English and other languages
° Publishing in the Korean language: "The Daily Overseas
Market News" and the quarterly "The Trade Promotion" to
provide overseas market information to Korean exporters
and importers
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8. KOTRA's Domestic Network
KOTRA's domestic branches conduct surveys of their regional
industries, supply information about overseas markets, deal with trade
inquiries, and hold exhibitions displaying various articles obtained
through the overseas network.
9. Korea Trade Centers
The 86 Korea Trade Centers in major cities around the world
introduce interested Korean manufacturers and exporters to foreign
importers, and provide the latest information about Korean industries.
Information regarding the Korean market and Korean importers is also
provided by KOTRA and its branch offices abroad.
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